Why are people liberal? : a motivated social cognition perspective

The present dissertation examined why people adopt or endorse certain political ideologies (i.e., liberal or conservative). According to a motivated social cognition perspective (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a; Kruglanslsocial-cognitive needs (Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, Need for Change, and Avoidance of Decisional Commitment) would be associated with liberalism. Moreover, research suggests that the relations between the needs and liberalism might be moderated by political sophistication (e.g., Converse, 1964). University students (Study 1; n == 201) and community adults (Study 2; n == 197) completed questionnaires assessing political liberalism, political sophistication, and individual differences 're~ective of the four proposed needs. As predicted, correlation and hierarchical regression analyses in both Studies 1 and 2 indicated that political liberalism was related to Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, and Need for Change. 11 Avoidance of Decisional Commitment uniquely predicted political liberalism in Study 2; however, contrary to predictions, it was unrelated to political liberalism in Study 1. Furthermore, some of these relations were moderated by political sophistication, such that among individuals with a greater knowledge of politics, the relation between certain needs and liberalism was positive. To explore the role of situationally induced needs on political liberalism, each of the four proposed needs were manipulated in Study 3. Participants (n == 120) completed one of five scrambled-sentence tasks (one for each need condition and control condition), measures of explicit and implicit political liberalism, political sophistication, and state and trait measures indicative of the four proposed needs. The ~anipulation did not successfully prime participants with the needs. Therefore, a replication of the analyses from Studies 1 and 2 was conducted on the dispositional needs. Results showed that Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, and Need for Change were linked with greater explicit and implicit political liberalism. Study 4 examined the effect of manipulated Need for Inclusiveness on participants' endorsement ofpolitical liberalism, independent of conservatism. Participants (n == 43) were randomly assigned to a Need for Inclusiveness or control condition, and completed separate measures of political liberalism and conservatism, and political sophistication. Participants in the Need for Inclusiveness condition reported greater liberalism than those in a control condition; this effect was not moderated by political sophistication. Generally, the findings from this dissertation suggest that there might be other needs underlying political ideology, especially political liberalism. Thus, consistent with others' (Jost, Glaser et aI., 2003a), individuals might adopt political liberalism as a way of gratifying certain psychological needs. Implications and future research are discussed.

An Investigation of the Role of Attention in the Cross-Race Effect: An Ecological Approach

The current set of studies was conducted to examine the cross-race effect (CRE), a phenomenon commonly found in the face perception literature. The CRE is evident when participants display better own-race face recognition accuracy than other-race recognition accuracy (e.g. Ackerman et al., 2006). Typically the cross-race effect is attributed to perceptual expertise, (i.e., other-race faces are processed less holistically; Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung & Caldara, 2006), and the social cognitive model (i.e., other-race faces are processed at the categorical level by virtue of being an out-group member; Hugenberg, Young, Bernstein, & Sacco, 2010). These effects may be mediated by differential attention. I investigated whether other-race faces are disregarded and, consequently, not remembered as accurately as own-race (in-group) faces. In Experiment 1, I examined how the magnitude of the CRE differed when participants learned individual faces sequentially versus when they learned multiple faces simultaneously in arrays comprising faces and objects. I also examined how the CRE differed when participants recognized individual faces presented sequentially versus in arrays of eight faces. Participants’ recognition accuracy was better for own-race faces than other-race faces regardless of familiarization method. However, the difference between own- and other-race accuracy was larger when faces were familiarized sequentially in comparison to familiarization with arrays. Participants’ response patterns during testing differed depending on the combination of familiarization and testing method. Participants had more false alarms for other-race faces than own-race faces if they learned faces sequentially (regardless of testing strategy); if participants learned faces in arrays, they had more false alarms for other-race faces than own-races faces if ii i they were tested with sequentially presented faces. These results are consistent with the perceptual expertise model in that participants were better able to use the full two seconds in the sequential task for own-race faces, but not for other-race faces. The purpose of Experiment 2 was to examine participants’ attentional allocation in complex scenes. Participants were shown scenes comprising people in real places, but the head stimuli used in Experiment 1 were superimposed onto the bodies in each scene. Using a Tobii eyetracker, participants’ looking time for both own- and other-race faces was evaluated to determine whether participants looked longer at own-race faces and whether individual differences in looking time correlated with individual differences in recognition accuracy. The results of this experiment demonstrated that although own-race faces were preferentially attended to in comparison to other-race faces, individual differences in looking time biases towards own-race faces did not correlate with individual differences in own-race recognition advantages. These results are also consistent with perceptual expertise, as it seems that the role of attentional biases towards own-race faces is independent of the cognitive processing that occurs for own-race faces. All together, these results have implications for face perception tasks that are performed in the lab, how accurate people may be when remembering faces in the real world, and the accuracy and patterns of errors in eyewitness testimony.

Predictors of academic achievement and social competence in adolescence : facilitation, inhibition and general cognitive processing /

The relevance of attentional measures to cognitive and social adaptive behaviour was examined in an adolescent sample. Unlike previous research, the influence of both inhibitory and facilitory aspects of attention were studied. In addition, contributions made by these attentional processes were compared with traditional psychometric measures of cognitive functioning. Data were gathered from 36 grade 10 and 1 1 high school students (20 male and 16 female students) with a variety of learning and attentional difficulties. Data collection was conducted in the course of two testing sessions. In the first session, students completed questionnaires regarding their medical history, and everyday behaviours (the Brock Adaptive Functioning Questionnaire), along with non-verbal problem solving tasks and motor speed tasks. In the second session, students performed working memory measures and computer-administered tasks assessing inhibitory and facilitory aspects of attention. Grades and teacher-rated measures of cognitive and social impulsivity were also gathered. Results indicate that attentional control has both cognitive and social/emotional implications. Performance on negative priming and facilitation trials from the Flanker task predicted grades in core courses, social functioning measures, and cognitive and social impulsivity ratings. However, beneficial effects for academic and social functioning associated with inhibition were less prevalent in those demonstrating a greater ability to respond to facilitory cues. There was also some evidence that high levels of facilitation were less beneficial to academic performance, and female students were more likely to exceed optimal levels of facilitory processing. Furthermore, lower negative priming was ''S'K 'i\':y-: -'*' - r " j«v ; ''*.' iij^y Inhibition, Facilitation and Social Competence 3 associated with classroom-rated distraction and hyperactivity, but the relationship between inhibition and social aspects of impulsivity was stronger for adolescents with learning or reading problems, and the relationship between inhibition and cognitive impulsivity was stronger for male students. In most cases, attentional measures were predictive of performance outcomes independent of traditional psychometric measures of cognitive functioning. >,, These findings provide support for neuropsychological models linking inhibition to control of interference and arousal, and emphasize the fundamental role of attention in everyday adolescent activities. The findings also warrant further investigation into the ways which inhibitory and facilitory attentional processes interact, and the contextdependent nature of attentional control.associated with classroom-rated distraction and hyperactivity, but the relationship between inhibition and social aspects of impulsivity was stronger for adolescents with learning or reading problems, and the relationship between inhibition and cognitive impulsivity was stronger for male students. In most cases, attentional measures were predictive of performance outcomes independent of traditional psychometric measures of cognitive functioning. >,, These findings provide support for neuropsychological models linking inhibition to control of interference and arousal, and emphasize the fundamental role of attention in everyday adolescent activities. The findings also warrant further investigation into the ways which inhibitory and facilitory attentional processes interact, and the contextdependent nature of attentional control.

A social-cognitive model of monitoring and its relationship to behaviour in a naturalistic observation : development and individual differences

years 8 months) and 24 older (M == 7 years 4 months) children. A Monitoring Process Model (MPM) was developed and tested in order to ascertain at which component process ofthe MPM age differences would emerge. The MPM had four components: (1) assessment; (2) evaluation; (3) planning; and (4) behavioural control. The MPM was assessed directly using a referential communication task in which the children were asked to make a series of five Lego buildings (a baseline condition and one building for each MPM component). Children listened to instructions from one experimenter while a second experimenter in the room (a confederate) intetjected varying levels ofverbal feedback in order to assist the children and control the component ofthe MPM. This design allowed us to determine at which "stage" ofprocessing children would most likely have difficulty monitoring themselves in this social-cognitive task. Developmental differences were obselVed for the evaluation, planning and behavioural control components suggesting that older children were able to be more successful with the more explicit metacomponents. Interestingly, however, there was no age difference in terms ofLego task success in the baseline condition suggesting that without the intelVention ofthe confederate younger children monitored the task about as well as older children. This pattern ofresults indicates that the younger children were disrupted by the feedback rather than helped. On the other hand, the older children were able to incorporate the feedback offered by the confederate into a plan ofaction. Another aim ofthis study was to assess similar processing components to those investigated by the MPM Lego task in a more naturalistic observation. Together the use ofthe Lego Task ( a social cognitive task) and the naturalistic social interaction allowed for the appraisal of cross-domain continuities and discontinuities in monitoring behaviours. In this vein, analyses were undertaken in order to ascertain whether or not successful performance in the MPM Lego Task would predict cross-domain competence in the more naturalistic social interchange. Indeed, success in the two latter components ofthe MPM (planning and behavioural control) was related to overall competence in the naturalistic task. However, this cross-domain prediction was not evident for all levels ofthe naturalistic interchange suggesting that the nature ofthe feedback a child receives is an important determinant ofresponse competency. Individual difference measures reflecting the children's general cognitive capacity (Working Memory and Digit Span) and verbal ability (vocabulary) were also taken in an effort to account for more variance in the prediction oftask success. However, these individual difference measures did not serve to enhance the prediction oftask performance in either the Lego Task or the naturalistic task. Similarly, parental responses to questionnaires pertaining to their child's temperament and social experience also failed to increase prediction oftask performance. On-line measures ofthe children's engagement, positive affect and anxiety also failed to predict competence ratings.

The relation of attentional, emotional, and social regulation to cognitive competence, from infancy to school entry

Recent research on the sources of cognitive competence in infancy and early childhood has highlighted the role of social and emotional factors (for example, Lewis, 1993b). Exploring the roots of competence requires a longitudinal and multivariate approach. To deal with the resulting complexity, potentially integrative theoretical constructs are required. One logical candidate is self-regulation. Three key developmental questions were the focus of this investigation. 1) Does infant self-regulation (attentional, emotional, and social) predict preschool cognitive competence? 2) Does infant self-regulation predict preschool self-regulation? 3) Does preschool self-regulation predict concurrent preschool cognitive competence? One hundred preschoolers (46 females, 54 males; mean age = 5 years, 11 months) who had participated at 9- and/ or 12-months of age in an object permanence task were recruited to participate in this longitudinal investigation. Each subject completed four scales of the WPPSI-R and two social cognitive tasks. Parents completed questionnaires about their preschoolers' regulatory behaviours (Achenbach's Child Behavior Checklist [1991] and selected items from Eisenberg et ale [1993] and Derryberry & Rothbart [1988]). Separate behavioural coding systems were developed to capture regulatory capabilities in infancy (from the object permanence task) and preschool (from the WPPSIR Block Design). Overall, correlational and multiple regression results offered strong affirmative answers to the three key questions (R's = .30 to .38), using the behavioural observations of self-regulation. Behavioural regulation at preschool substantially predicted parental reports of regulation, but the latter variables did not predict preschool competence. Infant selfregulation and preschool regulation made statistically independent contributions to competence, even though regulation at Time 1 and Time 2 ii were substantially related. The results are interpreted as supporting a developmental pathway in which well-regulated infants more readily acquire both expertise and more sophisticated regulatory skills. Future research should address the origins of these skills earlier in infancy, and the social contexts that generate them and support them during the intervening years.