Brock University Coat of Arms

The armorial bearings for Brock University, or more simply the University Coat of Arms, or crest, was designed in a large part by Presdent Gibson, assisted by other members of the Board of Governors (A preliminary design can be seen here). The Coat of Arms was granted to Brock University on March 17th, 1965. The Coat of Arms consist of an eagle, taken from General Brock’s own arms, displayed against a scarlet background - one of the official colours of Brock University. Immediately above it on a chief argent is displayed a maple-leaf (for Canada), a scallop shell (from the Lincoln and Welland regiment), and a trillium (for the province of Ontario). An open book fronts the eagle representing learning and knowledge. The crest itself is made up of a torch symbolizing learning, surrounded by a serpent for wisdom, with two calumet or North American pipes of peace, to symbolize Canada, friendship and agreement. The supporters consist of a beaver on the dexter side, emblematic of Canada and representing work and industry in learning. On the sinister side, a brock or badger (also in commemoration of General Brock) represents tenacity of purpose. The motto 'Surgite' is visible just below the arms.

Science Complex Opening

Pictured here from left to right are James Gibson, President Emeritus, R. A. Macleod, Board of Trustees, and Dr. Cecil Shaver, former Chancellor, during the 1984 Science Complex opening - an addition to the Mackenzie Chown Complex now simply known as H Block.

Science Complex Opening

Pictured here from left to right are Henry Tomarin, Board of Trustees, St. Catharines Mayor Roy Adams, R. Campbell, Niagara Region chairman, Peter Misener, and R. Misener, Chancellor, during the 1984 Science Complex opening - an addition to the Mackenzie Chown Complex now simply known as H Block.

1970 Design Presentation

Pictured here from left to right are Chairman of the Board, Whiting Lathrop, President James Gibson, and Architect Raymond Moriyama during the formal presentation of the $7.7 million MacKenzie Chown Complex project, which at the time was known as the Academic Staging Building or simply East Block.

Heidegger on the way of thinking

This thesis attempts to clarify what Heidegger meant by the term "thinking" (Denken), where this ^'meanr is submitted in the double sense: firstly, in the sense of what Heidegger intended by the use and exposition of this term that we find in his lecture series. Was Heisst Denken?, where Heidegger quickly makes it clear that this intention is to actually bring thinking on the way, viz. making provision for the leap into thinking, and where this intention was carried out with the employment of a specific guiding phrase. In the second sense, it is an attempt at clarifying the meaning of the term. But this is not to say that we are here simply out to see how Heidegger defines the word '*thinking." It is in fact precisely within such definitive discourse that thought dies out. It is not merely be a case of defining a word, because this enterprise would be just as shallow as much as it would be unworkable. It is for this reason that Heidegger decided to establish for himself the task, not merely of explaining thinking as something to be beheld at a distance, but rather of bringing thinking underway by means of his lecture, proclaiming that, "Only the leap into the river tells us what is swimming. The question 'What is called thinking?' can never be answered by proposing a definition of the concept thinking, and then diligently explaining what is contained in that definition." (WCT, 21) This being Heidegger's intention, in order to understand Heidegger in his treatment of the term thinking, it is clear that we must also undergo an experience with thinking. It is in this spirit that the present work was written so as to collaborate the two senses of what Heidegger meant by "thinking."

Physiological reactivity and the perception of emotional stimuli as they relate to social adaptive functioning after traumatic brain injury / y Melonie Jane Hopkins.

Traumatic brain injury (TBI) often affects social adaptive functioning and these changes in social adaptability are usually associated with general damage to the frontal cortex. Recent evidence suggests that certain neurons within the orbitofrontal cortex appear to be specialized for the processing of faces and facial expressions. The orbitofrontal cortex also appears to be involved in self-initiated somatic activation to emotionally-charged stimuli. According to Somatic Marker Theory (Damasio, 1994), the reduced physiological activation fails to provide an individual with appropriate somatic cues to personally-relevant stimuli and this, in turn, may result in maladaptive behaviour. Given the susceptibility of the orbitofrontal cortex in TBI, it was hypothesized that impaired perception and reactivity to socially-relevant information might be responsible for some of the social difficulties encountered after TBL Fifteen persons who sustained a moderate to severe brain injury were compared to age and education matched Control participants. In the first study, both groups were presented with photographs of models displaying the major emotions and either asked to identify the emotions or simply view the faces passively. In a second study, participants were asked to select cards from decks that varied in terms of how much money could be won or lost. Those decks with higher losses were considered to be high-risk decks. Electrodermal activity was measured concurrently in both situations. Relative to Controls, TBI participants were found to have difficulty identifying expressions of surprise, sadness, anger, and fear. TBI persons were also found to be under-reactive, as measured by electrodermal activity, while passively viewing slides of negative expressions. No group difference,in reactivity to high-risk card decks was observed. The ability to identify emotions in the face and electrodermal reactivity to faces and to high-risk decks in the card game were examined in relationship to social monitoring and empathy as described by family members or friends on the Brock Adaptive Functioning Questionnaire (BAFQ). Difficulties identifying negative expressions (i.e., sadness, anger, fear, and disgust) predicted problems in monitoring social situations. As well, a modest relationship was observed between hypo-arousal to negative faces and problems with social monitoring. Finally, hypo-arousal in the anticipation of risk during the card game related to problems in empathy. In summary, these data are consistent with the view that alterations in the ability to perceive emotional expressions in the face and the disruption in arousal to personally-relevant information may be accounting for some of the difficulties in social adaptation often observed in persons who have sustained a TBI. Furthermore, these data provide modest support for Damasio's Somatic Marker Theory in that physiological reactivity to socially-relevant information has some value in predicting social function. Therefore, the assessment of TBI persons, particularly those with adaptive behavioural problems, should be expanded to determine whether alterations in perception and reactivity to socially-relevant stimuli have occurred. When this is the case, rehabilitative strategies aimed more specifically at these difficulties should be considered.

Wellspring: an intrinsic case study of community-based education for adults living with cancer /

This paper presents education research as vital to addressing the issues faced by adults living with cancer. This qualitative study looked at philosophies of practice for cancer patient education. It was about understanding how values and beliefs shape the way program planners and managers operationalize their knowledge of adult education and how this has significant impact on meeting the needs of those touched by cancer. Improved technology has extended life expectancy, so that Canadians living with cancer, or even dying with cancer now spend less time in direct medical care. The notion of cancer as simply a medical concern is outdated. This study found that informational and support needs of adults living with cancer are often unmet, ignored or unknown. This research investigated a community-based education initiative that is inviting, accessible, and promotes a sense of hope. More specifically, this case study uncovered factors contributing to the success of Wellspring, a grass-roots cancer patient support centre which has been recognized nationally for its ability to effectively meet the diverse non-medical supportive care needs of as many cancer patients and caregivers as possible. Therefore, Wellspring was selected as a case study. Educating people to take charge of their own lives and supporting them in making informed decisions about their lifestyle choices made Wellspring part of a social action movement that focused on improving social attitudes toward people living with cancer. Results of this descriptive inquiry and philosophical inquiry evolved into data that was used to devise an organic model of community-based education that encompasses Adler's (1993) four dimensions of philosophy within a socio-cultural context.

An investigation of the nature and role of historicality in the thought of Dilthey and Heidegger

Introduction The question of the meaning, methods and philosophical manifestations of history is currently rife with contention. The problem that I will address in an exposition of the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, centers around the intersubjectivity of an historical world. Specifically, there are two interconnected issues. First, since all knowledge occurs to a person from within his or her historical age how can any person in any age make truth claims? In order to answer this concern we must understand the essence and role of history. Yet how can we come to an individual understanding ofwhat history is when the meanings that we use are themselves historically enveloped? But can we, we who are well aware of the knowledge that archaeology has dredged up from old texts or even from 'living' monuments of past ages, really neglect to notice these artifacts that exist within and enrich our world? Charges of wilful blindness would arise if any attempt were made to suggest that certain things of our world did not come down to us from the past. Thus it appears more important 2 to determine what this 'past' is and therefore how history operates than to simply derail the possibility for historical understanding. Wilhelm Dilthey, the great German historicist from the 19th century, did not question the existence of historical artifacts as from the past, but in treating knowledge as one such artifact placed the onus on knowledge to show itself as true, or meaningful, in light ofthe fact that other historical periods relied on different facts and generated different truths or meanings. The problem for him was not just determining what the role of history is, but moreover to discover how knowledge could make any claim as true knowledge. As he stated, there is a problem of "historical anarchy"!' Martin Heidegger picked up these two strands of Dilthey's thought and wanted to answer the problem of truth and meaning in order to solve the problem of historicism. This problem underscored, perhaps for the first time, that societal presuppositions about the past and present oftheir era are not immutable. Penetrating to the core of the raison d'etre of the age was an historical reflection about the past which was now conceived as separated both temporally and attitudinally from the present. But further than this, Heidegger's focus on asking the question of the meaning of Being meant that history must be ontologically explicated not merely ontically treated. Heidegger hopes to remove barriers to a genuine ontology by II 1 3 including history into an assessment ofprevious philosophical systems. He does this in order that the question of Being be more fully explicated, which necessarily for him includes the question of the Being of history. One approach to the question ofwhat history is, given the information that we get from historical knowledge, is whether such knowledge can be formalized into a science. Additionally, we can approach the question of what the essence and role of history is by revealing its underlying characteristics, that is, by focussing on historicality. Thus we will begin with an expository look at Dilthey's conception of history and historicality. We will then explore these issues first in Heidegger's Being and Time, then in the third chapter his middle and later works. Finally, we shall examine how Heidegger's conception may reflect a development in the conception of historicality over Dilthey's historicism, and what such a conception means for a contemporary historical understanding. The problem of existing in a common world which is perceived only individually has been philosophically addressed in many forms. Escaping a pure subjectivist interpretation of 'reality' has occupied Western thinkers not only in order to discover metaphysical truths, but also to provide a foundation for politics and ethics. Many thinkers accept a solipsistic view as inevitable and reject attempts at justifying truth in an intersubjective world. The problem ofhistoricality raises similar problems. We 4 -. - - - - exist in a common historical age, presumably, yet are only aware ofthe historicity of the age through our own individual thoughts. Thus the question arises, do we actually exist within a common history or do we merely individually interpret this as communal? What is the reality of history, individual or communal? Dilthey answers this question by asserting a 'reality' to the historical age thus overcoming solipsism by encasing individual human experience within the historical horizon of the age. This however does nothing to address the epistemological concern over the discoverablity of truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, rejects a metaphysical construel of history and seeks to ground history first within the ontology ofDasein, and second, within the so called "sending" of Being. Thus there can be no solipsism for Heidegger because Dasein's Being is necessarily "cohistorical", Being-with-Others, and furthermore, this historical-Being-in-the-worldwith- Others is the horizon of Being over which truth can appear. Heidegger's solution to the problem of solipsism appears to satisfy that the world is not just a subjective idealist creation and also that one need not appeal to any universal measures of truth or presumed eternal verities. Thus in elucidating Heidegger's notion of history I will also confront the issues ofDasein's Being-alongside-things as well as the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world so that Dasein's historicality is explicated vis-a-vis the "sending of Being" (die Schicken des S eins).

Concept analysis in social studies

This project was undertaken because of a need to analyse concepts in social science more specifically and sequence them more carefully in a social science program. Concepts have been identified vaguely on many curriculum documents or left in isolation from each other when they are specifically identified. The project's aim was to identify a method for analysing concepts and sequencing their teaching on some rational basis. Once the method for analysing concepts was identified a questionnaire was designed and administered to a random sample of students at the grade three, five and eight levels. The questionnaire attempted to measure their comprehension of specific social science concepts at several levels which became progressively more complex. The major hypothesis was that there would be a direct correlation between age and achievement on the questionnaire. The raw scores were seriated and correlated with the ages of the students using the rankdifference- squared method. For the majority of areas tested it was found that there was a significant correlation between age and achievement on the questionnaire. Variation in the correlation coefficients generated suggests that comprehension of social science concepts is not simply a function of age but is probably a function of several inter-related factors such as reading ability, skill in Basic Thinking Skills and age. Thirty students completed each test. There were three tests in the questionnaire.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Microstructural and geochemical investigation of North American lower-middle Paleozoic trilobites and recent arthropods

Trilobites ¥tere collected from Ordovician and Devonian formations of Ontario} New York} Ohio} Oklahoma} and Indiana. Diversity was generally low} but 19..?telllS and Ph..~tY>ps ¥tere the most abundant species from the Ordovician and Devonian} respectively. Recent marine arthropods ¥tere collected from the Atlantic shore of the middle Florida Keys} and from the Pacific and lagoonal waters at Cape Beale} B. C. Fresh-water arthropods were collected along the shore of the Severn River in northcentral Ontario. Cuticles ¥tere analyzed for major} minor and trace elements, 180 and 13C isotopes, as ¥tell as examined by scanning electron micr?scope to identify original and diagenetic fabrics. Examination of trilobite cuticles by scanning electron microscope revealed several microstructures consistent with those observed in Recent arthropods. Microstructures} such as setae and tegumental gland duct openings} in like sized Lim/IllS and Isoteline trilobites may indicate common ancestral origins for these organisms, or simply parallel cuticle evolutions. The dendritic microstructure, originally' thought to be a diagenetic indicator, was found in Recent specimens and therefore its presence in trilobites may be suggestive of the delicate nature of diagenesis in trilobites. The absence of other primary microstructures in trilobites may indicate alteration, taxonomic control} or that there is some inherent feature of S EM examination which may' not allow detection of some features} while others are apparently visit·le onl~1 under SH.·1. The region of the cuticle sampled for examination is also a major influence in detecting pristine microstructures, as not all areas of trilobite and Recent arthropod cuticles will have microstructures identifiable in a SEM study. Subtleties in the process of alteration, however} ma~·· leave pristine microstructures in cuticles that are partial~/ silicified or do 10m itized, and degree and type of alteration may vary stratigraphically and longitudinally within a unit. The presence of fused matrices, angular calcite rhombs, and pyrite in the cuticle are thought to be indicative of altered cuticles, although pyritization may not affect the entire cuticle. t-~atural processes in Recent arthropods, such as molting, lead to variations in cuticle chemistries, and are thought to reflect the area of concentration of the elements during calcification. The level of sodium in Recent arthropods was found to be higher than that in trilobites, but highly mobile when sUbjected to the actions of VY'€'athering. Less saline water produced lovy'€'r magnesium and higher calcium values in Recent specimens .. and metal variations in pristine Ordovician trilobite cuticle appears to follow the constraints outlined for Recent arthropods, of regulation due to the chemislry of the surrounding medium. In diagenetic analysis, sodium, strontium and magnesium proved most beneficial in separating altered from least altered trilobites. Using this criterion, specimens from shale show the least amount of geochemical alteration, and have an original mineralogy of 1.7 - 2.4 mole % MgC03 (8000 t(> 9500 ppm magnesium) for both /s>..?/e/11S lJA'i.riff!11S and PseIAit'11J17ites I..itmirpin..itl/~ and 2.8 - 3.3 mole % MgC03 (5000 to 7000 ppm magnesium) for Ph.i{).?PS This is Slightly lower than the mineralogy of Recent marine arthropods (4.43 - 12.1 mole % MgC03), and slightly higher than that of fresh-water crayfish (0.96 - 1.82 mole % MgC03). Geochemically pristine trilobites were also found to possess primary microstructures. Stable isotope values and trends support the assertion that marine-meteoriclburial fluids were responsible for the alteration observed in a number of the trilobite specimens. The results of this stUdy suggest that fossil material has to be evaluated separately along taxonomic and lithological lines to arrive at sensible diagenetic and e nvironmenta I interpretations.

Out of the darkness and into the light : a study of inauthentic and authentic speech

Introduction Man can be described as the being who shows himself in speech, and from birth to death is continually speaking. Communication is so close to us, so woven into our very being, that we have little understanding of the way it is constituted; for it is as hard to obtain distance from communication as it is to obtain distance from ourselves. All communication is not alike. There are two basic modesl of communication, the inauthentic and the authentic, between which there occurs a constant tension. It is in the inauthentic mode, points out Heidegger, that we find ourselves "proximately and for the most part"; 1. Being and Time, pg. 68 Dasein decides as to the way it will comport itself in taking up its task of having being as an issue for it. " •.• it~, in its very being 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself or only "seem" to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic--that is, something of its own--can it have lost itself and not yet won itself." 2. therefore Heidegger also terms it "everydayness".2 Caught up in the world of everydayness, our speaking covers over and conceals3 our rootedness in being, leaving us in the darkness of untruth. The image of darkness may be inferred from Heidegger's use of the image of "clearing,,4 to depict being as 2. ibid. pg. 69 "Dasein's average everydayness, however, is not to be taken as a mere 'aspect'. Here too, and even in the mode of inauthenticity, the structure of existentiality lies ~ priori and here too Dasein's being is an issue for it in a definite way; and Dasein comports itself towards it the mode of average everydayness, even if this is only the mode of fleeing in the face of it and forgetfulness thereof." 3. ibid. pg. 59 "covering over" and "concealing" are 1;yays Dasein tries to flee its task of having being as an issue for itself. " ••• This being can be covered up so extensively that it becomes forgotten and no question arises about it or its meaning ••• n How everyday speaking accomplishes this will be taken up in detail in the second chapter which explores Dasein's everyday speech. 4. ibid, pg. 171 lI ••• we have in mind nothing other than the Existential - ontological structure of this entity (Dasein), that it is in such a way as to be its 'there'. To say that it is -' illuminated' [tlerleuchtet"] means that as Being-in-theworld it is cleared [gelichtetJ in itself7 not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing. Only for an entity which is eXistentially cleared in this way does what is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark •••• " 3 dis-coveredness and truth. Our first task will be to explore the nature of communication in general and then to explore each of the modes manifested in turn. The structure of the inauthentic mode of communication can be explored by asking the following questions: What is this speaking about? Who is it that is speaking and who is spoken to? Does this speaking show man in his speech? The authentic mode is distinguished by the rarity with which we encounter it; as the inauthentic conceals, so the authentic reveals our rootedness in being. Yet this rarity makes it difficult to delineate its elusive structure clearly. Its constituent elements can be brought into focus by asking the same questions of this mode that we previously asked of the inauthentic mode. Our initial response to the disclosure of the authentic mode is to attempt to abandon the inauthentic mode and leave the darkness behind dwelling only in the "lighted place". All through the ages, some men pushing this to extreme, have, upon uncovering their relatedness to being, experienced a deep longing to dwell in such a "place" of pure truth and oft times denigrated or attempted to exclude the everyday world. Such 4. flight is twice mistaken: first it atbempts to fix truth as unchanging and static and secondly, it opposes this to untruth which it seeks to abolish. This is both the wrong view of truth and the wrong view of untruth as Heidegger points out in The Origin of The-Work of Art: The Way-to-be of truth, i.e., of discoveredness, is under the sway of refusal. But this refusal is no lack or privation, as if truth could be simply discoveredness rid of all covers. If it could be that, it would no longer be itself . ••• Truth in its way-to-be is untruth.5 Pure light is not the nature of Being nor is pure unconcealedness possible for man. Failure to remember this is the failure to realize that communication destroys itself in such flight because it no longer maintains the contingency of its task, i.e., the dis-closedness of being. We are reminded of the strong attraction this flight from darkness held for Plato. Light, truth and Being are all beyond the darkness and have nothing to do with it. In Book VII of the R~public, Socrates' explanation of the Allegory of the Cave to Glaucon points to a decided preference men have for the "lighted place". 5. The Origin Of The Work Of Art, pg. 42 5. Come then, I said, and join me in this further thought, and do not be surprised that those who attained to this height are not willing to occupy themselves with the affairs of men, but their souls ever feel the upward urge and yearning for that sojourn above. For this, I take it, is likely if in this point too the likeliness of our image holds. 6 Despite the attraction to pure truth, human communication is more complex than putting down one mode of communication and picking up another. Due to the fact that we are always on the way, the title of my thesis will have to be amended: OUT OF THE DARKNESS AND INTO THE LIGHT--AGAIN AND AGAIN. It must be this way because this is what it means to be human. This is the point made by Mephisto to Faust in pointing out that man, standing between God and the devil, needs both darkness and light: Er findet sich in einem ewigen Gl~t Uns hat er in die Finsternis gebracht, Und euch taugt einzig Tag und Nacht. 7 6. Republic z (517 c & d) It should be noted however, that while the philosopherking must be compelled to return to the cave for purely political reasons, once he has taken adequate view of the "brightest region of being" he has the full truth and his return to darkness adds nothing to the truth. 7. Faust, pg. 188 6. This thesis proposes to examine the grounds that give rise to communication, uncovering the structure of its inauthentic and authentic modes and paying close attention to tpeir interrelationship and to their relationship to language as "the house of Being": language that both covers and opens up man's rootedness in Being, transforming him as he moves along his way, taking up his "ownmost task" of becoming who he is. roots. He is the being who shows himself inn that reflects his forgetfulness or remembrance of his rootedness in being. Man comes into an already existent world and is addressedl through things in the world which are c

The finite bandwidth model for spin fluctuations in Pd

The frequency dependence of the electron-spin fluctuation spectrum, P(Q), is calculated in the finite bandwidth model. We find that for Pd, which has a nearly full d-band, the magnitude, the range, and the peak frequency of P(Q) are greatly reduced from those in the standard spin fluctuation theory. The electron self-energy due to spin fluctuations is calculated within the finite bandwidth model. Vertex corrections are examined, and we find that Migdal's theorem is valid for spin fluctuations in the nearly full band. The conductance of a normal metal-insulator-normal metal tunnel junction is examined when spin fluctuations are present in one electrode. We find that for the nearly full band, the momentum independent self-energy due to spin fluctuations enters the expression for the tunneling conductance with approximately the same weight as the self-energy due to phonons. The effect of spin fluctuations on the tunneling conductance is slight within the finite bandwidth model for Pd. The effect of spin fluctuations on the tunneling conductance of a metal with a less full d-band than Pd may be more pronounced. However, in this case the tunneling conductance is not simply proportional to the self-energy.

The isolation, partial purification and preliminary characterization of a growth factor from chick embryo brains

Chicl( brain growth factor (CBGF) is a mitogen isolated from embryonic chick brains thought to have a potential role as a trophic factor involved in nerve dependent amphibian limb regeneration. In addition, CBGF stimulates 3H-thymidine incorporation in chick embryo brain astrocytes in vitro. In this study, cultured chick embryo brain non-neuronal cells were employed in a bioassay to monitor CBGF activity throughout various stages of its pllrification. Cell culture and assay conditions were optimized. Nonneuronal cells grew best on collagen-coated culture dishes in complete medium, were most responsive to a growth stimulus [10% fetal bovine serum (FBS)] at the second and third subcultures, and were healthiest when rendered "quiescent" in medium supplemented with 1% FBS. The most effective bioassay conditions consisted of a minimum 14.5 hour "quiescence" time (24 hours was used), a 6 hour "prestimulation" time, and a 24 hour 3H-thymidine labeling time. Four-day subconfluent primary non-neuronal cells consisted of 6.63% GFAP positive cells; as a result cultures were thought to be mainly composed of astroblasts. CBGF was purified from 18-day chick embryo brains by ultrafiltration through Amicon PM-30 and YM-2 membranes, size exclusion chromatography through a Biogel P6 column, and analytical reverse-phase high-performance liquid chromatography (rp-HPLC). The greatest activity resided in rp-HPLC fraction #7 (10 ng/ml) which was as effective as 10% FBS at stimulating 3H-thymidine incorporation in chick embryo brain nonneuronal cells. Although other researchers report the isolation of a mitogenic fraction consisting of 5'-GMP from the embryonic chick brain, UV absorbance spectra, rp-HPLC elution profiles, and fast atom bombardment (FAB) mass spectra indicated that CBGF is neither 5'-GMP nor 51-AMP. 2 Moreover, commercially available 5t-GMP was inhibitory to 3H-thymidine incorporation in the chick non-neuronal cells, while Sf-AMP had no effect. Upon treatment with pronase, the biological activity of fraction P6-3 increased; this increase was nearly 30% greater than what would be expected from a simple additive effect of any mitogenic activity of pronase alone together with P6-3 alone. This may suggest the presence of an inhibitor protein. The bioactive component may be a protein protected by a nucleoside/nucleotide or simply a nucleoside/nucleotide acting alone. While the FAB mass spectrum of rp-HPLC fraction #7 did not reveal molecular weight or sequence information, the ion of highest molecular weight was observed at m/z 1610; this is consistent with previous estimations of CBGF's size. 3

Niagara Region Municipality Records 1962-1963, 1969-1976, 1980

Niagara Region Municipality Records 1962-1963, 1969-1976, 1980