22 resultados para Shareholders
em Brock University, Canada
Resumo:
A report of the Directors to the shareholders, it reads "The year 1965 showed a continued trend of decrease in sales. The opening of new wineries in Moose Jaw, Calgary, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick has resulted in a change in wine marketing across Canada and are contributing factors. The Company's sales both retail and wholesale have continued to drop in Ontario, notwithstanding the advertising program undertaken by the Company. This decline is a matter of great concern to the Directors of the Company. Our new package introduced in the late fall of 1965 is now available across Canada which should improve our sales picture during the present year. Net profit is down $19, 000 from 1964, due to increases in the cost of raw materials and supplies and to reduced sales." The directors listed are: John M. Woodbridge, William R. Barnes, A.H. Kidder, P.G.D. Armour, H.M. Pawling, Miss Florence A. Goffin, William D. McLean.
Resumo:
The report reads: "The year 1970 saw many significant changes in our Company. Sales were higher than in any previous year showing an increase in gallons of 8.8% and in dollar volume of 9.7%. The new offices and warehouse are fully operational, the fermenters installed prior to vintage assisted in holding our labour costs to a reasonable level, and the use of liquid sugar proved very successful. We added two representatives to our sales staff during the year and direct contact with our customers will be intensified. Product development is continuing and the addition of new lines and better distribution will be receiving priority. Our venture in the product supply for Valley Rouge Wines of Manitoba will, we trust, increase our sales volume and assist in lowering our fixed overhead. Capital expenses in 1971 will continue at a high level. Our co-operation with the various Government departments in respect to pollution, will obligate our Company to install facilities to satisfy the strict requirements in this regard. Preparations must be made now to handle bulk harvested grapes, the addition of storage and fermenting capacity and the replacement of production equipment, will be under constant review, thus enabling us to maintain production and efficiency. With the continued dedicated service of our personnel and the support of all our Shareholders, we are confident the challenge will be met in 1971."
Resumo:
Long Point Company explanatory memorandum for shareholders. This is a 2 page printed flyer put out by J.I. Mackenzie, secretary-treasurer, March 21, 1878.
Resumo:
Meeting of shareholders, yeas and nays (1 page, printed), Nov. 18, 1881.
Resumo:
Report from the annual meeting of the shareholders held on June 1, 1886 regarding shares (copy of 1 handwritten page). The board of directors also met and new directors were named. This is signed by Louis N. Hayne, secretary, June 7, 1886.
Resumo:
Report from the annual meeting of the shareholders held on June 1, 1886 in which amendments and field rules and regulations were made (copy of 1 handwritten page). This is signed by Louis N. Hayne, secretary, June 7, 1886.
Resumo:
Notice regarding bonds and shareholders and the rights of the directors of the Long Point Company, n.d.
Resumo:
The Cedar Dale Scythe Works was the second manufacturing company that A.S. Whiting had established in Oshawa, the first being the Oshawa Manufacturing Co. in 1852. The Oshawa Manufacturing Co. was eventually taken over by the Joseph Hall Works in 1857. In 1862, the Cedar Dale Works was built after being in a rented space in the Hall Works for two years, building scythes and hoes. With the building of the firm, the village of Cedar Dale was established. In 1867, the firm became Whiting and Cowan when John Cowan bought into the company. After the death of Whiting in 1867, his son-in-law, R.S. Hamlin headed the company. By 1872, it became the A.S. Whiting Manufacturing Co. when Cowan withdrew from the business. Before Whiting’s death, the company had been profitable but due to new machinery being developed, hand tools were becoming obsolete and the business only lasted for a few more years (source: Oshawa Community Museum and Archives Web site).
Resumo:
The clippings describe the City of the Falls and its attempts by its shareholders to sell lots to this newly developing city. The venture by shareholders W. Allan, James Buchanan, Thomas Clark, J.H. Dunn, Thomas Dixon, General Murray, James Robinson, Samuel Street and William Witla intended to favourably position their city as a destination for “affording an easy approach for the annual assemblage of the Fashionable, the Learned and the Great”. The venture failed due to the building of the Buffalo and Niagara Falls railway.
Resumo:
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of the choice of cut-off points, sampling procedures, and the business cycle on the accuracy of bankruptcy prediction models. Misclassification can result in erroneous predictions leading to prohibitive costs to firms, investors and the economy. To test the impact of the choice of cut-off points and sampling procedures, three bankruptcy prediction models are assessed- Bayesian, Hazard and Mixed Logit. A salient feature of the study is that the analysis includes both parametric and nonparametric bankruptcy prediction models. A sample of firms from Lynn M. LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database in the U. S. was used to evaluate the relative performance of the three models. The choice of a cut-off point and sampling procedures were found to affect the rankings of the various models. In general, the results indicate that the empirical cut-off point estimated from the training sample resulted in the lowest misclassification costs for all three models. Although the Hazard and Mixed Logit models resulted in lower costs of misclassification in the randomly selected samples, the Mixed Logit model did not perform as well across varying business-cycles. In general, the Hazard model has the highest predictive power. However, the higher predictive power of the Bayesian model, when the ratio of the cost of Type I errors to the cost of Type II errors is high, is relatively consistent across all sampling methods. Such an advantage of the Bayesian model may make it more attractive in the current economic environment. This study extends recent research comparing the performance of bankruptcy prediction models by identifying under what conditions a model performs better. It also allays a range of user groups, including auditors, shareholders, employees, suppliers, rating agencies, and creditors' concerns with respect to assessing failure risk.
Resumo:
We examine stock market reactions around the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions. We find a symmetric and transitory price response accompanied by a significant increase in trading volume on the effective date. Firms added to the Nasdaq-100 Index experience significant increases in institutional ownership, the number of market makers, and the number of shareholders. In contrast, firms removed from the index show significant decreases in the number of institutional shareholders. Additions to the Nasdaq-100 Index also show significant increases in four liquidity measures, whereas deletions demonstrate significant decreases in two liquidity measures. These changes in liquidity are related to the abnormal return on the announcement day. Taken together, the results suggest support for the price pressure, liquidity, and investor awareness hypotheses.
Resumo:
This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, I provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, I find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation
Resumo:
The paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders.
Resumo:
The meeting notes include an audit for "year ending June 30th, 1880, thence to May, 25th, 1881". There is also an "auditor's report" by Richard Tew and P. Corridi which states: "To the President and shareholders of the Ontario Grape Growing and Wine Manufacturing Company, Barnsdale, Ont. Gentlemen, We the undersigned have much pleasure in informing you that we have completed our audit of the Company's Books for the year ending June 30th, 1880, thence to May 24th, 1881, and can testify to their correctness. In future we would recommend that the Books be made up to May 24th in each year, five weeks previous to the Annual meeting being held, and that the Day Book kept by the manager be submitted to the Secretary monthly, together with all vouchers, so that the transactions can be duly recorded in the Company's Books. We beg to congratulate the shareholders on the satisfactory exhibit of the Company's affairs, as shown by the annexed Balance Sheet. We are Gentlemen, yours respectfully." This is the first audit included in the book.
Resumo:
The by-law reads: "A by-law to amend by-law no. 79 of the company by restricting the distribution of monies set aside for profit sharing to officers and employees regularly employed at the company's plant. Be it therefore enacted as a by-law of Barnes Wines, Limited as follows: That Schedule 'A' to By-Law no. 79 of the Company enacted on the 2nd day of February, 1953, be and the same is hereby amended by adding after the word "Company" in the last line of paragraph I thereof, the following: 'regularly employed at the Company's plant,' Enacted this 9th day of February, 1966. Witness the Corporate Seal of the Company. Unanimously confirmed by all the Shareholders of the Company at a Special General Meeting of the Shareholders of the Company held on the 21st day of February, 1966."