Fifth series of historical documents : [All relating to the War of 1812].

Published under the auspices of "The Literary and Historical Society of Quebec".

Why are we still at war? : or, The American question considered ; in a series of essays rejected by the journalists as unpopular ; recommended to a candid perusal /

In the Pamphleteer, vol. 4, p. 551-576. London, 1814.

Why are we still at war? : or, The American question considered ; in a series of essays rejected by the journalists as unpopular ; recommended to a candid perusal

In the Pamphleteer, vol. 4, p. 551-576. London, 1814

CEO Compensation, Compensation Risk, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Technology Firms

Literature suggests that CEOs of technology firms earn higher pay than CEOs of non-technology firms. I investigate whether compensation risk explains the difference in compensation between technology firms and non-technology firms. Controlling for firm size and performance, I find that CEOs in technology firms have higher pay, but also have much higher compensation risk compared to non-technology firms. Compensation risk explains the major part of the difference in CEO pay. My study is consistent with the labor market economics view that CEOs earn competitive risk-adjusted total compensation.

Managerial Risk-Taking and CEO Excess Compensation

This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, I provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, I find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation

Niagara River and Falls from Lake Erie to Lake Ontario : a series of one hundred and fifty-three original etchings (1886)

A portfolio of 50 folio and 103 vignette etchings, printed on fine china paper, which has been pressed into a sturdy hand-made paper. The plates were printed by J.H. Daniels of Boston in black, brown, sepia or blue ink. All prints are dated, numbered, and signed or initialed in the plate by Sangster, and the folio prints have pencil signatures. Vol. 1. Vignettes (nos. 1-53) -- vol. 2. Vignettes (nos. 54-103) -- vol. 3. Plates (vol. 1 and 2, nos. 1-50).

Niagara River and Falls from Lake Erie to Lake Ontario : a series of one hundred and fifty-three original etchings (1886) Vol.2

A portfolio of 50 folio and 103 vignette etchings, printed on fine china paper, which has been pressed into a sturdy hand-made paper. The plates were printed by J.H. Daniels of Boston in black, brown, sepia or blue ink. All prints are dated, numbered, and signed or initialed in the plate by Sangster, and the folio prints have pencil signatures. Vol. 1. Vignettes (nos. 1-53) -- vol. 2. Vignettes (nos. 54-103) -- vol. 3. Plates (vol. 1 and 2, nos. 1-50).

Niagara River and Falls from Lake Erie to Lake Ontario : a series of one hundred and fifty-three original etchings (1886) Vol. 3

A portfolio of 50 folio and 103 vignette etchings, printed on fine china paper, which has been pressed into a sturdy hand-made paper. The plates were printed by J.H. Daniels of Boston in black, brown, sepia or blue ink. All prints are dated, numbered, and signed or initialed in the plate by Sangster, and the folio prints have pencil signatures. Vol. 1. Vignettes (nos. 1-53) -- vol. 2. Vignettes (nos. 54-103) -- vol. 3. Plates (vol. 1 and 2, nos. 1-50).

Effect of executive compensation on firm performance

The paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders.