The role of self-presentation in adolescent health risk behaviours

Self-presentation has been identified as playing a key role in the perfonnance of various potentially hazardous health behaviours such as substance abuse, eating disorders and reckless behaviours (Leary, Tchividjian, & Kraxberger, 1994; Martin & Leary, 2001; Martin, Leary, & O'Brien, 2001). The present study investigated the role of selfpresentation on adolescent health-risk behaviours. Specifically, this study examined the prevalence of adolescent identified health-risk behaviours rooted in self-presentational motives in youths aged 13-18 years. The current study also identified the specific images associated with these behaviours desired by youth, and the targets of these behaviours. Also, the relationship between these behaviours, and several trait measures (social physique anxiety, public-self consciousness, fear of negative evaluations, selfpresentational efficacy) of self-presentation were examined. Finally, the gender differences in health risk behaviours and self-presentational concerns were examined. Participants in the present study were 96 adolescent students, 34 male and 62 female, recruited from various private schools across Southern Ontario. Students ranged in age from 13 to 18 years for both males (M age = 15.81 years, SD = 1.49) and females (M age = 14.89 years, SD = 1.17) and ranged from grades 8 through 13. Results of the current study suggested that Canadian adolescents between the ages of 13 and 18 years participated in health risk behaviours for self-presentational purposes. Drinking alcohol, skipping school, and performing stunts and dares were identified as the most common health risk behaviours performed for self-presentational purposes by both males and females. Appearing fun and cool were the most commonly reported desired images while appearing brave and mature were the least reported. The most desired target group cited was same sex friends, followed by other sex friends. Trait measures of self-presentational concerns identified females as being higher in public self-consciousness, and social physique anxiety than males. Males were found to be higher in self-presentational efficacy than females. The total number of health risk behaviours was predicted by selfpresentational efficacy and social physique anxiety for males, and social physique anxiety for females. Findings of the current study suggest that Canadian adolescents' health risk behaviours are rooted, in part, in self-presentational motives. Thus far, an educational approach to health interventions has been favoured and/or adopted by teachers, health promoters, and educators (Jessor, 1992). Implications of the current study suggest that although educational interventions are beneficial in presenting the associated risks with certain activities and/or behaviours, one reason this type of approach may be ineffective in changing adolescent behaviour over the long run is that it does not address the strong and prominent influences of interpersonal motives on health damaging behaviour. It is evident that social acceptance and public image are of importance to adolescents, and the desire to make the "right" impression and to achieve peer approval and acceptance often override health and safety concerns (Jessor, 1992). Thus, a self-presentational approach focusing on changing the images associated with the behaviours may be more successful at deterring adolescent health risk behaviours.

Self-presentational motives in eating disorders : a known groups difference approach

Self-presentation reflects the processes by which individuals attempt to monitor and control the impressions others form of them (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Concerns over impressions conveyed have been linked to numerous health behaviors (Crawford & Eklund, 1994; Martin, Leary, & O'Brien, 2001). The present study investigated the role of cognitive manifestations of dispositional and situational self presentational motivation (SPM) in 131 females with known groups differences on a measure of eating disorders. Participants were classified as in-treatment (IN = 39); at risk (AT = 46); and not at risk (NOT = 46) for eating disordered behaviour. Each participant completed The Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; Leary, 1983), the Public Self-Consciousness Scale (PSC; Fenigstein, Sheier, & Buss, 1975), and the Social Physique Anxiety Scale (SPA; Hart, Leary, & Rejeski, 1989), as measures of dispositional SPM. Situational SPM was assessed through Self-Presentational Efficacy (SPE; Gammage, Hall, & Martin, 2004), and the Exercise Motivation Inventory-2 (Markland & Ingeldew, 1997). Significant differences emerged on the measure of eating disorder behaviour between AT and NOT. To determine if group differences existed on measures of trait SPM an ANOVA was conducted. Results indicated that the NOT group experienced less FNE, PSC and SPA than the IN and AT groups, and the AT group experienced less FNE and PSC than the IN group. Pearson bivariate correlations were conducted on measures of trait SPM and EMI-2 subscales theoretically linked to SPM. It was found that FNE, PSC and SPA were all positively correlated with weight management for the NOT group. To determine if group differences existed on selfpresentational exercise motives independent samples I-tests were conducted. Results revealed that the AT group was more motivated to exercise for weight management, and appearance, and social recognition than the NOT group. To determine if group differences existed on the state measure of self-presentational efficacy a series of ANOVA's were conducted. Results revealed that the NOT group experienced significantly greater self-presentational efficacy expectancy and self-presentational outcome value than the AT group. Finally, a discriminant function analysis was conducted to determine if trait SPM would predict group membership. Results revealed that 63.4% of participants were correctly classified, with SPA, PSC, and FNE differentiating the NOT group from the AT and IN groups and FNE and PSC differentiating the AT group from the IN group. Thus self-presentation motivation appears to have an influence on females who have an eating disorder and those at risk for an eating disorder. Potential applications of the influence of self-presentational motives on eating disorders and future research directions are discussed.

The effects of postural threat on cognitive strategies used to maintain upright stance

It is well established that postural threat modifies postural control, although little is known regarding the underlying mechanism(s) responsible. It is possible that changes in postural control under conditions of elevated postural threat result from alterations in cognitive strategies. The purpose of this study was to determine the influence of elevated postural threat on cognitive strategies and to determine the relationship between postural control, psychological, and cognitive measures. It was hypothesized that elevated postural threat would cause a shift to more conscious control of posture. It was also expected that a relationship between fear of falling and postural control would exist that could be explained by changes in conscious control of posture. Forty-eight healthy young adults stood on a force plate at two different surface heights: ground level (LOW) and 3.2m above ground level (HIGH). Center of pressure (COP) summary measures calculated to quantify postural control were the mean position (AP-COP MP), root mean square (AP-COP RMS) and mean power frequency (AP-COP MPF) in the anteriorposterior direction. Trunk sway measures calculated in the pitch direction were trunk angle and trunk velocity. Psychological measures including perceived balance confidence, perceived fear of falling, perceived anxiety, and perceived stability were self reported. As a physiological indicator of anxiety, electrodermal activity was collected. The cognitive strategies assessed were movement reinvestment and attention focus. A modified state-sp-ecific version of the Movement Specific Reinvestment Scale was used to measure conscious motor processing (CMP) and movement self-consciousness (MSC). An attention focus questionnaire was developed to assess the amount of attention directed to internal and external sources. An effect of postural threat on cognitive strategies was observed as participants reported more conscious control and a greater concern or worry about their posture at the HIGH postural threat condition as well as an increased internal and external focus of attention. In addition changes in postural control, psychological, and physiological measures were found. The participants leaned away from the edge of the platform, the frequency of their postural adjustments increased, and the velocity of their trunk movements increased. Participants felt less confident, more fearful, more anxious, and less stable with an accompanying increase in physiological anxiety. Significant correlations between perceived anxiety, AP-COP MP, and cognitive measures revealed a possible relationship that could be mediated by cognitive measures. It was found that with greater conscious motor processing, more movement self-consciousness, and a greater amount of attention focused externally there was a larger shift of the mean position away from the edge of the platform. This thesis provides evidence that postural threat can influence cognitive strategies causing a shift to more conscious control of movement which is associated with leaning away from the edge of the platform. Shifting the position of the body away from the direction of the postural threat may reflect a cognitive strategy to ensure safety in this situation due to the inability to employ a stepping strategy when standing on an elevated platform.

Children's Lie-Telling and Self-Awareness as an Honesty Promoting Technique

The present study investigated how social-cognitive development relates to children’s lie-telling and the effectiveness of a novel honesty promoting technique (i.e., self-awareness). Sixty-four children were asked not to peek at a toy in the experimenter’s absence and were later asked about whether they had peeked as a measure of their honesty. Half of the children were questioned in the self-awareness condition and half in the control condition. Additionally, children completed a battery of cognitive and social-cognitive tests to assess executive functioning and theory-of-mind understanding. While first-order theory-of-mind understanding, inhibitory control, and visuospatial working memory did not significantly relate to children’s lie-telling, measures of inhibitory control in conjunction with working memory and complex working memory were significantly related to children’s lie-telling. Finally, the novel honesty promoting technique was effective: children in the self-aware condition lied significantly less often than children in the control condition.

Kierkegaard : the temporality of becoming a self

Introduction In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze compares and contrasts Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's ideas of repetition. He argues that neither of them really give a representation of repetition. Repetition for them is a sort of selective task: the way in which they determine what is ethical and eternal. With Nietzsche, it is a theater of un belie f. ..... Nietzsche's leading idea is to found the repetition in the etemal return at once on the death of God and the dissolution of the self But it is a quite different alliance in the theater of faith: Kierkegaard dreams of alliance between a God and a self rediscovered. I Repetition plays a theatrical role in their thinking. It allows them to dramatically stage the interplay of various personnae. Deleuze does give a positive account ofKierkegaard's "repetition"; however, he does not think that Kierkegaard works out a philosophical model, or a representation of what repetition is. It is true that in the book Repetition, Constantin Constantius does not clearly and fully work out the concept of repetition, but in Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard gives a full explanation of the self and its temporality which can be connected with repetition. When Sickness Unto Death is interpreted according to key passages from Repetition and The Concept of Anxiety, a clear philosophical concept of repetition can be established. In my opinion, Kierkegaard's philosophy is about the task of becoming a self, and I will be attempting to show that he does have a model of the temporality of self-becoming. In Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard explains his notions of despair with reference to sin, self, self-becoming, faith, and repetition. Despair is a sickness of the spirit, of the self, and accordingly can take three forms: in despair not to be conscious of having a self (not despair in the strict sense); in despair not to will to be oneself; in despair to will to be oneself2 In relation to this definition, he defines a self as "a relation that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself relates to another.''3 Thus, a person is a threefold relationship, and any break in that relationship is despair. Despair takes three forms corresponding to the three aspects of a self s relation to itself Kierkegaard says that a selfis like a house with a basement, a first floor, and a second floor.4 This model of the house, and the concept of the stages on life's way that it illustrates, is central to Kierkegaard's philosophy. This thesis will show how he unpacks this model in many of his writings with different concepts being developed in different texts. His method is to work with the same model in different ways throughout his authorship. He assigns many of the texts to different pseudonyms, but in this thesis we will treat the model and the related concepts as being Kierkegaard's and not only the pseudonyms. This is justified as our thesis will show this modelremains the same throughout Kierkegaard's work, though it is treated in different ways by different pseudonyms. According to Kierkegaard, many people live in only the basement for their entire lives, that is, as aesthetes ("in despair not to be conscious of having a self'). They live in despair of not being conscious of having a self They live in a merely horizontal relation. They want to get what they desire. When they go to the first floor, so to speak, they reflect on themselves and only then do they begin to get a self In this stage, one acquires an ideology of the required and overcomes the strict commands of the desired. The ethical is primarily an obedience to the required whereas the aesthetic is an obedience to desire. In his work Fear and Trembling (Copenhagen: 1843), Johannes de Silentio makes several observations concerning this point. In this book, the author several times allows the desired ideality of esthetics to be shipwrecked on the required ideality of ethics, in order through these collisions to bring to light the religious ideality as the ideality that precisely is the ideality of actuality, and therefore just as desirable as that of esthetics and not as impossible as the ideality of ethics. This is accomplished in such a way that the religious ideality breaks forth in the dialectical leap and in the positive mood - "Behold all things have become new" as well as in the negative mood that is the passion of the absurd to which the concept "repetition" corresponds.s Here one begins to become responsible because one seeks the required ideality; however, the required ideality and the desired ideality become inadequate to the ethical individual. Neither of them satisfy him ("in despair not to will to be oneself'). Then he moves up to the second floor: that is, the mystical region, or the sphere of religiousness (A) ("despair to will to be oneself). Kiericegaard's model of a house, which is connected with the above definition ofdespair, shows us how the self arises through these various stages, and shows the stages of despair as well. On the second floor, we become mystics, or Knights of Infinite Resignation. We are still in despair because we despair ofthe basement and the first floor, however, we can be fiill, free persons only ifwe live on all the floors at the same time. This is a sort of paradoxical fourth stage consisting of all three floors; this is the sphere of true religiousness (religiousness (B)). It is distinguished from religiousness (A) because we can go back and live on all the floors. It is not that there are four floors, but in the fourth stage, we live paradoxically on three at once. Kierkegaard uses this house analogy in order to explain how we become a self through these stages, and to show the various stages of despair. Consequently, I will be explaining self-becoming in relation to despair. It will also be necessary to explain it in relation to faith, for faith is precisely the overcoming of despair. After explaining the becoming of the self in relation to despair and faith, I will then explain its temporality and thereby its repetition. What Kierkegaard calls a formula, Deleuze calls a representation. Unfortunately, Deleuze does not acknowledge Kierkegaard's formula for repetition. As we shall see, Kierkegaard clearly gives a formula for despair, faith, and selfbecoming. When viewed properly, these formulae yield a formula for repetition because when one hasfaith, the basement, firstfloor, and secondfloor become new as one becomes oneself The self is not bound in the eternity ofthe first floor (ethical) or the temporality of the basement (aesthete). I shall now examine the two forms of conscious despair in such a way as to point out also a rise in the consciousness of the nature of despair and in the consciousness that one's state is despair, or, what amounts to the same thing and is the salient point, a rise in the consciousness of the self The opposite to being in despair is to have faith. Therefore, the formula set forth above, which describes a state in which there is not despair at all, is entirely correct, and this formula is also the formula for faMi in ^elating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Worldview awareness and adult education /

This research derived data from two sets of interviews with 18 participants who were involved in adult education in either a community college or a university. The purpose was to explore their worldview awareness. Through the interviews, the participants shared their understanding of worldview as a term and concept and as something that might be seen to apply in their practice of teaching. The responses indicated that there are three kinds of awareness (noetic, experiential, and integrative) which appeared to develop upon a landscape of constraints and opportunities. Constraints were seen to fall into the 5 broad categories of institutional, circumstantial, self-imposed, other-imposed, and discipline-related constraints. Opportunities for developing awareness were linked to individual experiences and could occur to different extents in many directions, on different occasions, and in different phases of life. Through this research, and in spite of the prevalence of worldview in the human experience, it was foimd that the term and concept have remained on the margins of educational discourse. Consequently, theory, research, and practice have been deprived of a useful and usable concept.

Creating a Space for Self-Transformation: Factors of Success for Adult Literacy Learners with Specific Learning Difficulties

A significant number of adults in adult literacy programs in Ontario have specific learning difficulties. This study sought to examine the holistic factors that contributed to these learners achieving their goals. Through a case study design, the data revealed that a combination of specific learning methods and strategies, along with particular characteristics of the instructor, participant, and class, and the evidence of self-transformation all seemed to contribute to the participant's success in the program. Instructor-directed teaching and cooperative learning were the main learning methods used in the class. General learning strategies employed were the use of core curriculum and authentic documents, and using phonics, repetition, assistive resources, and using activities that appealed to various learning styles. The instructor had a history of both professional development in the area of learning disabilities as well as experience working with learners who had specific learning difficulties. There also seemed to be a goodness of fit between the participant and the instructor. Several characteristics of the participant seemed to aid in his success: his positive self-esteem, self-advocacy skills, self-determination, self-awareness, and the fact that he enjoyed learning. The size (3-5 people) and type of class (small group) also seemed to have an impact. Finally, evidence that the participant went through a self-transformation seemed to contribute to a positive learner identity. These results have implications for practice, theory, and further research in adult education.