Steeltown scene : genre, performance and identity in the alternative independent music scene in Hamilton, Ontario

This thesis examines the independent alternative music scene in the city of Hamilton, Ontario, also known, with reference to its industrial heritage, as "Steeltown." Drawing on the growing literature on the relationship between place and popular music, on my own experience as a local musician, direct observation of performances and of venues and other sites of interaction, as well as ethnographic interviews with scene participants, I focus on the role of space, genre and performance within the scene, and their contribution to a sense of local identity. In particular, I argue that the live performance event is essential to the success of the local music scene, as it represents an immediate process, a connection between performers and audience, one which is temporally rooted in the present. My research suggests that the Hamilton alternative music scene has become postmodern, embracing forms of "indie" music that lie outside of mainstream taste, and particularly those which engage in the exploration and deconstruction of pre-existing genres. Eventually, however, the creative successes of an "indiescene" permeate mass culture and often become co-opted into the popular music mainstream, a process which, in turn, promotes new experimentation and innovation at the local level.

Nietzsche's eternal recurrence of the same : the effect of logic abridgement, contradictions and inconsistencies

I will argue that the doctrine of eternal recurrence of the same no better interprets cosmology than pink elephants interpret zoology. I will also argue that the eternal-reiurn-of-the-same doctrine as what Magnus calls "existential imperative" is without possibility of application and thus futile. To facilitate those arguments, the validity of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same will be tested under distinct rubrics. Although each rubric will stand alone, one per chapter, as an evaluation of some specific aspect of eternal recurrence, the rubric sequence has been selected to accommodate the identification of what I shall be calling logic abridgments. The conclusions to be extracted from each rubric are grouped under the heading CONCLUSION and appear immediately following rubric ten. Then, or if, at the end of a rubric a reader is inclined to wonder which rubric or topic is next, and why, the answer can be found at the top of the following page. The question is usually answered in the very first sentence, but always answered in the first paragraph. The first rubric has been placed in order by chronological entitlement in that it deals with the evolution of the idea of eternal recurrence from the time of the ancient Greeks to Nietzsche's August, 1881 inspiration. This much-recommended technique is also known as starting at the beginning. Rubric 1 also deals with 20th. Century philosophers' assessments of the relationship between Nietzsche and ancient Greek thought. The only experience of E-R, Zarathustra's mountain vision, is second only because it sets the scene alluded to in following rubrics. The third rubric explores .ii?.ih T jc,i -I'w Nietzsche's evaluation of rationality so that his thought processes will be understood appropriately. The actual mechanism of E-R is tested in rubric four...The scientific proof Nietzsche assembled in support of E-R is assessed by contemporary philosophers in rubric five. E-R's function as an ethical imperative is debated in rubrics six and seven.. .The extent to which E-R fulfills its purpose in overcoming nihilism is measured against the comfort assured by major world religions in rubric eight. Whether E-R also serves as a redemption for revenge is questioned in rubric nine. Rubric ten assures that E-R refers to return of the identically same and not merely the similar. In addition to assemblage and evaluation of all ten rubrics, at the end of each rubric a brief recapitulation of its principal points concludes the chapter. In this essay I will assess the theoretical conditions under which the doctrine cannot be applicable and will show what contradictions and inconsistencies follow if the doctrine is taken to be operable. Harold Alderman in his book Nietzsche's Gift wrote, the "doctrine of eternal recurrence gives us a problem not in Platonic cosmology, but in Socratic selfreflection." ^ I will illustrate that the recurrence doctrine's cosmogony is unworkable and that if it were workable, it would negate self-reflection on the grounds that selfreflection cannot find its cause in eternal recurrence of the same. Thus, when the cosmology is shown to be impossible, any expected ensuing results or benefits will be rendered also impossible. The so-called "heaviest burden" will be exposed as complex, engrossing "what if speculations deserving no linkings to reality. To identify ^Alderman p. 84 abridgments of logic, contradictions and inconsistencies in Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence of the same, I. will examine the subject under the following schedule. In Chapter 1 the ancient origins of recurrence theories will be introduced. ..This chapter is intended to establish the boundaries within which the subsequent chapters, except Chapter 10, will be confined. Chapter 2, Zarathustra's vision of E-R, assesses the sections of Thus Spoke Zarathustra in which the phenomenon of recurrence of the same is reported. ..Nihilism as a psychological difficulty is introduced in this rubric, but that subject will be studied in detail in Chapter 8. In Chapter 2 the symbols of eternal recurrence of the same will be considered. Whether the recurrence image should be of a closed ring or as a coil will be of significance in many sections of my essay. I will argue that neither symbolic configuration can accommodate Nietzsche's supposed intention. Chapter 3 defends the description of E-R given by Zarathustra. Chapter 4, the cosmological mechanics of E-R, speculates on the seriousness with which Nietzsche might have intended the doctrine of eternal recurrence to be taken. My essay reports, and then assesses, the argument of those who suppose the doctrine to have been merely exploratory musings by Nietzsche on cosmological hypotheses...The cosmogony of E-R is examined. In Chapter 5, cosmological proofs tested, the proofs for Nietzsche's doctrine of return of the same are evaluated. This chapter features the position taken by Martin ' Heidegger. My essay suggests that while Heidegger's argument that recurrence of the same is a genuine cosmic agenda is admirable, it is not at all persuasive. Chapter 6, E-R is an ethical imperative, is in essence the reporting of a debate between two scholars regarding the possibility of an imperative in the doctrine of recurrence. Their debate polarizes the arguments I intend to develop. Chapter 7, does E-R of the same preclude alteration of attitudes, is a continuation of the debate presented in Chapter 6 with the focus shifted to the psychological from the cosmological aspects of eternal recurrence of the same. Chapter 8, Can E-R Overcome Nihilism?, is divided into two parts. In the first, nihilism as it applies to Nietzsche's theory is discussed. ..In part 2, the broader consequences, sources and definitions of nihilism are outlined. My essay argues that Nietzsche's doctrine is more nihilistic than are the world's major religions. Chapter 9, Is E-R a redemption for revenge?, examines the suggestion extracted from Thus Spoke Zarathustra that the doctrine of eternal recurrence is intended, among other purposes, as a redemption for mankind from the destructiveness of revenge. Chapter 10, E-R of the similar refuted, analyses a position that an element of chance can influence the doctrine of recurrence. This view appears to allow, not for recurrence of the same, but recurrence of the similar. A summary will recount briefly the various significant logic abridgments, contradictions, and inconsistencies associated with Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence of the same. In the 'conclusion' section of my essay my own opinions and observations will be assembled from the body of the essay.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

The role of a minor party : a comparative study of the British Liberal Party and the Australian Country Party since 1918

and the Australian Country Party since 1918. 2. The thesis examines the proposition that the role of a minor party is determined, not by its total strength expressed as a percentage of the national vote, but by how its strength is concentrated. Australia and Britain were chosen for the comparison because of the many similarities in political culture and in the extent of class voting. Each country has a party - the Country Party in Australia and the Liberal Party in Britain - which has had a distinct impact on the political scene in their respective countries. In the period from 1918 to the present day neither party, at the national level, has ever held the largest number of seats in parliament let alone a majority of seats, and it is in this sense that they are herein defined as minor parties. In the thesis the constitutional background of and differences between Australia and Britain are reviewed, followed by a brief historical picture of each of the two parties being studied. The sources of supporc of the two parties are analysed and it is here that real differences emerge. The Country Party in Australia is a deliberately sectional party with a narrow rural base, whereas the British Liberal Party is more broadly based than either the Labour or Conservative Parties in Britain. 3. Party leadership and organisation are then discussed. Both parties have had outstanding leaders, Earle Page and McEwen for the Country Party; Asquith, Lloyd George and Grimond for the Liberal Party. Both parties have had relatively fewer leaders than their major party opponents. However, whereas the Country Party has been free of serious splits the Liberal Party was shattered on the leadership struggles of Asquith and Lloyd George. Both parties have been identified with decentralisation of state power, the Country Party through its support, albeit sometimes lukewarm of the New States Movement; the Liberal Party through its espousal of a federal system for Britain with separate Welsh, Scottish and regional assemblies. Unfortunately for the British Liberal Party the beneficiaries of their policies in this area have been relatively new nationalist parties in both Wales arid Scotland. The major part of the thesis is devoted to a study of how the electoral systems in the two countries have, in practice, worked to the advantage or disadvantage of the Country Party and the British Liberal Party. The Country Party has been as consistently over-represented in the House of Representatives as the Liberal Party has been under-represented in the British House of Commons. With the even distribution of its support the introduction of the single transferable vote, in itself, would bring little benefit to the British Liberal Party in terms of seats. Multimember urban constituencies combined with some type of list system are the only way the Liberals are likely to obtain House of Commons seats in proportion to their votes. 4. Finally, the relations of the two minor parties with their respective major parties are considered. In the conclusion the future of the two parties is reviewed. In general terms it appears that the Country Party is faced with a slow decline. Although the British Liberal Party made a major breakthrough, in terms of votes, in the February 1974 election, they were unable to maintain this momentum in the October election, even though they lost very little ground. In the long term they must make an inroad into Labour held seats if they are to progress further.

"I might be a duck, but I'm human" : an analysis of clothing in Disney cartoons

Mickey Mouse, one of the world's most recognizable cartoon characters, did not wear a shirt in his earliest incarnation in theatrical shorts and, for many years, Donald Duck did not wear pants and still rarely does so. Especially when one considers the era in which these figures were first created by the Walt Disney Studio, in the 1920s and 1930s, why are they portrayed without full clothing? The obvious answer, of course, is that they are animals, and animals do not wear clothes. But these are no ordinary animals: in most cases, they do wear clothing - some clothing, at least - and they walk on two legs, talk in a more or less intelligible fashion, and display a number of other anthropomorphic traits. If they are essentially animals, why do they wear clothing at all? On the other hand, if these characters are more human than animal, as suggested by other behavioral traits - they walk, talk, work, read, and so on - why are they not more often fully clothed? To answer these questions I undertook three major research strategies used to gather evidence: interpretive textual analysis of 321 cartoons; secondary analysis of interviews conducted with the animators who created the Disney characters; and historical and archival research on the Disney Company and on the times and context in which it functioned. I was able to identify five themes that played a large part in what kind of clothing a character wore; first, the character's gender and/or sexuality; second, what species or "race" the character was; third, the character's socio-economic status; fourth, the degree to which the character was anthropomorphized; and, fifth, the context in which the character and its clothing appeared in a particular scene or narrative. I concluded that all of these factors played a part in determining, to some extent, the clothing worn by particular characters at particular times. However, certain patterns emerged from the analysis that could not be explained by these factors alone or in combination. Therefore, my analysis also investigates the individual and collective attitudes and desires of the men in the Disney studio who were responsible for creating these characters and the cultural conditions under which they were created. Drawing on literature from the psychoanalytic approach to film studies, I argue that the clothing choices spoke to an idealized fantasy world to which the animators (most importantly, Walt Disney himself), and possibly wider society, wanted to return.

Tintype of African American Woman Standing with Book [n.d.]

A woman standing with a book beside a table covered with a decorative cloth is featured in this small black and white tintype photograph. The tintype has been mounted in a paper slip frame with gold edging. There is a small area of red, hand-colored highlighting on the tablecloth. The backdrop appears to be a painted landscape scene. The tintype is undated and there is no indication of the identity of the woman in the photo or the photographer. This tintype was in the possession of Iris Sloman Bell, of St. Catharines, Ontario. The Sloman - Bell families have relatives who are former slaves from the United States who later settled in southern Ontario."Tintypes were the invention of Prof. Hamilton Smith of Ohio. They begin as thin sheets of iron, covered with a layer of black paint. This serves as the base for the same iodized collodion coating and silver nitrate bath used in the ambrotype process. First made in 1856, millions were produced well into the twentieth century. When tintypes were finished in the same sorts of mats and cases used for ambrotypes, it can be almost impossible to distinguish which process was used without removing the image to examine the substrate." Source: American Museum of Photography http://www.photographymuseum.com/primer.html

Formalizing affordances in situation

The representation of a perceptual scene by a computer is usually limited to numbers representing dimensions and colours. The theory of affordances attempted to provide a new way of representing an environment, with respect to a particular agent. The view was introduced as part of an entire field of psychology labeled as 'ecological,' which has since branched into computer science through the field of robotics, and formal methods. This thesis will describe the concept of affordances, review several existing formalizations, and take a brief look at applications to robotics. The formalizations put forth in the last 20 years have no agreed upon structure, only that both the agent and the environment must be taken in relation to one another. Situation theory has also been evolving since its inception in 1983 by Barwise & Perry. The theory provided a formal way to represent any arbitrary piece of information in terms of relations. This thesis will take a toy version of situation theory published in CSLI lecture notes no. 22, and add to the given ontologies. This thesis extends the given ontologies to include specialized affordance types, and individual object types. This allows for the definition of semantic objects called environments, which support a situation and a set of affordances, and niches which refer to a set of actions for an individual. Finally, a possible way for an environment to change into a new environment is suggested via the activation of an affordance.

Sketches of the Battle Fields of Ontario from the War of 1812, July 15, 1876.

Accompanying caption from the Canadian Illustrated News, July 15, 1876: “We publish today a page of sketches consisting of the following battle fields in Ontario :--Lundy’s Lane where, without doubt, the hardest fought battle of 1812-15 took place, and in which more troops were engaged than in any other engagement of that war : the battle field of Stony Creek where the Canadians and Indians made a night attack on the Americans and achieved a victory over a greatly superior force and obliged the Americans to retreat back to the shelter of Old Fort George which was the scene of many engagements during the war. Beaver Dam battle field is just in the suburbs of the thriving village of Thorold, and the monument covers the remains of several soldiers whose bodies were unearthed during the building of the new Welland Canal at that place.”

Recreation at Crystal Beach - Postcards

Board with six postcards of Crystal Beach. First postcard, Steamer "Americana" leaving foot of Main St. Second postcard, Divers at Crystal Beach, Canada. Third postcard, Cyclone Coaster, Crystal Beach, Ontario. Fourth postcard, Scenic Railway, Crystal Beach, Ont. Fifth postcard, Scene in the Park, Crystal Beach, Ont. Sixth postcard, Scene on the Midway, Crystal Beach, Canada.

Fonthill to Fenwick - Postcards

Board of six postcards of Fonthill to Fenwick. First postcard, "The parting of the ways", Fonthill. Second postcard, Canboro Road, looking west, Fonthill. Third postcard, unknown caption, Fenwick. Fourth postcard, Dominion Canners, Factory No. 50, Fonthill, Canada. Fifth postcard, Street Scene, Ridgeville. Sixth postcard, Post Office, Ridgeville.

An Investigation of the Role of Attention in the Cross-Race Effect: An Ecological Approach

The current set of studies was conducted to examine the cross-race effect (CRE), a phenomenon commonly found in the face perception literature. The CRE is evident when participants display better own-race face recognition accuracy than other-race recognition accuracy (e.g. Ackerman et al., 2006). Typically the cross-race effect is attributed to perceptual expertise, (i.e., other-race faces are processed less holistically; Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung & Caldara, 2006), and the social cognitive model (i.e., other-race faces are processed at the categorical level by virtue of being an out-group member; Hugenberg, Young, Bernstein, & Sacco, 2010). These effects may be mediated by differential attention. I investigated whether other-race faces are disregarded and, consequently, not remembered as accurately as own-race (in-group) faces. In Experiment 1, I examined how the magnitude of the CRE differed when participants learned individual faces sequentially versus when they learned multiple faces simultaneously in arrays comprising faces and objects. I also examined how the CRE differed when participants recognized individual faces presented sequentially versus in arrays of eight faces. Participants’ recognition accuracy was better for own-race faces than other-race faces regardless of familiarization method. However, the difference between own- and other-race accuracy was larger when faces were familiarized sequentially in comparison to familiarization with arrays. Participants’ response patterns during testing differed depending on the combination of familiarization and testing method. Participants had more false alarms for other-race faces than own-race faces if they learned faces sequentially (regardless of testing strategy); if participants learned faces in arrays, they had more false alarms for other-race faces than own-races faces if ii i they were tested with sequentially presented faces. These results are consistent with the perceptual expertise model in that participants were better able to use the full two seconds in the sequential task for own-race faces, but not for other-race faces. The purpose of Experiment 2 was to examine participants’ attentional allocation in complex scenes. Participants were shown scenes comprising people in real places, but the head stimuli used in Experiment 1 were superimposed onto the bodies in each scene. Using a Tobii eyetracker, participants’ looking time for both own- and other-race faces was evaluated to determine whether participants looked longer at own-race faces and whether individual differences in looking time correlated with individual differences in recognition accuracy. The results of this experiment demonstrated that although own-race faces were preferentially attended to in comparison to other-race faces, individual differences in looking time biases towards own-race faces did not correlate with individual differences in own-race recognition advantages. These results are also consistent with perceptual expertise, as it seems that the role of attentional biases towards own-race faces is independent of the cognitive processing that occurs for own-race faces. All together, these results have implications for face perception tasks that are performed in the lab, how accurate people may be when remembering faces in the real world, and the accuracy and patterns of errors in eyewitness testimony.

How are Girls' Attitudes Toward Cyberbullying Affected by Drama for Social Intervention?

This is a study exploring teenaged girls’ understanding and experiences of cyberbullying as a contemporary social phenomenon. Participants included 4 Grade 11 and 12 girls from a medium-sized independent school in southwestern Ontario, Canada. The girls participated in 9 extracurricular study sessions from January to April 2013. During the sessions, they engaged with Drama for Social Intervention (Clark, 2009; Conrad, 2004; Lepp, 2011) activities with the intended goal of producing a collective creation. Qualitative data were collected throughout the sessions using fieldnotes, participant journals, interviews, and participant artefacts. The findings are presented as an ethnodrama (Campbell & Conrad, 2006; Denzin, 2003; Saldaña, 1999) with each thematic statement forming a title of a scene in the script (Rogers, Frellick, & Babinski, 2002). The study found that girl identity online consists of many disconnected avatars. It also suggested that distancing (Eriksson, 2011) techniques, used to engender safety in Drama for Social Intervention, might have contributed to participant disengagement with the study’s content. Implications for further research included the utility of arts-based methods to promote participants’ feelings of growth and reflection, and a reevaluation of cyberbullying discourses to better reflect girls’ multiple avatar identities. Implications for teachers and administrators encompassed a need for preventative approaches to cyberbullying education, incorporating affective empathy-building (Ang & Goh, 2010) and addressing girls’ feelings of safety in perceived anonymity online.

Illustration - "Grape Culture - A new Source of Canadian Wealth"

An illustration from the "Canadian Illustrated News" that shows a group of individuals "gathering the fruit" and then a "scene in the vineyard".

Ontario Forest Industries Association records, 1900-1989, n.d.

The Ontario Forest Industries Association (OFIA) was founded in 1944. It is a provincial trade association that represents member companies who produce a wide range of products, including pulp, paper, paperboard, lumber, panelboard, plywood and veneer. The OFIA works with its member companies to address issues of common interest and concern, and communicates these issues to the appropriate government, industrial or business sector. The Ontario Forest Information Service represented the OFIA from 1951 to 1988 as the publishers of their industry periodicals. Bush News was the first periodical published by the Service for the OFIA and ran until 1964, when it was replaced by Ontario Logger. In 1968, the name was changed to The Logger. In 1970, this was replaced by The Forest Scene. This new periodical was a departure from the earlier versions, which had served primarily as an internal communication system for the industry. The Forest Scene adopted a new format and editorial approach, emphasizing outdoor activities, recreation, hunting and fishing, conservation, and forestry operations and methods, thus appealing to a much wider readership. The Forest Scene ceased publication in 1988.

Drawing, St. Catharines House on February 26, 1849

A drawing done on paper 50cm x 45cm and mounted in a frame under glass. This is a drawing of a meeting held at the St. Catharines House on February 26, 1849. The drawing was done from memory by W. Osborn who has signed the picture on one of the pillars on the right hand side of the picture. The caption under the picture reads "Act 1st Scene 1st". There is some dialogue, "Woodruff - 'He says gentlemen, my son holds an office under Government, of 400 pounds per year - he forgot to tell you, he sold his constituents at Cornwall' - Macdonald 'You're a liar'". The artist portrays a fight breaking out and lists the characters as Boyd , Rykert, Hobdon, Foley, The Sheriff, Woodruff, J.W.O. Clarke, McDonald, Lamb, Hamilton and Hathaway. There are some very slight wrinkles and tears in the drawing. They do not affect the drawing. [Rolland MacDonald (1810-1881) represented Cornwall in the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada from 1844-1846. He was called to the bar in 1832 and set up practice in St. Catharines. The quote on the drawing concerns the constituents at Cornwall. This meeting was covered in reports in the St. Catharines Journal on: March 1, March 8, march 15 and march 22, 1849. There is also an excerpt in William Hamilton Merritt's diary noting the riot and the sketch by Osborn].