CEO Compensation, Compensation Risk, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Technology Firms

Literature suggests that CEOs of technology firms earn higher pay than CEOs of non-technology firms. I investigate whether compensation risk explains the difference in compensation between technology firms and non-technology firms. Controlling for firm size and performance, I find that CEOs in technology firms have higher pay, but also have much higher compensation risk compared to non-technology firms. Compensation risk explains the major part of the difference in CEO pay. My study is consistent with the labor market economics view that CEOs earn competitive risk-adjusted total compensation.

Managerial Risk-Taking and CEO Excess Compensation

This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, I provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, I find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation

Stress, social support, and health risk behaviours as mediators of the forgiveness-health relation /

The mediating roles of stress, social support, and health risk behaviours in the relationships between dispositional forgiveness and mental and physical health were examined. Participants were 748 undergraduate students (554 women, 194 men) entering their first year of studies at Brock University. Participants, ranging in age from 17 to 25 years, completed the Brock University First Year Health Study and were provided monetary compensation. Dispositional forgiveness, stress, social support, health risk behaviours, mental health, and physical health were measured using self-report methods. The data were analyzed separately for women and men because there were significant mean differences on many of the study'S variables. Analyses revealed that the mediated relationships between dispositional forgiveness and health were generally stronger for women than men. Stress was the most robust mediator of the forgiveness-health relation for both women and men. The only health risk behaviour that mediated the forgivenesshealth relation was physical fitness and this result was found for women only. Social support mediated several of the relationships between forgiveness and health but not others. Results were discussed with reference to the literature on forgiveness and health. Several directions for future research were offered, such as conducting longitudinal research designs to assess the direction of causality better, investigating moderator variables of the forgiveness-health relation, and building models, which incorporate multiple mediators using structural equation modelling techniques.

Effect of executive compensation on firm performance

The paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders.