Caseflow management and the politics of professionalism : lawyers and independent paralegals

Caseflow Management is a public sector program designed to promote effective management of cases through the resolution process in the public court system. Given its public nature caseflow management policy is ultimately an exercise in political will. To date that political will has been dominated by the legal profession which has influenced the Ministry of the Attorney General to limit the term~ of reference for caseflow management and its application to a narrow range of alternatives which are primarily in the interest of the legal profession. This thesis will explain the nature and extent of the politics within the legal profession that impact on caseflow management and demonstrate the potential for better serving the public interest by eXl~anding its terms of reference to incorporate independent paralegals and public / private sector partnerships in the Ontario Provincial Court System for highway traffic offences and other matters of a summary conviction nature.

Modeling short-range ballistic missile defense and Israel's Iron Dome system

This paper develops a model of short-range ballistic missile defense and uses it to study the performance of Israel’s Iron Dome system. The deterministic base model allows for inaccurate missiles, unsuccessful interceptions, and civil defense. Model enhancements consider the trade-offs in attacking the interception system, the difficulties faced by militants in assembling large salvos, and the effects of imperfect missile classification by the defender. A stochastic model is also developed. Analysis shows that system performance can be highly sensitive to the missile salvo size, and that systems with higher interception rates are more “fragile” when overloaded. The model is calibrated using publically available data about Iron Dome’s use during Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012. If the systems performed as claimed, they saved Israel an estimated 1778 casualties and $80 million in property damage, and thereby made preemptive strikes on Gaza about 8 times less valuable to Israel. Gaza militants could have inflicted far more damage by grouping their rockets into large salvos, but this may have been difficult given Israel’s suppression efforts. Counter-battery fire by the militants is unlikely to be worthwhile unless they can obtain much more accurate missiles.