"Re-huminization": the role of human-animal similarity in predicting prejudice towards immigrants and non-human animals

Research implies that there ~ay be an association between attitudes toward margil1alized human outgroups and non-human animals. Very few studies, however, have specifically tested this relation empirically. The general purpose of the present research was to determine if such a relation exists and if perceptions of human-animal similarity avail as a common predictor of both types of attitudes. Ideological orientations associated with prejudiced attitudes (Social Dominance Orientation, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, and Universal Orientation) were also examined as individual differences in predicting perceptions of human-animal similarity. As predicted, people who endorsed prejudiced attitudes toward human outgroups (Study 1) and immigrants in particular (Studies 2 and 3), were more likely to endorse prejudiced attitudes toward non-human animals. In Study 2, perceptions that humans are superior (versus similar) to other animals directly predicted higher levels of prejudice toward non-human animals, whereas the effect of human superiority beliefs on immigrant prejudice was mediated by dehumanization. In other words, greater perceptions of humans as superior (versus similar) to other animals "allowed for" greater dehumanization of immigrants, which in turn resulted in heightened immigrant prejudice. Furthermore, people higher in Social Dominance Orientation or Right-Wing Authoritarianism were particularly likely to perceive humans as superior (versus similar) to other animals, whereas people characterized by a greater Universal Orientation were more likely to perceive humans and non-human animals as similar. Study 3 examined whether inducing perceptions of human-animal similarity through experimental manipulation would lead to more favourable attitudes toward non-human animals and immigrants. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of four 11 editorials designed to highlight either the similarities or differences between humans and other animals (i.e., animals are similar to humans; humans are similar to animals;~~nimals are inferior to humans; humans are superior to animals) or to a neutral control condition. Encouragingly, when animals were described as similar to humans, prejudice towards non-human animals and immigrants was significantly lower, and to some extent this finding was also true for people naturally high in prejudice (i.e., high in Social Dominance Orientation or Right-Wing Authoritarianism). Inducing perceptions that nonhuman animals are similar to humans was particularly effective at reducing the tendency to dehumanize immigrants ("re-humanization"), lowering feelings of personal threat regarding one's animal-nature, and at increasing inclusive intergroup representations and empathy, all of which uniquely accounted for the significant decreases in prejudiced attitudes. Implications for research, theory and prejudice interventions are considered.

Predictors of prejudice perceptions and the role of group identification in international students

The purpose of the present study was first to determine what influences international students' perceptions of prejudice, and secondly to examine how perceptions of prejudice would affect international students' group identification. Variables such as stigma vulnerability and contact which have been previously linked with perceptions of prejudice and intergroup relations were re-examined (Berryman-Fink, 2006; Gilbert, 1998; Nesdale & Todd, 2000), while variables classically linked to prejudicial attitudes such as right-wing authoritarianism and openness to experience were explored in relation to perceptions of prejudice. Furthermore, the study examined how perceptions of prejudice might affect the students' identification choices, by testing two opposing models. The first model was based on the motivational nature of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) while the second model was based on the cognitive nature of self-categorization theory/ rejection-identification model (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Schmitt, Spears, & Branscombe,2003). It was hypothesized that stigma vulnerability, right-wing authoritarianism, openness to experience and contact would predict both personal and group perceptions of prejudice. It was also hypothesized that perceptions of prejudice would predict group identification. If the self-categorizationlrejection-identification model was supported, international students would identify with the international students. If the social mobility strategy was supported, international students would identify with the university students group. Participants were 98 international students who filled out questionnaires on the Brock University Psychology Department Website. The first hypothesis was supported. The combination of stigma vulnerability, right-wing authoritarianism, openness to experience and contact predicted both personal and group prejudice perceptions of international students. Furthermore, the analyses supported the self-categorizationlrejectionidentification model. International identification was predicted by the combination of personal and group prejudice perceptions of international students.

Determinants and Consequences of Dehumanization: An Interspecies Model of Prejudice

Dehumanizing ideologies that explicitly liken other humans to “inferior” animals can have negative consequences for intergroup attitudes and relations. Surprisingly, very little is known about the causes of dehumanization, and essentially no research has examined strategies for reducing dehumanizing tendencies. The Interspecies Model of Prejudice specifies that animalistic dehumanization may be rooted in basic hierarchical beliefs regarding human superiority over animals. This theoretical reasoning suggests that narrowing the human-animal divide should also reduce dehumanization. The purpose of the present dissertation, therefore, was to gain a more complete understanding of the predictors of and solutions to dehumanization by examining the Interspecies Model of Prejudice, first from a layperson’s perspective and then among young children. In Study 1, laypeople strongly rejected the human-animal divide as a probable cause of, or solution to, dehumanization, despite evidence that their own personal beliefs in the human-animal divide positively predicted their dehumanization (and prejudice) scores. From Study 1, it was concluded that the human-animal divide, despite being a robust empirical predictor of dehumanization, is largely unrecognized as a probable cause of, or solution to, dehumanization by non-experts in the psychology of prejudice. Studies 2 and 3 explored the expression of dehumanization, as well as the Interspecies Model of Prejudice, among children ages six to ten years (Studies 2 and 3) and parents (Study 3). Across both studies, White children showed evidence of racial dehumanization by attributing a Black child target fewer “uniquely human” characteristics than the White child target, representing the first systematic evidence of racial dehumanization among children. In Study 3, path analyses supported the Interspecies Model of Prejudice among children. Specifically, children’s beliefs in the human-animal divide predicted greater racial prejudice, an effect explained by heightened racial dehumanization. Moreover, parents’ Social Dominance Orientation (preference for social hierarchy and inequality) positively predicted children’s human-animal divide beliefs. Critically, these effects remained significant even after controlling for established predictors of child-prejudice (i.e., parent prejudice, authoritarian parenting, and social-cognitive skills) and relevant child demographics (i.e., age and sex). Similar patterns emerged among parent participants, further supporting the Interspecies Model of Prejudice. Encouragingly, children reported narrower human-animal divide perceptions after being exposed to an experimental prime (versus control) that highlighted the similarities among humans and animals. Together the three studies reported in this dissertation offer important and novel contributions to the dehumanization and prejudice literature. Not only did we find the first systematic evidence of racial dehumanization among children, we established the human-animal divide as a meaningful dehumanization precursor. Moreover, empirical support was obtained for the Interspecies Model of Prejudice among diverse samples including university students (Study 1), children (Studies 2 and 3), and adult-aged samples (Study 3). Importantly, each study also highlights the promising social implication of targeting the human-animal divide in interventions to reduce dehumanization and other prejudicial processes.

"I like my beer cold, my TV loud, and my homosexuals flaming!" : preference for stereotype consistency as a function of a person x situation interaction /

The study centers on the power of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) as predictors of prejudice against stereotypical and nonstereotypical homosexuals under the threat of death and the threat of uncertainty. Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) is an individual difference variable that measures the tendency for individuals to unquestionably follow those perceived to be authorities. Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) is an individual difference variable that measures the degree to which an individual prefers inequality among social groups. The RWA and SDO Scales are considered to be two of the strongest predictors of prejudice, such as prejudice against homosexuals. The study focuses on the unique predictive power of these two variables in predicting prejudice against homosexuals. The study also examines the role of situational threat in prejudice, specifically the threat of death (mortality salience) and the threat of uncertainty (uncertainty salience). Competing predictions from theories involving the threat of death (Terror Management Theory) and the threat of uncertainty (Uncertainty Management Theory) are also tested. The preference for expected information in the form of stereotypes concerning male homosexuals (that is, a stereotypical or non-stereotypical homosexual) were tested. The difference between the predictive power ofRWA and SDO was examined by measuring how these variables predict liking of a stereotypical or non-stereotypical homosexual under the threat of death, the threat of uncertainty, or a control condition. Along with completing a measure for RWA and a measure for SDO, participants were asked to think of their own death, of their being uncertain or about watching television then were asked to read about a week in the life of either a stereotypical or non-stereotypical male homosexual. Participants were then asked to evaluate the individual and his essay. Based on the participants' evaluations, results from 180 heterosexual university students show that RWA and SDO are strong predictors for disliking of a stereotypical homosexual under the threat of uncertainty and disliking of a non-stereotypical homosexual under the threat of death. Furthermore, however, results show that RWA is a particularly strong predictor of disliking of a stereotypical homosexual under the threat of uncertainty, whereas SDO is an exceptionally strong predictor of disliking of the non-stereotypical homosexual under the threat of death. This further adds to the notion that RWA and SDO are indeed unique predictors of prejudice. Implications are also explored, including the fact that the study simuhaneously examined the role of individual difference variables and situational threat variables, as well as exploratory analysis on Dominating Authoritarians.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Perceptions of intergroup bias : the roles of social projection and meta-stereotypes

Underlying intergroup perceptions include processes of social projection (perceiving personal traitslbeliefs in others, see Krueger 1998) and meta-stereotyping (thinking about other groups' perceptions of one's own group, see Vorauer et aI., 1998). Two studies were conducted to investigate social projection and meta-stereotypes in the domain of White-Black racial relations. Study 1, a correlational study, examined the social projection of prejudice and 'prejudiced' meta-stereotypes among Whites. Results revealed that (a) Whites socially projected their intergroup attitudes onto other Whites (and Blacks) [i.e., Whites higher in prejudice against Blacks believed a large percentage of Whites (Blacks) are prejudiced against Blacks (Whites), whereas Whites low in prejudice believed a smaller percentage of Whites (Blacks) are prejudiced]; (b) Whites held the meta:..stereotype that their group (Whites) is viewed by Blacks to be prejudiced; and (c) prejudiced meta-stereotypes may be formed through the social projection of intergroup attitudes (result of path-model tests). Further, several correlates of social projection and meta-stereotypes were identified, including the finding that feeling negatively stereotyped by an outgroup predicted outgroup avoidance through heightened intergroup anxiety. Study 2 replicated and extended these findings, investigating the social projection of ingroup favouritism and meta- and other-stereotypes about ingroup favouritism. These processes were examined experimentally using an anticipated intergroup contact paradigm. The goal was to understand the experimental conditions under which people would display the strongest social projection of intergroup attitudes, and when experimentally induced meta-stereotypes (vs. other-stereotypes; beliefs about the group 11 preferences of one's outgroup) would be most damaging to intergroup contact. White participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions and received (alleged) feedback from a previously completed computer-based test. Depending on condition, this information suggested that: (a) the participant favoured Whites over Blacks; (b) previous White participants favoured Whites over Blacks; (c) the participant's Black partner favoured Blacks over Whites; (d) previous Black participants favoured Blacks over Whites; (e) the participant's Black partner viewed the participant to favour Whites over Blacks; or (£) Black participants previously participating viewed Whites to favour Whites over Blacks. In a defensive reaction, Whites exhibited enhanced social projection of personal intergroup attitudes onto their ingroup under experimental manipulations characterized by self-concept threat (i.e., when the computer revealed that the participant favoured the ingroup or was viewed to favour the ingroup). Manipulated meta- and otherstereotype information that introduced intergroup contact threat, on the other hand, each exerted a strong negative impact on intergroup contact expectations (e.g., anxiety). Personal meta-stereotype manipulations (i.e., when the participant was informed that her/ his partner thinks s/he favours the ingroup) exerted an especially negative impact on intergroup behaviour, evidenced by increased avoidance of the upcoming interracial interaction. In contrast, personal self-stereotype manipulations (i.e., computer revealed that one favoured the ingroup) ironically improved upcoming intergroup contact expectations and intentions, likely due to an attempt to reduce the discomfort of holding negative intergroup attitudes. Implications and directions for future research are considered.

Letter From Sir Isaac Brock to James FitzGibbon - July 29, 1812

A two page letter written by Sir Isaac Brock in York, Upper Canada to James FitzGibbon on July 29, 1812. The name of the recipient is not included but according to Mary Agnes FitzGibbon, one can find a transcript of the letter in her "A Veteran of 1812", page 60.[1812], 29 July: Major-General Isaac Brock, York, to James FitzGibbon. I lament that you should have been so long impressed with the idea that I possessed the means of being serviceable to you. I had scarcely heard of Mr. Johnson having declined a Company in the Glengarry (which would have given me the nomination) but I received account of his being reinstated. I consequently thought no more of the business thinking that officer was enjoying the fruits of his good fortune. I know not positively whether Mr. Johnson is reinstated, but being under obligations to promote his views, I cannot possibly interfere to his prejudice. I rather wonder you did not hear that Lieut Lamont had long ago my promise of nominating him to the Company provided it became vacant, which of course would have precluded my application in your behalf. Altho you must be sensible of the impossibility of my taking any step to forward your views in the present case, yet be assured I shall always feel happy in any opportunity that may offer to do your service. To a person unaccustomed to my writing I scarcely would hazard sending this scrawl. I am, Dear Sir, Yours faithfully, Isaac Brock I should like to be among the 49th at this moment. I am satisfied they will support and even add to their former fame. They have my very best wishes. The 41st are behaving nobly at Amherstburg.

Exploring the impact of outgroup membership discoveries on individual outcomes and intergroup relations

Group memberships represent important components of identity, with people holding membership in various groups and categories. The groups that one belongs to are known as ingroups, and the groups that one does not belong to are known as outgroups. Movement between groups can occur, such that an individual becomes a member of a former outgroup. In some cases, this movement between groups can represent a sudden discovery for the self and/or others, especially when one becomes a member of an ambiguous, concealable, or otherwise not readily visible group. The effects of this type of movement, however, are poorly documented. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate these outgroup membership discoveries, examining the individual intrapsychic, interpersonal, and potential intergroup effects of both self- and other-outgroup membership discoveries. Specifically, discoveries of homosexuality were examined in three studies. In Study 1, hypothetical reactions to self- and other-homosexuality discovery were assessed; in Study 2, the effects of discovering self-homosexuality (vs. self-heterosexuality) were experimentally examined; and in Study 3, the effects of discovering another’s homosexuality earlier relative to later in a developing friendship were experimentally examined. Study 1 revealed that, upon a discovery of self-homosexuality, participants expected negative emotions and a more negative change in feelings toward the self. Upon a discovery of a friend’s homosexuality, participants expected a more negative change in feelings toward the friend, but more a positive change in feelings toward homosexuals. For both hypothetical self- and friend- homosexuality discoveries, more negative expected emotions predicted more negative expected change in feelings toward the target individual (the self or friend), which in turn predicted more negative expected change in feelings toward homosexuals as a group. Further, for self-homosexuality discovery, the association between negative expected emotions and negative expected change in feelings toward the self was stronger among those higher in authoritarianism. Study 2 revealed that, upon discovering one’s own homosexuality (vs. heterosexuality), heterosexual participants experienced more negative emotions, more fear of discrimination, and more negative self-evaluations. The effect of the homosexuality discovery manipulation on negative self-evaluations was mediated by fear of discrimination. Further, those higher in authoritarianism or pre-test prejudice toward homosexuals demonstrated more negative emotions following the manipulation. Study 3 revealed that upon discovering an interaction partner’s homosexuality earlier (vs. later) participants reported a more positive contact experience, a closer bond with the partner, and more positive attitudes toward the partner. Earlier (vs. later) discovery predicted more positive contact experience, which in turn predicted a closer bond with the partner. Closer bond with the partner subsequently predicted more positive evaluations of the partner. Interestingly, the association between bond with partner and more positive attitudes toward the partner was stronger among those higher in authoritarianism or pre-test prejudice toward homosexuals. Overall, results suggest that self-homosexuality discovery results in negative outcomes, whereas discovering another’s homosexuality can result in positive outcomes, especially when homosexuality is discovered earlier (vs. later). Implications of these findings for both actual outgroup membership discoveries and social psychological research are discussed.

Subjective Ambivalence and the Expression of Anti-Gay Bias

Univalent attitudes toward gay people have been widely studied, but no research to date has examined ambivalent (i.e., torn, conflicted) attitudes toward gay people. However, the Justification-Suppression Model (JSM; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) proposes that ambivalence leads to biased expressions through intrapsychic processes which facilitate biased expression, particularly in contexts presenting strong justifications for expressing prejudice and weak pressures to suppress prejudice. I test these implications in the context of bias toward gay people. In Study 1, the measurement of ambivalence is examined in terms of both subjective ambivalence (i.e., the reported experience of “torn” attitudes) and calculated ambivalence (i.e., mathematical conflict between positive and negative attitude components). I find that higher subjective ambivalence is only associated with more negative attitudes toward gay people (and not positive attitudes toward gay people), and that higher subjective ambivalence predicts less gay rights support even after taking negative and positive attitudes toward gay people into account. Further, higher subjective ambivalence is associated with ideological opposition to gay people and more negative intergroup emotions (e.g., intergroup disgust). These findings suggest it is valuable to examine the unique component of subjective ambivalence separate from univalent negativity. Because calculated ambivalence measures are mathematically dependent upon a univalent negative measure, they cannot be examined separately from negativity. Therefore, subjective ambivalence is the focus of Study 2. The main goals of Study 2 were to determine why and when subjective ambivalence is related to bias. I examined the extent to which the negative relation between subjective ambivalence and opposition to anti-gay bullying can be accounted for by lower intergroup empathy and lower collective guilt, which may facilitate the expression of bias in keeping with the JSM. The relation between subjective ambivalence and anti-gay bullying opposition was examined within four social contexts based on a 2 (high vs. low offensiveness) x 2 (normatively unjustified vs. normatively justified) manipulation. I expected that higher subjective ambivalence would be most strongly related to lower intergroup empathy and collective guilt when there are the strongest justifications for bias expression, and that lower intergroup empathy and collective guilt would lead to less opposition to anti-gay bullying. Higher subjective ambivalence predicted less anti-gay bullying opposition. After accounting for positivity and negativity, the direct effect of subjective ambivalence was no longer significant, yet subjective ambivalence uniquely predicted intergroup empathy, which in turn predicted less anti-gay bullying opposition. These findings provide evidence that subjective ambivalence is largely negative in nature, but also presents evidence for a unique component of subjective ambivalence (separate from univalent attitudes) associated with low intergroup empathy and negativity. In contrast to previous research, I found very little evidence for the context-dependency of subjective ambivalence. Further research on subjective ambivalence, including subjective ambivalence toward other social groups, may expand our understanding of the factors leading to biased expressions.

Subliminal Exposure to Empathy Primes: A New Method to Reduce Intergroup Bias?

An abundant literature has demonstrated the benefits of empathy for intergroup relations (e.g., Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002). In addition, empathy has been identified as the mechanism by which various successful prejudice-reduction procedures impact attitudes and behaviour (e.g., Costello & Hodson, 2010). However, standard explicit techniques used in empathy-prejudice research have a number of potential limitations (e.g., resistance; McGregor, 1993). The present project explored an alternative technique, subliminally priming (i.e., outside of awareness) empathy-relevant terms (Study 1), or empathy itself (Study 2). Study 1 compared the effects of exposure to subliminal empathy-relevant primes (e.g., compassion) versus no priming and priming the opposite of empathy (e.g., indifference) on prejudice (i.e., negative attitudes), discrimination (i.e., resource allocation), and helping behaviour (i.e., willingness to empower, directly assist, or expect group change) towards immigrants. Relative to priming the opposite of empathy, participants exposed to primes of empathy-relevant constructs expressed less prejudice and were more willingness to empower immigrants. In addition, the effects were not moderated by individual differences in prejudice-relevant variables (i.e., Disgust Sensitivity, Intergroup Disgust-Sensitivity, Intergroup Anxiety, Social Dominance Orientation, Right-wing Authoritarianism). Study 2 considered a different target category (i.e., Blacks) and attempted to strengthen the effects found by comparing the impact of subliminal empathy primes (relative to no prime or subliminal primes of empathy paired with Blacks) on explicit prejudice towards marginalized groups and Blacks, willingness to help marginalized groups and Blacks, as well as implicit prejudice towards Blacks. In addition, Study 2 considered potential mechanisms for the predicted effects; specifically, general empathy, affective empathy towards Blacks, cognitive empathy towards Blacks, positive mood, and negative mood. Unfortunately, using subliminal empathy primes “backfired”, such that exposure to subliminal empathy primes (relative to no prime) heightened prejudice towards marginalized groups and Blacks, and led to stronger expectations that marginalized groups and Blacks improve their own situation. However, exposure to subliminal primes pairing empathy with Blacks (relative to subliminal empathy primes alone) resulted in less prejudice towards marginalized groups and more willingness to directly assist Blacks, as expected. Interestingly, exposure to subliminal primes of empathy paired with Blacks (vs. empathy alone) resulted in more pro-White bias on the implicit prejudice measure. Study 2 did not find that the potential mediators measured explained the effects found. Overall, the results of the present project do not provide strong support for the use of subliminal empathy primes for improving intergroup relations. In fact, the results of Study 2 suggest that the use of subliminal empathy primes may even backfire. The implications for intergroup research on empathy and priming procedures generally are discussed.

Elisha B. Sherwood letter, February 26, 1845

Elisha Barber Sherwood (1810-1905) was a Presbyterian minister. He began his career as a minister in the Church at Wilson, Niagara County, N.Y., subsequently becoming pastor at various churches in New York, Michigan, and Missouri. He is the author of Fifty Years on the Skirmish Line, a review of his ministerial work.