The carbon disclosure project, an evolution in international environmental corporate governance : motivations and determinants of market response to voluntary disclosures

This paper examines the factors associated with Canadian firms voluntarily disclosing climate change information through the Carbon Disclosure Project. Five hypotheses are presented to explain the factors influencing management's decision to disclose this information. These hypotheses include a response to shareholder activism, domestic institutional investor shareholder activism, signalling, litigation risk, and low cost publicity. Both binary logistic regressions as well as a cross-sectional analysis of the equity market's response to the environmental disclosures being made were used to test these hypotheses. Support was found for shareholder activism, low cost publicity, and litigation risk. However, the equity market's response was not found to be statistically significant.

Accounting for Human Rights Violations Risk: Conflict Minerals Mandatory Disclosures under the Dodd Frank Act

This paper examines the equity market response to firms’ disclosure of human rights violation risk with regard to conflict mineral usage as required by Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (the Act). This paper assesses the aggregate equity market response to regulatory events leading to the passage of the Act, the equity market reaction to voluntary early disclosures and mandatory disclosures of conflict mineral information in Form SD, as well as the determinants of the equity market response. Using a sample of 4,399 US registrants from January 1, 2008 to September 30, 2014, we document a significant negative stock market reaction to the passage of the Act and to conflict minerals disclosures on Form SD. The equity market reaction is more negative and limited to companies that source their minerals from conflict zones, companies with human rights violations, and companies with ambiguous disclosures. Taken together, the results of this study provide an economic justification for companies with poor conflict minerals practices to improve in order to avoid high costs that will arise if firms are forced to disclose human rights abuses. This paper also provides preliminary evidence that Form SD is successful in reducing the governance gap that exposes investors to unnecessary sanction, litigation and reputation risk from firms’ activities in conflict minerals usage.

ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF EMERGING MARKET MUTUAL FUNDS IN CANADA

Emerging markets have received wide attention from investors around the globe because of their return potential and risk diversification. This research examines the selection and timing performance of Canadian mutual funds which invest in fixed-income and equity securities in emerging markets. We use (un)conditional two- and five-factor benchmark models that accommodate the dynamics of returns in emerging markets. We also adopt the cross-sectional bootstrap methodology to distinguish between ‘skill’ and ‘luck’ for individual funds. All the tests are conducted using a comprehensive data set of bond and equity emerging funds over the period of 1989-2011. The risk-adjusted measures of performance are estimated using the least squares method with the Newey-West adjustment for standard errors that are robust to conditional heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The performance statistics of the emerging funds before (after) management-related costs are insignificantly positive (significantly negative). They are sensitive to the chosen benchmark model and conditional information improves selection performance. The timing statistics are largely insignificant throughout the sample period and are not sensitive to the benchmark model. Evidence of timing and selecting abilities is obtained in a small number of funds which is not sensitive to the fees structure. We also find evidence that a majority of individual funds provide zero (very few provide positive) abnormal return before fees and a significantly negative return after fees. At the negative end of the tail of performance distribution, our resampling tests fail to reject the role of bad luck in the poor performance of funds and we conclude that most of them are merely ‘unlucky’.