Creativity and the working artist/teacher : the relationships

The purpose of this qualitative study was to understand the relationships between creativity and the working artist/teacher employed by an art college. The topic emerged from my job as an instructor at The Ontario College of Art which was used as the primary data resource and provided the highest caliber of professionals to chose from. Existent data were used to facilitate the study generated by the research of Cawelti, Rappaport, and Wood (1992). The data were generated by a group of 5 faculty members from The University of Northern Iowa, recognized for their expertise in the arts (a painter, a poet, a sculptor, a novelist, and a photographer). They were asked to respond to the following statement: "In as much detail as you like, list the things that you did, thought, or felt the last time you created an artistic product. II Cawelti, Rappaport, and Wood (1992) produced three models of the creative process, each building on the previous, with the resultant third,being in my opinion, an excellent illustration (text/visual) of the creative process. Model three (Appendix D) presented a "multi-dimensional view of the creative process: time, space, observatility, and consciousnessll (p. 90). Model three utilized a visual mapping device along the bottom of the page linked to text segments above. Both the visual and the text were interrelated so that they harmonized into a comprehensive "picture." The parti'cipants of this qualitative study were asked to consider model three from their professional perspective as artist/teachers. The interpretive sciences directed the methodology. The hermeneutic circle of continuous reflection from the whole to the part and back to the whole was an important aspect of the data analyses. Four members of the Foundation Department at The Ontario College of Art were the key participants. A series of conversational interviews was the primary source of data collection, this was augmented by observation, fie,ldnotes, and follow up telephone interviews. Transcripts of interviews were returned to participants for reflection and the telephone was used to discuss any additional -points raised. Analysis consisted of coding and organizing data according to emerging themes. These themes formed the basis for the narrative stories. The text of the narrative stories were given back to each participant for further comment. Revisions were made until both the researcher and the participants felt that the stories reflected reality. The resultant whole was critiqued from the researcher's perspective. The significance of this study was discussed as it pertains to the working artist/teacher and areas in need of further study are pointed out.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Agnes Ethelwyn Wetherald fonds

An accomplished poet, writer and journalist, Ethelwyn Wetherald’s works were present in all Ontario readers for school children. Among her most notable works are; The Indigo Bird, The Red-Winged Blackbird, and The Pasture Field. The above poem Legacies is one of her most famous works and appears on her gravestone. Wetherald was born in 1857 as the sixth child out of an eventual eleven. Although born in Rockwood Ontario, she spent most of her life in Fenwick (Pelham Township), Ontario, where she died in 1940. Wetherald used her surroundings as her inspiration and focused on nature. She has been coined a nature poet and journalist. Wetherald received her education at both the Friends boarding school in Union Springs, N.Y. and at Pickering College in Pickering Ontario. After her schooling she wrote numerous articles for the Toronto Globe under the pen name Bel Thistelwaite, derived from her Grandmother’s name. These articles lead to a position as Women’s editor of the Globe and later she was part of the Advertiser’s editorial staff in London Ontario. Wetherald continued writing after she was finished with the papers and published six volumes of poetry between 1895 and 1931. Her work was not only known amongst school children, but also attracted the attention of Earl Grey, Governor-General of Canada in 1907 and Sir Wilfred Laurier, Prime Minster of Canada in 1911. In 1921 she published a book entitled Tree Top Morning, which she dedicated to her daughter Dorothy Rungeling who also became an author. Recently Rungeling published Life and works of Ethelwyn Wetherald 1857-1940 : with a selection of her poems and articles about her mother. Rungeling, Dorothy W., Life and works of Ethelwyn Wetherald

Photograph - Dorothy Wetherald Rungeling, 1915

This photograph is of Dorothy Wetherald Rungeling in 1915. She is approximately 4 years old in this image. Dorothy is the adopted daughter of Canadian poet Agnes Ethelwyn Wetherald.

Photograph - William Bliss Carman and Miss M. B. Stevenson, September 1927

A photograph of poet William Bliss Carman and M. B. Stevenson in New Canaan, Connecticut. The photograph from September 1927 was sent to fellow poet Ethelwyn Wetherald in 1932. It was included in a four page letter from Carman to Wetherald. Carman, also Canadian, spent most of his years in the United States, but in his letter he mentions that he "regrets" he cannot keep in closer touch with his fellow Canadian poets.

Letter - Bliss Carman to Ethelwyn Wetherald, 15 Decemer 1897

This letter from William Bliss Carman to Ethelwyn Wetherald in 1897, includes a photo of Carman with Miss M. B. Stevenson from the year 1927. Carman, originally from Canada, had great success as

Dorothy Rungeling fonds, 1887-2013, n.d.

Dorothy Rungeling was born in 1911 and raised in Fenwick, Ontario, by her adopted mother, Ethelwyn Wetherald. After graduating high school, she attended Fort Erie business College. She worked briefly in Toronto and then Hamilton, but eventually took a job with Brown Brothers’ Nursery in Pelham to be closer to home. Dorothy pursued many interests, learning to play the violin, saxophone and clarinet. She met her husband Charles at a local dance where she was playing. In 1939, they opened an automobile and farm machinery business in Welland. In their spare time, they were active in skeet and trap shooting, for which Dorothy won many trophies. In the early 1940s, Dorothy developed a passion for horses, training and showing them in addition to teaching riding at the Welland Riding Club, as well as judging at horse shows. By the late 1940s her interest in horses was waning, but she soon after discovered and pursued a new interest: flying. She joined the Welland Flying Club, obtained a flying licence, and in 1949 purchased her first plane. She proceeded to obtain a Commercial Pilot Licence in 1951, an Instructor’s Licence in 1953, and a Senior Commercial Licence in 1954. She participated in many air races in the 1950s, including the All Women’s International Air Races, the Women’s Transcontinental Air Races, and the Canadian Governor-General’s Cup Air Race. Some of the most notable races were the 1954 International Air Race, where Dorothy met with President Batista of Cuba, and the Governor-General’s Cup Air Race, where she won 1st place in 1953 and 1956 (and was the only woman competing). In 1958, she was also the first Canadian woman to solo pilot a helicopter. That same year she obtained her Airline Transport Licence. She also wrote several articles on aviation, contributing to publications such as Canadian Aviation and Air Facts, a U.S. aviation magazine. In addition to these articles, Dorothy authored several books about her life, as well as a selection of poems and articles by Ethelwyn Wetherald. As planes became more expensive, Dorothy spent less time flying, instead pursuing an interest in sailing. She and her husband bought a sailboat and became members of the Niagara-on-the-Lake Sailing Club. In 2003, Dorothy was awarded the Order of Canada for her accomplishments. She also wrote a regular column for the Voice of Pelham in 2012-2013, called A Century in Pelham. Dorothy celebrated her 100th birthday in 2011, and remains an active member of the community.

An Epic Poem, The Norton House

A poem by J.W. Keating, Poet Laureate of the Norton House, C. Sherwood Book and Job Printer, St. Catharines, March 3, 1886. There is a note on the front page which says "see page 11". There is a section of the poem which is marked. The poem first mentions Annie Conolly, who studied at Loretto in Niagara, then mentions Annie Wallace [this name is underlined], "who here did once sojourn with Nanna and Leslie".