Adolescent females' self-concept and physical education : a Q-sort analysis /

This research illuminates the relationship between female adolescents' self-concept and their experience of physical education. This was accomplished through three stages of interviews and a Qsort. The topics through which the research was categorized included peer support, teachers as significant others, meaningful connections to the body, and curriculum content. During stage one female physical education specialists, curriculum coordinators, and adolescents were interviewed to develop Q-items for the Q-sort. The second stage Involved two groups of females between the ages of 12 and 14 years who participated in the Q-sort. The final stage involved an insight group that consisted of four Q-sort participants who interpreted the highest ranking Q-items. Critical to this research was giving these adolescents the opportunity to voice what was important to them. The results of the research included descriptions of the elements in physical education that were deemed most important by female adolescent students. The topics of "peer support" and "meaningful connections to the body" were ranked the highest. By interpreting the rich insights of the discussion group, it was found that peers were most influential to these young girls. Perceiving and bestowing respect were imperative in this stage of their lives.

Explorations and comparisons of actual, ideal, and ought forgiveness definitions : a Q-methodological study /

Numerous definitions of forgiveness have been proposed in the literature (e.g.. North, 1987; Enright, Freedman & Rique, 1998), most ofwhich are based on religious or philosophical notions, rather than on empirical evidence. Definitions employed by researchers have typically set very high standards for forgiveness. This research was designed to investigate the possibility that these definitions describe an ideal of forgiveness and may not reflect laypersons' beliefe and experiences. Using Higgins' Self-Discrepancy Theory as a fiamework, three types of forgiveness beliefs were investigated: actual, ideal, and ought Q-methodology (which permits intensive study ofphenomena in small samples) was employed to examine and compare participants' beliefs about forgiveness across these domains. Thirty participants (20 women), 25 to 78 years of age, were recruited firom the community. They were asked to sort a set of66 statements about forgiveness according to their level of agreement with each statement This process was repeated three times, with the goal of modelling participants' actual experiences, their ideals, and how they believed forgiveness ought to be. Three perspectives on forgiveness emerged across the domains: forgiveness as motivated by religious beliefs, reconciliation-focussed forgiveness, and conflicted forgiveness. These perspectives indicated that, for many participants, the definitions presented in the literature may coincide with their beliefs about how forgiveness would ideally be and should be, as well as with their experiences of forgiveness; however, a large number of participants' experiences of, and beliefs about, forgiveness do not conform to the standards set out in the literature, and to exclude these participants' experiences and beliefs would mean overlooking what forgiveness means to a large portion of people. Results of this study indicate that researchers need to keep an open mind about what forgiveness may mean to their participants.

Kierkegaard : the temporality of becoming a self

Introduction In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze compares and contrasts Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's ideas of repetition. He argues that neither of them really give a representation of repetition. Repetition for them is a sort of selective task: the way in which they determine what is ethical and eternal. With Nietzsche, it is a theater of un belie f. ..... Nietzsche's leading idea is to found the repetition in the etemal return at once on the death of God and the dissolution of the self But it is a quite different alliance in the theater of faith: Kierkegaard dreams of alliance between a God and a self rediscovered. I Repetition plays a theatrical role in their thinking. It allows them to dramatically stage the interplay of various personnae. Deleuze does give a positive account ofKierkegaard's "repetition"; however, he does not think that Kierkegaard works out a philosophical model, or a representation of what repetition is. It is true that in the book Repetition, Constantin Constantius does not clearly and fully work out the concept of repetition, but in Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard gives a full explanation of the self and its temporality which can be connected with repetition. When Sickness Unto Death is interpreted according to key passages from Repetition and The Concept of Anxiety, a clear philosophical concept of repetition can be established. In my opinion, Kierkegaard's philosophy is about the task of becoming a self, and I will be attempting to show that he does have a model of the temporality of self-becoming. In Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard explains his notions of despair with reference to sin, self, self-becoming, faith, and repetition. Despair is a sickness of the spirit, of the self, and accordingly can take three forms: in despair not to be conscious of having a self (not despair in the strict sense); in despair not to will to be oneself; in despair to will to be oneself2 In relation to this definition, he defines a self as "a relation that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself relates to another.''3 Thus, a person is a threefold relationship, and any break in that relationship is despair. Despair takes three forms corresponding to the three aspects of a self s relation to itself Kierkegaard says that a selfis like a house with a basement, a first floor, and a second floor.4 This model of the house, and the concept of the stages on life's way that it illustrates, is central to Kierkegaard's philosophy. This thesis will show how he unpacks this model in many of his writings with different concepts being developed in different texts. His method is to work with the same model in different ways throughout his authorship. He assigns many of the texts to different pseudonyms, but in this thesis we will treat the model and the related concepts as being Kierkegaard's and not only the pseudonyms. This is justified as our thesis will show this modelremains the same throughout Kierkegaard's work, though it is treated in different ways by different pseudonyms. According to Kierkegaard, many people live in only the basement for their entire lives, that is, as aesthetes ("in despair not to be conscious of having a self'). They live in despair of not being conscious of having a self They live in a merely horizontal relation. They want to get what they desire. When they go to the first floor, so to speak, they reflect on themselves and only then do they begin to get a self In this stage, one acquires an ideology of the required and overcomes the strict commands of the desired. The ethical is primarily an obedience to the required whereas the aesthetic is an obedience to desire. In his work Fear and Trembling (Copenhagen: 1843), Johannes de Silentio makes several observations concerning this point. In this book, the author several times allows the desired ideality of esthetics to be shipwrecked on the required ideality of ethics, in order through these collisions to bring to light the religious ideality as the ideality that precisely is the ideality of actuality, and therefore just as desirable as that of esthetics and not as impossible as the ideality of ethics. This is accomplished in such a way that the religious ideality breaks forth in the dialectical leap and in the positive mood - "Behold all things have become new" as well as in the negative mood that is the passion of the absurd to which the concept "repetition" corresponds.s Here one begins to become responsible because one seeks the required ideality; however, the required ideality and the desired ideality become inadequate to the ethical individual. Neither of them satisfy him ("in despair not to will to be oneself'). Then he moves up to the second floor: that is, the mystical region, or the sphere of religiousness (A) ("despair to will to be oneself). Kiericegaard's model of a house, which is connected with the above definition ofdespair, shows us how the self arises through these various stages, and shows the stages of despair as well. On the second floor, we become mystics, or Knights of Infinite Resignation. We are still in despair because we despair ofthe basement and the first floor, however, we can be fiill, free persons only ifwe live on all the floors at the same time. This is a sort of paradoxical fourth stage consisting of all three floors; this is the sphere of true religiousness (religiousness (B)). It is distinguished from religiousness (A) because we can go back and live on all the floors. It is not that there are four floors, but in the fourth stage, we live paradoxically on three at once. Kierkegaard uses this house analogy in order to explain how we become a self through these stages, and to show the various stages of despair. Consequently, I will be explaining self-becoming in relation to despair. It will also be necessary to explain it in relation to faith, for faith is precisely the overcoming of despair. After explaining the becoming of the self in relation to despair and faith, I will then explain its temporality and thereby its repetition. What Kierkegaard calls a formula, Deleuze calls a representation. Unfortunately, Deleuze does not acknowledge Kierkegaard's formula for repetition. As we shall see, Kierkegaard clearly gives a formula for despair, faith, and selfbecoming. When viewed properly, these formulae yield a formula for repetition because when one hasfaith, the basement, firstfloor, and secondfloor become new as one becomes oneself The self is not bound in the eternity ofthe first floor (ethical) or the temporality of the basement (aesthete). I shall now examine the two forms of conscious despair in such a way as to point out also a rise in the consciousness of the nature of despair and in the consciousness that one's state is despair, or, what amounts to the same thing and is the salient point, a rise in the consciousness of the self The opposite to being in despair is to have faith. Therefore, the formula set forth above, which describes a state in which there is not despair at all, is entirely correct, and this formula is also the formula for faMi in ^elating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it.

The physiology of inscription : Foucault's genealogy as curative science

In ''Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," Foucault suggests that genealogy is a sort of "curative science." The genealogist must be a physiologist and a pathologist as well as an historian, for his task is to decipher the marks that power relations and historical events leave on the subjugated body; "he must be able to diagnose the illnesses of the body, its conditions of weakness and strength, its breakdowns and resistances, to be in a position to judge philosophical discourse." But this claim seems to be incongruent with another major task of genealogy. After all, genealogy is supposed to show us that the things we take to be absolute are in fact discontinuous and historically situated: "Nothing in man-not even his body-is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men." If this is true, then the subjugated body can never be restored to a healthy state because it has no essential or original nature. There are no universal standards by which we can even distinguish between healthy and unhealthy bodies. So in what sense is genealogy to be a "curative science"? In my thesis, I try to elucidate the complex relationship between genealogy and the body. I argue that genealogy can be a curative science even while it "multiplies our body and sets it against itself." Ifwe place a special emphasis on the role that transgression plays in Foucault's genealogical works, then the healthy body is precisely the body that resists universal standards and classifications. If genealogy is to be a curative science, then it must restore to the subjugated body an "identity" that transgresses its own limits and that constitutes itself, paradoxically, in the very effacement of identity. In the first chapter of my thesis, I examine the body's role as "surface of the inscription of events." Power relations inscribe on and around the body an identity or subjectivity that appears to be unified and universal, but which is in fact disparate and historically situated. The "subjected" body is the sick and pathologically weak body. In Chapters 2 and 3, I describe how it is possible for the unhealthy body to become healthy by resisting the subjectivity that has been inscribed upon it. Chapter 4 explains how Foucault's later works fit into this characterization of genealogy

Opening truth to imagination : the pragmatism of John Dewey and Richard Rorty

This study explores in a comparative way the works of two American pragmatist philosophers-John Dewey and Richard Rorty. I have provided a reading of their broader works in order to offer what I hope is a successful sympathetic comparison where very few exist. Dewey is often viewed as the central hero in the classical American pragmatic tradition, while Rorty, a contemporary pragmatist, is viewed as some sort of postmodern villain. I show that the different approaches by the two philosophers-Dewey's experiential focus versus Rorty's linguistic focus-exist along a common pragmatic continuum, and that much of the critical scholarship that pits the two pragmatists against each other has actually created an unwarranted dualism between experience and language. I accomplish this task by following the critical movement by each of the pragmatists through their respective reworking of traditional absolutist truth conceptions toward a more aesthetical, imaginative position. I also show how this shift or "turning" represents an important aspect of the American philosophical tradition-its aesthetic axis. I finally indicate a role for liberal education (focusing on higher nonvocational education) in accommodating this turning, a turning that in the end is necessitated by democracy's future trajectory

Educators' attitudes to philosophies of music education

This study used Q methodology to measure the extent to which individuals with five educational roles (student teacher, elementary music teacher, principal, high school music teacher, and music consultant) held five proposed philosophies of music education (hedonic, utilitarian, aesthetic cognitivism, aesthetic formalist, and praxial). Twenty-seven sUbjects participated in the Q study. These subjects were a convenience sample based on their educational role, accessibility, and willingness to participate. Participants completed a background sheet which indicated their background in music, and their responsibility for teaching music. The sUbjects in this Q study rank-ordered a set of 60 Q sort items (each item representing a proposed philosophical position) twice: Sort P to reflect current practice, and Sort I to reflect the ideal situation. The results of the sorting procedures were recorded by the participant on the response page which organized the rankings according to an approximated normal distribution as required by Q methodology. The analysis of the data suggested that the comparison across philosophical positions was significant and that the results of the interaction between philosophical position and educational role were significant, although educational role alone was not significant. Post-hoc analysis of the data was used to determine the significant differences between the levels of the, independent variables used in the model: philosophical position, educational role, and music background. A model of the association of the five philosophical positions was presented and discussed in relation to the Q study results. Further research could refine the Q sort items to better reflect each philosophical position.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Sedimentology and micromorphology of drumlin sediments at Chimney Bluffs State Park, New York, United States of America

The drumlin sediments at Chimney Bluffs, New York appear to represent a block-inmatrix style glacial melange. This melange comprises sand stringers, lenses and intraclasts juxtaposed in an apparently massive diamicton. Thin section examination of these glacigenic deposits has revealed microstructures indicative of autokinetic subglacial defonnation which are consistent with a deformable bed origin for the diamicton. These features include banding and. necking of matrix grains, oriented plasma fabrics and the formation of pressure shadows at the long axis ends of elongate clasts. Preservation of primary stratification within the sand intraclasts appears to suggest that these features were pre-existing up-ice deposits that were frozen, entrained, then deposited as part of a defonning till layer beneath an advancing ice sheet. Multi-directional micro-shearing within the sand blocks is thought to reflect the frozen nature of the sand units in such a high strain environment. It is also contended that dewatering of the sediment pile leading to the eventual immobilisation of the defonning till layer was responsible for opening sub-horizontal fissures within the diamicton. These features were subsequently infilled with mass flow poorly sorted sands and silts which were subjected to ductile defonnation during the waning stages of an actively deforming till layer. Microstructures indicative of the dewatering processes in the sand units include patches of fine-grained particles within a coarser-grained matrix and the presence of concentrated zones of translocated clays. However, these units were probably confined within an impermeable diamicton casing that prevented massive pore water influxes from the deforming till layer~ Hence, these microstructures probably reflect localised dewatering of the sand intraclasts. A layered subglacial shear zone model is proposed for the various features exhibited by the drumlin sediments. The complexity of these structures is explained in terms of ii superposing deformation styles in response to changing pore water pressures. Constructional glaciotectonics, as implied by the occurrence of sub-horizontal fissuring, is suggested as the mechanism for the stacking of the sand intraclast units within the diamicton. The usefulness of micromorphology in complimenting the traditional sedimentology of glacigenic deposits is emphasised by the current study. An otherwise massive diamicton was shown to contain microstructures indicative of the very high strain rates expected in a complexly deforming till layer. . It is quite obvious from this investigation that the classification of diamictons needs to be re-examined for evidence of microstructures that could lead to the re-interpretation of diamicton forming processes. RESUME Le pacquet de sediments drumlinaire de Chimney Bluffs, New York, represent un "bloc-en-matrice" genre de melange glaciale. Des structures microscopique comprennent l'evidence pour la defonnation intrinseque attribuee a l'origine lit non resistant du drumlin. PreselVation des structures primaires au coeur des blocs arenaces suggere que ceux sont des depots preexistant qui furent geles, entraines et par la suite sedimentes au milieu d'une couche de debris sous-glaciaires en voie de deformation. Des failles microscopiques a l'interieur des blocs arenaces appuient aussi l'idee d'un bloc cohesif (c'est-a-dire gele) au centre d'un till non resistant. Des implications significatives s'emergent de cette etude pour les conditions sous-glaciaire et les processus de la formation des drumlin.

The nature of avidyÄ in Buddhism and VedÄ nta

This thesis deals with the nature of ignorance as it was interpreted in the Upani~adic tradition, specifically in Advaita Vedanta, and in early and Mahayana Buddhism , e specially in the Madhyamika school of Buddhism. The approach i s a historical and comparative one. It examines the early thoughts of both the upanis.a ds and Buddhism abou t avidya (ignorance), shows how the notion was treated by the more speculative and philosphically oriented schools which base d themselves on the e arly works, and sees how their views differ. The thesis will show that the Vedinta tended to treat avidya as a topic for metaphysical s peculation as t he s chool developed, drifting from its initial e xistential concerns, while the Madhyamika remained in contact with the e xistential concerns evident in the first discourses of the Buddha. The word "notion" has been chosen for use in referring t o avidya, even though it may have non-intellectual and emotional connotations, to avoid more popular a lternatives such as "concept" or "idea". In neither the Upani,ads, Advaita Vedanta, or Buddhism is ignorance merely a concept or an idea. Only in a secondary sense, in texts and speech , does it become one. Avidya has more to do with the lived situation in which man finds himself, with the subjectobject separation in which he f eels he exists, than with i i i intel lect ual constr ucts . Western thought has begun to r ealize the same with concerns such as being in modern ontology, and has chosen to speak about i t i n terms of the question of being . Avidya, however, i s not a 'question' . If q ue stions we r e to be put regarding the nature of a vidya , they would be more of t he sort "What is not avidya?", though e ven here l anguage bestows a status t o i t which avidya does not have. In considering a work of the Eastern tradition, we f ace t he danger of imposing Western concepts on it. Granted t hat avidya is customari ly r endered i n English as ignorance, the ways i n which the East and West view i gno rance di f f er. Pedagogically , the European cultures, grounded in the ancient Greek culture, view ignorance as a l ack or an emptiness. A child is i gnorant o f certain t hings and the purpose o f f ormal education , in f act if not in theory, is to fill him with enough knowledge so that he can cope wit h t he complexities and the e xpectations of s ociety. On another level, we feel t hat study and research will l ead t o the discovery o f solutions, which we now lack , for problems now defying solut i on . The East, on the o t her hand, sees avidya in a d i fferent light.Ignorance isn't a lack, but a presence. Religious and philosophical l iterature directs its efforts not towards acquiring something new, but at removing t.he ideas and opinions that individuals have formed about themselves and the world. When that is fully accomplished, say the sages , t hen Wisdom, which has been obscured by those opinions, will present itself. Nothing new has to be learned, t hough we do have t o 'learn' that much. The growing interest in t he West with Eastern religions and philosophies may, in time, influence our theoretical and practical approaches to education and learning, not only in the established educati onal institutions, but in religious , p sychological, and spiritual activities as well. However, the requirements o f this thesis do no t permit a formulation of revolutionary method or a call to action. It focuses instead on the textual arguments which attempt to convince readers that t he world in which they take themselves to exist is not, in essence, real, on the ways i n which the l imitations of language are disclosed, and on the provisional and limited schemes that are built up to help students see through their ignorance. The metaphysic s are provisional because they act only as spurs and guides. Both the Upanisadic and Buddhist traditions that will be dealt with here stress that language constantly fails to encompass the Real. So even terms s uch as 'the Real', 'Absolute', etc., serve only to lead to a transcendent experience . The sections dealing with the Upanisads and Advaita Vedanta show some of the historical evolution of the notion of avidya, how it was dealt with as maya , and the q uestions that arose as t o its locus. With Gau?apada we see the beginnings of a more abstract treatment of the topic, and , the influence of Buddhism. Though Sankhara' S interest was primarily directed towards constructing a philosophy to help others attain mok~a ( l iberation), he too introduced t echnica l t e rminology not found in the works of his predecessors. His work is impressive , but areas of it are incomplete. Numbers of his followers tried to complete the systematic presentation of his insi ghts . Their work focuses on expl anat i ons of adhyasa (superimposition ) , t he locus and object of ignorance , and the means by which Brahman takes itself to be the jiva and the world. The section on early Buddhism examines avidya in the context o f the four truths, together with dubkha (suffering), the r ole it p l ays in t he chain of dependent c ausation , a nd t he p r oblems that arise with t he doctrine of anatman. With t he doct rines of e arly Buddhism as a base, the Madhyamika elaborated questions that the Buddha had said t e nded not t o edi f ication. One of these had to do with own - being or svabhava. Thi s serves a s a centr e around which a discussion o f i gnorance unfolds, both i ndividual and coll ective ignorance. There follows a treatment of the cessation of ignorance as it is discussed within this school . The final secti on tries to present t he similarities and differences i n the natures o f ignorance i n t he two traditions and discusses the factors responsible for t hem . ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Dr. Sinha for the time spent II and suggestions made on the section dealing with Sankara and the Advait.a Vedanta oommentators, and Dr. Sprung, who supervised, direoted, corrected and encouraged the thesis as a whole, but especially the section on Madhyamika, and the final comparison.

Job satisfaction among nurses and its relationship to reflective practice /

This study was undertaken to explore job satisfaction among nurses and its relationship to reflective practice. It is a qualitative study that listens to the perspectives of 7 mental health nurses who work In a conmiunity hospital in southern Ontario. A pilot survey was conducted prior to the face-to -face interviews in order to develop meaningful questions to utilize in the interviews. Nurses participating in the study were ensured anonjnnlty and an opportunity to have their own personal perspectives heard. A convenient sample was obtained from the hospital in which the researcher worked as an educator and professional practice consultant. The concept of job satisfaction was found to be driven by the desire to do important work and to make a difference in patients' lives. The nurses articulated that it is directly related to other factors, such as the opportunity to work in one's area, of preference, involvement in decisionmaking processes, better patient/ staff ratios, and affordable, accessible continuing educational opportunities. Those nurses who have embraced reflective practice for many years seem to be able to sort out that which drives them to stay in nursing and that which will influence them to leave. The constraints of the study cO-e that it is a small qualitative study; therefore, the results are not generallzable. Reflection is integral to the practice of mental heallth nursing find a tool that is used extensively in therapy with patients. Future research could involve studing a different group of nurses who may be more task focused than mental health nurses.

Geochemistry and petrogenesis of the McElroy and Larder Lake assemblages, Abitibi Greenstone Belt, Northeastern Ontario

The McElroy and Larder Lake assemblages, located in the southern Abitibi Greenstone Belt are two late Archean metavolcanic sequences having markedly contrasting physical characteristics arid are separated from one another by a regional fault. An assemblage is an informal term which describes stratified volcanic and/or sedimentary rock units built during a specific time period in a similar depositional or volcanic setting and are commonly bounded by faults, unconformities or intrusions. The petrology and petrogenesis of these assemblages have been investigated to determine if a genetic link exists between the two adjacent assemblages. The McElroy assemblage is homoclinal sequence of evolved massive and pillowed fl.ows, which except for the basal unit represents a progressively fractionated volcanic pile. From the base to the top of the assemblage the lithologies include Fe-tholeiitic, dendritic flows; komatiite basaltic, ultramafic flows; Mg-tholeiitic, leucogabbro; Mg-tholeiitic, massive flows and Fe-tholeiitic, pillowed flows. Massive flows range from coarse grained to aphanitic and are commonly plagioclase glomerophyric. The Larder Lake assemblage consists of komatiitic, Mg-rich and Fe-rich tholeiitic basalts, structurally disrupted by folds and faults. Tholeiitic rocks in the Larder Lake assemblage range from aphanitic to coarse grained massive and pillowed flows. Komatiitic flows contain both spinifex and massive textures. Geochemical variability within both assemblages is attributed to different petrogenetic histories. The lithologies of the McElroy assemblage were derived by partial melting of a primitive mantle source followed by various degrees of crystal fractionation. Partial melting of a primitive mantle source generated the ultramafic flows and possibly other flows in the assemblage. Fractionation of ultramafic flows may have also produced the more evolved McElroy lithologies. The highly evolved, basal, dendritic flow may represent the upper unit 3 of a missing volcanic pile in which continued magmatism generated the remaining McElroy lithologies. Alternatively, the dendritic flows may represent a primary lava derived from a low degree (10-15%) partial melt of a primitive mantle source which was followed by continued partial melting to generate the ultramafic flows. The Larder Lake lithologies were derived by partial melting of a komatiitic source followed by gabbroic fractionation. The tectonic environment for both assemblages is interpreted to be an oceanic arc setting. The McElroy assemblage lavas were generated in a mature back arc setting whereas the Larder Lake lithologies were produced during the early stages of komatiitc crust subduction. This setting is consistent with previous models involving plate tectonic processes for the generation of other metavolcanic assemblages in the Abitibi Greenstone Belt.

The Effects of Body Posture on Emotion Perception: A Developmental and Theoretical Analysis

Previously, studies investigating emotional face perception - regardless of whether they involved adults or children - presented participants with static photos of faces in isolation. In the natural world, faces are rarely encountered in isolation. In the few studies that have presented faces in context, the perception of emotional facial expressions is altered when paired with an incongruent context. For both adults and 8- year-old children, reaction times increase and accuracy decreases when facial expressions are presented in an incongruent context depicting a similar emotion (e.g., sad face on a fear body) compared to when presented in a congruent context (e.g., sad face on a sad body; Meeren, van Heijnsbergen, & de Gelder, 2005; Mondloch, 2012). This effect is called a congruency effect and does not exist for dissimilar emotions (e.g., happy and sad; Mondloch, 2012). Two models characterize similarity between emotional expressions differently; the emotional seed model bases similarity on physical features, whereas the dimensional model bases similarity on underlying dimensions of valence an . arousal. Study 1 investigated the emergence of an adult-like pattern of congruency effects in pre-school aged children. Using a child-friendly sorting task, we identified the youngest age at which children could accurately sort isolated facial expressions and body postures and then measured whether an incongruent context disrupted the perception of emotional facial expressions. Six-year-old children showed congruency effects for sad/fear but 4-year-old children did not for sad/happy. This pattern of congruency effects is consistent with both models and indicates that an adult-like pattern exists at the youngest age children can reliably sort emotional expressions in isolation. In Study 2, we compared the two models to determine their predictive abilities. The two models make different predictions about the size of congruency effects for three emotions: sad, anger, and fear. The emotional seed model predicts larger congruency effects when sad is paired with either anger or fear compared to when anger and fear are paired with each other. The dimensional model predicts larger congruency effects when anger and fear are paired together compared to when either is paired with sad. In both a speeded and unspeeded task the results failed to support either model, but the pattern of results indicated fearful bodies have a special effect. Fearful bodies reduced accuracy, increased reaction times more than any other posture, and shifted the pattern of errors. To determine whether the results were specific to bodies, we ran the reverse task to determine if faces could disrupt the perception of body postures. This experiment did not produce congruency effects, meaning faces do not influence the perception of body postures. In the final experiment, participants performed a flanker task to determine whether the effect of fearful bodies was specific to faces or whether fearful bodies would also produce a larger effect in an unrelated task in which faces were absent. Reaction times did not differ across trials, meaning fearful bodies' large effect is specific to situations with faces. Collectively, these studies provide novel insights, both developmentally and theoretically, into how emotional faces are perceived in context.

Broadside reporting the Fenian Invasion of Canada, June 2, 1866

The Fenians were a group intent on securing Irish independence from England. The movement had its origins in Ireland in1857, under the leadership of James Stephens, with the assistance of John O'Mahony, an American who had raised funds for the cause. The American branch of this movement was especially successful, having raised $500 000 and enlisting about 10 000 American Civil War veterans. The group split into two separate factions, one desiring an invasion of Canada and the other preferring an uprising in Ireland. It soon became apparent that an uprising in Ireland was not imminent, and a decision was made to invade Canada. In April, 1866, a raid was launched against New Brunswick. It proved unsuccessful, and another raid was attempted on June 1, 1866, this time in Ridgeway, near Fort Erie, Ontario. The Canadian militiamen were defeated, but the Fenians subsequently withdrew. A third incident occurred on June 7, this time at Missisquoi Bay in Quebec, when the Fenians crossed the border, remained there for 2 days, and withdrew. A failed uprising in Ireland in 1867 signaled the demise of the movement. The Fenian threat helped to promote a sense of union among Canadians and provided an incentive for Confederation.

Broadside reporting the Fenian Invasion of Canada, June 2, 1866

The Fenians were a group intent on securing Irish independence from England. The movement had its origins in Ireland in1857, under the leadership of James Stephens, with the assistance of John O'Mahony, an American who had raised funds for the cause. The American branch of this movement was especially successful, having raised $500 000 and enlisting about 10 000 American Civil War veterans. The group split into two separate factions, one desiring an invasion of Canada and the other preferring an uprising in Ireland. It soon became apparent that an uprising in Ireland was not imminent, and a decision was made to invade Canada. In April, 1866, a raid was launched against New Brunswick. It proved unsuccessful, and another raid was attempted on June 1, 1866, this time in Ridgeway, near Fort Erie, Ontario. The Canadian militiamen were defeated, but the Fenians subsequently withdrew. A third incident occurred on June 7, this time at Missisquoi Bay in Quebec, when the Fenians crossed the border, remained there for 2 days, and withdrew. A failed uprising in Ireland in 1867 signaled the demise of the movement. The Fenian threat helped to promote a sense of union among Canadians and provided an incentive for Confederation.