Kierkegaard : the temporality of becoming a self

Introduction In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze compares and contrasts Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's ideas of repetition. He argues that neither of them really give a representation of repetition. Repetition for them is a sort of selective task: the way in which they determine what is ethical and eternal. With Nietzsche, it is a theater of un belie f. ..... Nietzsche's leading idea is to found the repetition in the etemal return at once on the death of God and the dissolution of the self But it is a quite different alliance in the theater of faith: Kierkegaard dreams of alliance between a God and a self rediscovered. I Repetition plays a theatrical role in their thinking. It allows them to dramatically stage the interplay of various personnae. Deleuze does give a positive account ofKierkegaard's "repetition"; however, he does not think that Kierkegaard works out a philosophical model, or a representation of what repetition is. It is true that in the book Repetition, Constantin Constantius does not clearly and fully work out the concept of repetition, but in Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard gives a full explanation of the self and its temporality which can be connected with repetition. When Sickness Unto Death is interpreted according to key passages from Repetition and The Concept of Anxiety, a clear philosophical concept of repetition can be established. In my opinion, Kierkegaard's philosophy is about the task of becoming a self, and I will be attempting to show that he does have a model of the temporality of self-becoming. In Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard explains his notions of despair with reference to sin, self, self-becoming, faith, and repetition. Despair is a sickness of the spirit, of the self, and accordingly can take three forms: in despair not to be conscious of having a self (not despair in the strict sense); in despair not to will to be oneself; in despair to will to be oneself2 In relation to this definition, he defines a self as "a relation that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself relates to another.''3 Thus, a person is a threefold relationship, and any break in that relationship is despair. Despair takes three forms corresponding to the three aspects of a self s relation to itself Kierkegaard says that a selfis like a house with a basement, a first floor, and a second floor.4 This model of the house, and the concept of the stages on life's way that it illustrates, is central to Kierkegaard's philosophy. This thesis will show how he unpacks this model in many of his writings with different concepts being developed in different texts. His method is to work with the same model in different ways throughout his authorship. He assigns many of the texts to different pseudonyms, but in this thesis we will treat the model and the related concepts as being Kierkegaard's and not only the pseudonyms. This is justified as our thesis will show this modelremains the same throughout Kierkegaard's work, though it is treated in different ways by different pseudonyms. According to Kierkegaard, many people live in only the basement for their entire lives, that is, as aesthetes ("in despair not to be conscious of having a self'). They live in despair of not being conscious of having a self They live in a merely horizontal relation. They want to get what they desire. When they go to the first floor, so to speak, they reflect on themselves and only then do they begin to get a self In this stage, one acquires an ideology of the required and overcomes the strict commands of the desired. The ethical is primarily an obedience to the required whereas the aesthetic is an obedience to desire. In his work Fear and Trembling (Copenhagen: 1843), Johannes de Silentio makes several observations concerning this point. In this book, the author several times allows the desired ideality of esthetics to be shipwrecked on the required ideality of ethics, in order through these collisions to bring to light the religious ideality as the ideality that precisely is the ideality of actuality, and therefore just as desirable as that of esthetics and not as impossible as the ideality of ethics. This is accomplished in such a way that the religious ideality breaks forth in the dialectical leap and in the positive mood - "Behold all things have become new" as well as in the negative mood that is the passion of the absurd to which the concept "repetition" corresponds.s Here one begins to become responsible because one seeks the required ideality; however, the required ideality and the desired ideality become inadequate to the ethical individual. Neither of them satisfy him ("in despair not to will to be oneself'). Then he moves up to the second floor: that is, the mystical region, or the sphere of religiousness (A) ("despair to will to be oneself). Kiericegaard's model of a house, which is connected with the above definition ofdespair, shows us how the self arises through these various stages, and shows the stages of despair as well. On the second floor, we become mystics, or Knights of Infinite Resignation. We are still in despair because we despair ofthe basement and the first floor, however, we can be fiill, free persons only ifwe live on all the floors at the same time. This is a sort of paradoxical fourth stage consisting of all three floors; this is the sphere of true religiousness (religiousness (B)). It is distinguished from religiousness (A) because we can go back and live on all the floors. It is not that there are four floors, but in the fourth stage, we live paradoxically on three at once. Kierkegaard uses this house analogy in order to explain how we become a self through these stages, and to show the various stages of despair. Consequently, I will be explaining self-becoming in relation to despair. It will also be necessary to explain it in relation to faith, for faith is precisely the overcoming of despair. After explaining the becoming of the self in relation to despair and faith, I will then explain its temporality and thereby its repetition. What Kierkegaard calls a formula, Deleuze calls a representation. Unfortunately, Deleuze does not acknowledge Kierkegaard's formula for repetition. As we shall see, Kierkegaard clearly gives a formula for despair, faith, and selfbecoming. When viewed properly, these formulae yield a formula for repetition because when one hasfaith, the basement, firstfloor, and secondfloor become new as one becomes oneself The self is not bound in the eternity ofthe first floor (ethical) or the temporality of the basement (aesthete). I shall now examine the two forms of conscious despair in such a way as to point out also a rise in the consciousness of the nature of despair and in the consciousness that one's state is despair, or, what amounts to the same thing and is the salient point, a rise in the consciousness of the self The opposite to being in despair is to have faith. Therefore, the formula set forth above, which describes a state in which there is not despair at all, is entirely correct, and this formula is also the formula for faMi in ^elating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it.

The wars of the gulls; : an historical romance in three chapters; chap. I, Shewing how and why and with whom the gulls went to war: chap. II, Shewing how the gulls make the deep to boil like a pot: chap. III, Shewing how a certain doughty general of the gulls goes forth to play the game of hull-gull in Upper Canada.

Transcribed on front paste-down: W.G. Phelps Oct. 29 1890.

A Foucauldian Analysis of Power and Representation in an Attempt to Run a Photovoice Project with Youth

This project evolved out of a search for ways to conduct research on “others” in a way that does not exploit, stigmatize or misrepresent their experience. This thesis is an ethnographic study in leisure research and youth work and an experiment in running a photovoice project. Photovoice is a participatory visual method that embodies the emancipatory ideal of empowering others through self-representation. The literature on photovoice lacks a comprehensive discussion on the complexity of power and representation. Postmodern theorists have proposed that participatory methods are not benign and that initiatives are acts of power in themselves that produce effects (Cook & Kothari, 2001). A Foucauldian analysis of power is used to deconstruct the researcher’s practice and reflect on why and how youth are “engaged”. This project seeks to embrace the principle of working “with” others, but also work from a postmodern perspective that acknowledges power and representation as ongoing problems.

The Hidden Truths of Self-Presentation, Self-Disclosure, and Deception on Online Dating Profiles: A Call for Change

The way in which individuals seek romantic partners has changed considerably in the past decades, most notably through online dating sites (ODSs). Despite the possibility of misrepresentation amongst client users, such sites continue to grow in popularity because ODSs provide a large pool from which individuals can select and attract potential partners. While much research has been undertaken on ODSs, little empirical research has examined postsecondary students’ use of ODSs. Therefore, this study sought to investigate why postsecondary students have become involved with and how they present themselves on ODSs. The researcher surveyed 20 postsecondary students and conducted in-depth interviews with 2 participants who use ODSs. Although the limited sample prevented results from being generalized, quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that participants became involved with ODSs for various purposes, such as seeking long-term relationships and/or marriage partners, or simply exploring or visiting ODSs out of curiosity. Findings indicate that ODS users’ physical appearance and/or “attractiveness” is considered the strongest predictor of relationship success. The study discusses how participants’ self-presentation affects outcomes of ODS usage, particularly when negative self-identification and presentation corresponding to factors such as individuals’ weight and age are taken into account.

Advocating recognition and redistribution in poverty alleviation programs in Ghana : an examination of state and NGO programs and policies

Abstract This thesis argues that poverty alleviation strategies and programs carried out by the government and Non Governmental Organizations in Ghana provide affirmative solutions to poverty. This is because, these intervention strategies have been influenced by conventional discourses on poverty that fail to adequately address non-economic issues of poverty such as powerlessness, marginalization and tmder-representation. The study is carried out in a two-pronged manner; first, it analyses state policies and strategies, particularly the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS), on poverty alleviation and compares these to NGO programs, implemented with funds and support from external donor organizations. Specifically, I focus on how NGOs and the governnlent of Ghana negotiate autonomy and financial dependency with their funding donor-partners and how these affect their policies and programs. Findings from this study reveal that while external influences dominate poverty alleviation policies and strategies, NGOs and the government of Ghana exercise varying degrees of agency in navigating these issues. In particular, NGOs have been able to adapt their programs to the changing needs of donor markets, and are also actively engaged in re-orienting poverty back to the political domain through advocacy campaigns. Overall, rural communities in Ghana depend on charitable NGOs for the provision of essential social services, while the Ghanaian government depends on international donor assistance for its development projects.

Letter - E.C. Schmon to Arthur A. Schmon, 22 December 1919

This letter describes a visit downtown for shopping and a walk and a planned outing to the theater that evening followed by dinner. The letter is labelled number 80.

(Re)writing the other/self : autoethnography in the transcultural arena of representation

Abstract: In Imperial Eyes Mary Louise Pratt (1992: 7, emphasis original) defines autoethnography as "instances in which colonized subjects undertake to represent themselves in ways that engage with the colonizer's own terms ... in response to or in dialogue with . . . metropolitan representations." Although Pratt's conceptualization of autoethnography has much to offer post-colonial studies, it has received little attention in the field. In this thesis, I interrogate Pratt's notion of autoethnography as a theoretical tool for understanding the self-representations of subordinate peoples within transcultural terrains of signification. I argue that autoethnography is a concept that allows us to move beyond some theoretical dualisms, and to recognize the (necessary) coexistence of subordinate peoples' simultaneous accommodation of and resistance to dominant representations of themselves. I suggest that even when autoethnographic expressions seem to rely on or to reproduce dominant knowledges, their very existence as speech acts implicitly resists dominant discourses which objectify members of oppressed populations and re-create them as Native Informants. I use Pratt's concept to analyze two books by Islamic feminist sociologist Fatima Memissi. Memissi's Dreams ofTrespass and Scheherazade Goes West illustrate the simultaneity of accommodation and disruption evident in autoethnographic communication. Across the two books, Memissi shows herself renegotiating the discourses which discipline her (and her speech). She switches back and forth between the positions of reader and author, demonstrates the reciprocity of the disciplinary gaze (she looks back at her dominants, reading their own reading of her representation of her social group), and provides a model of autoethnographic dialogue.

‘Designer Vaginas': The Representation of Female Genitals on Canadian Cosmetic Surgeons' Websites

This thesis critically examines the online marketing tactics of 10 (English language) Canadian cosmetic surgery clinics’ websites that offer Female Genital Cosmetic Surgery (FGCS), specifically, labiaplasty (labial reduction) and vaginoplasty (vaginal tightening). Drawing on a qualitative Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis (MCDA) and a feminist-informed social constructionist framework (Lazar, 2007), I examine how FGCS discourses reiterate and reinforce heteronormative sexual scripts for women, and impose restrictive models of femininity through the pathologization of genital diversity and the appropriation of postfeminist and neoliberal discourses of individual choice and empowerment. I explore feminist analyses of the links between FGCS and contemporary Western women’s postfeminist subjectivity, and the reconfiguration of women’s sexual agency, to better understand what these contemporary shifts may mean for women’s sexual anxiety and expression. My analysis highlights several discourses that organize the online marketing material of Canadian FGCS websites, including: the pathologization of genital diversity; restrictive models of femininity; heteronormative sexual scripts; neoliberal and post-feminist rhetorics of individual choice and empowerment; and psychological and sexual transformation. Overall, these discourses undermine acceptance of women’s genital diversity, legitimize the FGCS industry and frame FGCS as the only viable solution to alleviate women’s genital and sexual distress despite the lack of evidence regarding the long-term benefits and risks of these procedures, and the recommendations against FGCS by professional medical organizations.