An exploratory descriptive study of factors influencing students to seek or not to seek personal counselling on a college of applied arts and technology campus located in Southern Ontario /

This descriptive-exploratory study examined factors which were perceived by students at a College of Applied Arts and Technology (CAAT) campus as influencing them in choosing to come or not to come for personal counselling and why they would or would not retum. A total of 250 students selected through a sample of convenience were surveyed. A questionnaire survey was conducted with quantitative data collected using a 4-point, forced-choice Likert scale and yes/no questions and qualitative data collected using open-ended questions and invited comments. The responses were analyzed using means and modes for the Likert responses and percentages for the yes/no and check-off questions. The narrative responses were subjected to content analysis to identify themes. The mean score findings on factors influencing students to come for personal counselling were at or close to the mid- point of 2.5. Personal distress was the only variable found to have a negative response, meaning students would not come to counselling if they were in personal distress. On factors that would keep them from choosing to come to counselling, students seemed to trust counsellors and feel accepted by them and rejected the notion that peer pressure or the first session being unhelpful would keep them away from counselling. The counsellor's relationship with the student is the major determinant for repeat sessions. When asked what factors would influence students to not retum for personal counselling, students rejected the variables of peer pressure, the extra time needed for counselling, and not getting what they wanted in a session, but, in one instance, indicated that variables regarding the counselling relationship would keep them from returning.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Beyond g : putting multiple intelligences theory to the test /

The purpose of this study was to investigate Howard Gardner's (1983) Multiple Intelligences theory, which proposes that there are eight independent intelligences: Linguistic, Spatial, Logical/Mathematical, Interpersonal, Intrapersonal, Naturalistic, Bodily-Kinesthetic, and Musical. To explore Gardner's theory, two measures of each ability area were administered to 200 participants. Each participant also completed a measure of general cognitive ability, a personality inventory, an ability self-rating scale, and an ability self-report questionnaire. Nonverbal measures were included for most intelligence domains, and a wide range of content was sampled in Gardner's domains. Results showed that all tests of purely cognitive abilities were significantly correlated with the measure of general cognitive ability, whereas Musical, Bodily-Kinesthetic, and one of the Intrapersonal measures were not. Contrary to what Multiple Intelligences theory would seem to predict, correlations among the tests revealed a positive manifold and factor analysis indicated a large factor of general intelligence, with a mathematical reasoning test and a classification task from the Naturalistic domain having the highest ^- loadings. There were only minor sex differences in performance on the ability tests. Participants' self-estimates of ability were significantly and positively correlated with actual performance in some, but not all, intelligences. With regard to personality, a hypothesized association between Openness to Experience and crystallized intelligence was supported. The implications of the findings in regards to the nature of mental abilities were discussed, and recommendations for further research were made.

Transmission of West Nile virus in the Niagara Region among a population at risk for exposure

Background. West Nile Virus (WNV), a mosquito-borne flavivirus, is one of an increasing number of infectious diseases that have been emerging or re-emerging in the last two decades. Since the arrival ofWNV to Canada to present date, the Niagara Region has only reported 30 clinical cases, a small number compared to the hundreds reported in other regions of similar conditions. Moreover, the last reported human case in Niagara was in 2006. As it has been demonstrated that the majority of WNV infections are asymptomatic, the question remains whether the lack of clinical cases in Niagara truly reflects the lack of transmission to humans or if infections are still occurring but are mostly asymptomatic. Objectives. The general objective of this study was to establish whether or not active WNV transmission could be detected in a human population residing in Niagara for the 2007 transmission season. To fullfil this objective, a cross-sectional seroprevalence study was designed to investigate for the presence of anti-WNV antibodies in a sample of Mexican migrant agricultural workers employed in farms registered with the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP). Due to the Mexican origin of the study participants, three specific research objectives were proposed: a) determine the seroprevalence ofanti-WNV antibodies as well as anti-Dengue virus antibodies (a closely related virus prevalent in Mexico and likely to confound WNV serology); b) analyze risk factors associated with WNV and Dengue virus seropositivity; and c) assess the awareness of study participants about WNV infection as well as their understanding of the mode of transmission and clinical importance of the infection. Methodology: After obtaining ethics clearance from Brock University, farms were visited and workers invited to participate. Due to time constraints, only a small number of farms were enrolled with a resulting convenience and non-randomized study sample. Workers' demographic and epidemiological data were collected using a standardized questionnaire and blood samples were drawn to determine serum anti-WNV and anti- Dengue antibodies with a commercial ELISA. All positive samples were sent to the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg, Manitoba for confirmation with the Plaque Reduction Neutralization Test (PRNT). Data was analyzed with Stata 10.0. Antibody determinations were reported as seroprevalence proportions for both WNV and Dengue. Logistic regression was used to analyze risk factors that may be associated with seropositivity and awareness was reported as a proportion of the number of individuals possessing awareness over the total number of participants. Results and Discussion. In total 92 participants working in 5 farms completed the study. Using the commercial ELISA, seropositivity was as follows: 2.2% for WNV IgM, 20.7% for WNV IgG, and 17.1 % for Dengue IgG. Possible cross-reactivity was demonstrated in 15/20 (75.0%) samples that were positive for both WNV IgG and Dengue IgG. Confirmatory testing with the PRNT demonstrated that none of the WNV ELISA positive samples had antibodies to WNV but 13 samples tested positive for anti-Dengue antibodies (14.1 % Dengue sereoprevalence). The findings showed that the ELISA performance was very poor for assessing anti-WNV antibodies in individuals previously exposed to Dengue virus. However, the ELISA had better sensitivity and specificity for assessing anti-Dengue antibodies. Whereas statistical analysis could not be done for WNV seropositivity, as all samples were PRNT negative, logistic regression demonstrated several risk factors for Dengue exposure_ The first year coming to Canada appeared to be significantly associated with increased exposure to Dengue while lower socio-economic housing and the presence of a water basin in the yard in Mexico appeared to be significantly associated with a decreased exposure to Dengue_ These seemingly contradictory results illustrate that in mobile populations such as migrant workers, risk factors for exposure to Dengue are not easily identified and more research is needed. Assessing the awareness of WNV and its clinical importance showed that only 23% of participants had some knowledge of WNV, of which 76% knew that the infection was mosquito-borne and 47% recognized fever as a symptom. The identified lack of understanding and awareness was not surprising since WNV is not a visible disease in Mexico. Since WNV persists in an enzootic cycle in Niagara and the occurrence of future outbreaks is unpredictable, the agricultural workers remain at risk for transmission. Therefore it important they receive sufficient health education regarding WNV before leaving Mexico and during their stay in Canada. Conclusions. Human transmission of WNV could not be proven among the study participants even when due to their occupation they are at high risk for mosquito bites. The limitations of the study sample do not permit generalizable conclusions, however, the study findings are consistent with the absence of clinical cases in the Niagara Region, so it is likely that human transmission is indeed neglible or absent. As evidenced by our WNV serology results, PRNT must be utilized as a confirmatory test since false positivity occurs frequently. This is especially true when previous exposure to Dengue virus is likely.