"Re-huminization": the role of human-animal similarity in predicting prejudice towards immigrants and non-human animals

Research implies that there ~ay be an association between attitudes toward margil1alized human outgroups and non-human animals. Very few studies, however, have specifically tested this relation empirically. The general purpose of the present research was to determine if such a relation exists and if perceptions of human-animal similarity avail as a common predictor of both types of attitudes. Ideological orientations associated with prejudiced attitudes (Social Dominance Orientation, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, and Universal Orientation) were also examined as individual differences in predicting perceptions of human-animal similarity. As predicted, people who endorsed prejudiced attitudes toward human outgroups (Study 1) and immigrants in particular (Studies 2 and 3), were more likely to endorse prejudiced attitudes toward non-human animals. In Study 2, perceptions that humans are superior (versus similar) to other animals directly predicted higher levels of prejudice toward non-human animals, whereas the effect of human superiority beliefs on immigrant prejudice was mediated by dehumanization. In other words, greater perceptions of humans as superior (versus similar) to other animals "allowed for" greater dehumanization of immigrants, which in turn resulted in heightened immigrant prejudice. Furthermore, people higher in Social Dominance Orientation or Right-Wing Authoritarianism were particularly likely to perceive humans as superior (versus similar) to other animals, whereas people characterized by a greater Universal Orientation were more likely to perceive humans and non-human animals as similar. Study 3 examined whether inducing perceptions of human-animal similarity through experimental manipulation would lead to more favourable attitudes toward non-human animals and immigrants. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of four 11 editorials designed to highlight either the similarities or differences between humans and other animals (i.e., animals are similar to humans; humans are similar to animals;~~nimals are inferior to humans; humans are superior to animals) or to a neutral control condition. Encouragingly, when animals were described as similar to humans, prejudice towards non-human animals and immigrants was significantly lower, and to some extent this finding was also true for people naturally high in prejudice (i.e., high in Social Dominance Orientation or Right-Wing Authoritarianism). Inducing perceptions that nonhuman animals are similar to humans was particularly effective at reducing the tendency to dehumanize immigrants ("re-humanization"), lowering feelings of personal threat regarding one's animal-nature, and at increasing inclusive intergroup representations and empathy, all of which uniquely accounted for the significant decreases in prejudiced attitudes. Implications for research, theory and prejudice interventions are considered.

Construction of bovine adenovirus type 3 E1 and E3, substitution plasmids and the sequencing analysis of DNA pol and pTP /

The relative ease to concentrate and purify adenoviruses, their well characterized mid-sized genome, and the ability to delete non-essential regions from their genome to accommodate foreign gene, made adenoviruses a suitable candidate for the construction of vectors. The use of adenoviral vectors in gene therapy, vaccination, and as a general vector system for expressing foreign genes have been documented for some time. In this study, the objective was to rescue a BAV3 E1 or E3 recombinant vector carrying the kanamycin resistant gene, a dominant selectable marker with useful applications in studying vectored gene expression in mammalian cells. To accomplish the objective of this study, more information about BAV3 DNA sequences was required in order to make the manipulation of the virus genome accessible. Therefore, sequencing of the BAV3 genome from 1 1 .7% to 30.8% was carried out. Analysis of the determined sequences revealed the primary structure of important viral gene products coded by E2 including BAV3 DNA pol and precursor to terminal protein. Comparative analysis of these proteins with their counterparts from human and non human adenoviruses revealed important insights as to the evolutionary lineage of BAV3. In order to insert the kanamycin resistance gene in either E1 or E3, it was necessary to delete BAV3 sequences to accommodate the foreign gene so as not to exceed the limit of the packaging capacity of the virus. To construct a recombinant BAV3 in which a foreign gene was inserted in the deleted E1 region, an E1 shuttle vector was constructed. This involved the deletion from the viral sequences a region between 1.3% to 9% and inserting the kanamycin resistance gene to replace the deletion. The E1 shuttle vector contained the left (0%- 53.9%) segment of the genome and was expected to generate BAV3 recombinants that can be grown and propagated in cells that can complement the missing E1 functions. To construct a similar shuttle vector for E3 deletion, DNA sequences extending from 78.9% to 82.5% (1281 bp) were deleted from within the E3 region that had been cloned into a plasmid vector. The deleted region corresponds to those that have been shown to be non-essential for viral replication in cell culture. The resulting plasmid was used to construct another recombinant plasmid with BAV3 DNA sequences extending from 37.1% to 100% and with a deletion of E3 sequences that were replaced by kanamycin resistance gene. This shuttle plasmid was used in cotransfections with digested viral DNA in an attempt to rescue a recombinant BAV3 carrying the kanamycin resistance gene to replace the deleted E3. In spite of repeated attempts of transfection, El or E3 recombinant BAV3 were not isolated. It seems that other approaches should be applied to make a final conclusion on BAV3 infectivity.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Niagara alternative food projects : networks, discourses and nature /

This thesis undertakes an exploration of the nature of alternative food projects in Niagara. A review of various theoretical approaches to the study of food and agriculture, suggests that actor-network theory offers the most useful lens through which to understand these projects. In particular, actor-network theory facilitates non-dualistic theorisations of power and scale and a commitment to the inclusion of non-humans in the 'social' sciences. The research is based on 19 in-depth interviews with actors involved in various urban and rural projects including community supported agriculture, community gardens, chefs using local seasonal food, a winery that grows organically, the good food box, a value-added small business, and organic producers. The analysis consists of four themes. The first analytical section pays special attention to the prominence of agri-tourism in Niagara, and examines the ways in which the projects in the sample interact with agri-tourist networks. In the second section the discussion focuses on the discourses and practices of resistance among Niagara alternative food actors. The participants' interviews suggest there are more discourses of resistance toward agri-tourist than toward dominant food networks. The third section questions commodity chain theorisations of alternative food projects. In particular, this section shows how the inclusion of non-human actors in an analysis confounds conceptualisations of 'short' and 'local' chains. The final analytical section assesses relations of power in Niagara alternative food projects. Three important conclusions arise from this research. First, Niagara alternative food projects cannot be conceptualised as operating at the 'local' scale. Broadening the scope of analysis to include non-human actors, it becomes apparent that these projects actually draw on a variety of extra-local actors. They are at once local and global. Second, the projects in this sample are simultaneously part of alternative, dominant and agri-tourist networks. While Niagara alternative food projects do perform many of the roles characteristic of alternative food systems, they are also involved in practices of development, business, and class distinction. Thus, alternative food networks should not be understood as separate from and in direct opposition to dominant food networks. Despite the second conclusion, this research determines that Niagara alternative food projects have made significant strides in the reworking of power. The projects represented in this thesis do engage in resistant practices and are associated with increased levels ofjustice.

Social neuroendocrinology of competition

The relationship between testosterone concentrations and aggressive behaviour in studies of people has produced very inconsistent findings. However, one consistent fmding that has emerged is that competitive and aggressive interactions potentiate testosterone release in both human and non-human species. It has been argued that socially-induced alterations in testosterone concentrations may function to influence ongoing and/or future social behaviour. Nonetheless, few studies have empirically tested this hypothesis. The current series of experiments was designed to address the extent to which competitioninduced fluctuations in testosterone concentrations were associated with ongoing and/or subsequent social behaviour. In Study 1, men (n = 38) provided saliva samples prior to, and at the conclusion of, the Point Subtraction Aggression Paradigm (PSAP). Although baseline testosterone concentrations were not related to aggressive behaviour, there was a positive correlation between change in testosterone and aggressive behaviour such that men who were most aggressive on the PSAP demonstrated the largest increase in testosterone concentrations. Furthermore, a rise in testosterone during the PSAP predicted willingness to choose a subsequent competitive task. In Study 2, men and women provided saliva samples prior to and after competing against a same-sex opponent on the Number Tracing Task (NTT). The outcome of the competition was rigged such that half of the individuals won most of the races, while the other half lost most of the races, thus experimentally creating a winner and loser in the laboratory. Following the competitive interaction, men and women played the PSAP with their same-sex partner. Results indicated that men selected the aggressive response (but not reward or protection responses), more frequently than women. For men assigned to the loss condition, an increase in testosterone concentrations in response to the NTT predicted subsequent aggressive behaviour. For men assigned to the win condition, an increase in testosterone concentrations in response to the NTT predicted subsequent aggressive behaviour, but only among those men who scored high on trait dominance. Change in testosterone and trait dominance did not predict aggressive behaviour in women. In Study 3, men provided saliva samples prior to, during, and at the end of the PSAP. They were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions that differed in the extent to which they were provoked and whether they received reward for behaving aggressively (i.e., stealing points). Results indicated that baseline testosterone concentrations did not correlate with aggression in any of the experimental conditions. Consistent with Study 1, there was a positive correlation between change in testosterone and aggressive behaviour among men who were provoked, but did not receive reward for aggression (i.e., reactive condition). Men who were provoked but did not receive reward for aggression enjoyed the task the most and were more likely to choose the competitive versus non-competitive task relative to men assigned to the other experimental conditions. Also, individual differences in aggressive behaviour among these men were positively correlated with the extent to which they enjoyed the task. Together, these studies indicate that testosterone dynamics within the context of competition influence subsequent competitive and aggressive behaviours in humans and that testosterone may be a marker of the intrinsically rewarding nature of costly aggressive behaviour.