The measurement of the optical absorption cross section of photosystem 1 and photosystem 2 from whole live cells of porphyridium cruentum, in light state 1 and light state 2

The optical cross section of PS I in whole cells of Porphyridium cruentum (UTEX 161), held in either state 1 or state 2, was determined by measuring the change in absorbance at 820nm, an indication of P700+; the X-section of PS2 was determined by measuring the variable fluorescence, (Fv-Fo)/Fo, from PS2. Both cross-sections were 7 determined by fitting Poisson distribution equations to the light saturation curves obtained with single turnover laser flashes which varied in intensity from zero to a level where maximum yield occurred. Flash wavelengths of 574nm, 626nm, and 668nm were used, energy absorbed by PBS, by PBS and chla, and by chla respectively. There were two populations of both PSi and PS2. A fraction of PSi is associated with PBS, and a fraction of PS2 is free from PBS. On the transition S1->S2, only with PBS-absorbed energy (574nm) did the average X-section of PSi increase (27%), and that of PS2 decrease (40%). The fraction of PSi associated with PBS decreased, from 0.65 to 0.35, and the Xsection of this associated PS 1 increased, from 135±65 A2 to 400±300A2. The cross section of PS2 associated with PBS decreased from 150±50 A2 to 85±45 A2, but the fraction of PS2 associated with PBS, approximately 0.75, did not change significantly. The increase in PSi cross section could not be completely accounted for by postulating that several PSi are associated with a single PBS and that in the transition to state2, fewer PSi share the same number of PBS, resulting in a larger X-section. It is postulated that small changes occur in the attachment of PS2 to PBS causing energy to be diverted to the attached PSi. These experiments support neither the mobile-PBS model of state transitions nor that of spillover. From cross section changes there was no evidence of energy transfer from PS2 to PSi with 668nm light. The decrease in PS2 fluorescence which occurred at this wavelength cannot be explained by energy transfer; another explanation must be sought. No explanation was found for an observed decrease in PSi yield at high flash intensities.

From inference to affordance : the problem of visual depth-perception in the optical writings of Descartes, Berkeley, and Gibson

This thesis explores the debate and issues regarding the status of visual ;,iferellces in the optical writings of Rene Descartes, George Berkeley and James 1. Gibson. It gathers arguments from across their works and synthesizes an account of visual depthperception that accurately reflects the larger, metaphysical implications of their philosophical theories. Chapters 1 and 2 address the Cartesian and Berkelean theories of depth-perception, respectively. For Descartes and Berkeley the debate can be put in the following way: How is it possible that we experience objects as appearing outside of us, at various distances, if objects appear inside of us, in the representations of the individual's mind? Thus, the Descartes-Berkeley component of the debate takes place exclusively within a representationalist setting. Representational theories of depthperception are rooted in the scientific discovery that objects project a merely twodimensional patchwork of forms on the retina. I call this the "flat image" problem. This poses the problem of depth in terms of a difference between two- and three-dimensional orders (i.e., a gap to be bridged by one inferential procedure or another). Chapter 3 addresses Gibson's ecological response to the debate. Gibson argues that the perceiver cannot be flattened out into a passive, two-dimensional sensory surface. Perception is possible precisely because the body and the environment already have depth. Accordingly, the problem cannot be reduced to a gap between two- and threedimensional givens, a gap crossed with a projective geometry. The crucial difference is not one of a dimensional degree. Chapter 3 explores this theme and attempts to excavate the empirical and philosophical suppositions that lead Descartes and Berkeley to their respective theories of indirect perception. Gibson argues that the notion of visual inference, which is necessary to substantiate representational theories of indirect perception, is highly problematic. To elucidate this point, the thesis steps into the representationalist tradition, in order to show that problems that arise within it demand a tum toward Gibson's information-based doctrine of ecological specificity (which is to say, the theory of direct perception). Chapter 3 concludes with a careful examination of Gibsonian affordallces as the sole objects of direct perceptual experience. The final section provides an account of affordances that locates the moving, perceiving body at the heart of the experience of depth; an experience which emerges in the dynamical structures that cross the body and the world.