The People's Republic of China and her relations with the countries of the association of Southeast Asian nations : 1969-1975

Phe Ihesis examines the evolution of the -policies of the People fs Jtenublie of China towards J?hail°nd, PTal ysia, Singapore, Iidonesia pad the Philip-pines, organised in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations from 1969 to 1975• 2ze first central point of this study is an *ir sumption that the foreign relations of The People's Tepublic of Chi la Towards Southeast ^sia have been motivated by a dynamic interplay of t^o main factors: (1) Farxist-Leninist ideology and ICao J^e-tung Ph^ught, which dictate to China to behave as a revolutionary Dover vhich must assist the insurgent movements in the area in their strug fle to overthrow the local governments; (2) national interest, vhich demands of China to safeguard the southern flank of her territory bordering on Southerst 'sia through Friendly relations, trade and ot*»er conventional inrtniments of diplomacy. hile the tvo main motive factors are nuTually antagonistic and exclusivet the Chinere leaders are nevertheless at te mi ting to oring them iirco a coherent policy under Mao's theory of tve {hniity of op-nosites," vhich believes that it is -possible to reconcile these co-posing tendencies into a dynamic enuibrium through vhich both opnosites could be promoted at the same time although not to the same extent* la other words, the Chinese leaders conceive the dynamic equilibrium as a continuum between them in a mix in which one or the other orientation predominates in different •periods* Bins we might see China1 s conduct motivated in one period by mostly ideological considerations at the expense of the staire-to-state relations, then ve might see her policy in the middle of the continuum and suf ering from immo bill sine and just muddling through, or finally ?fe might see her emphasising friendly ties at the expense of support of revolutionary movements at the other extreme -point of the spectrum* !fhe mechanism vhich enables Peking to move from one pole to the other of the spectrum is activated by the following elementsJ (1) the result of an internal power struggle within the leadership in Peking between ideologically radical and moderate elements, which enables the victorious faction to initiate nev policies; (2) Peking's assessment of the changing intentions and capabilities of the major powers in the area; (3) internal changes within the countries of the area and the changing attitudes of their governments towards China; (4) changing fortunes of revolutionary movements operating in the area* 'Phe second major point of this study is an assertion that while China's conduct toward Southeast *lsia after her foundation in 1949 was primarily based upon ideological considerations, the beginning of the seventies saw the national interest reasserting itself as the leading motive factor* Thus China talks with her neighbours in Southeast asia in terms of relevance of fllong historical ties," casting herself into the role of a benevolent "older brother11 who is entitled to reopect and deference in exchange for patronage and protection* Hence the traditional echoes of the past are emerging ever stronger and influencing her postures towards the region, while the open support to revolutionary moevments is underplayed at the moment.

An investigation of the nature and role of historicality in the thought of Dilthey and Heidegger

Introduction The question of the meaning, methods and philosophical manifestations of history is currently rife with contention. The problem that I will address in an exposition of the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, centers around the intersubjectivity of an historical world. Specifically, there are two interconnected issues. First, since all knowledge occurs to a person from within his or her historical age how can any person in any age make truth claims? In order to answer this concern we must understand the essence and role of history. Yet how can we come to an individual understanding ofwhat history is when the meanings that we use are themselves historically enveloped? But can we, we who are well aware of the knowledge that archaeology has dredged up from old texts or even from 'living' monuments of past ages, really neglect to notice these artifacts that exist within and enrich our world? Charges of wilful blindness would arise if any attempt were made to suggest that certain things of our world did not come down to us from the past. Thus it appears more important 2 to determine what this 'past' is and therefore how history operates than to simply derail the possibility for historical understanding. Wilhelm Dilthey, the great German historicist from the 19th century, did not question the existence of historical artifacts as from the past, but in treating knowledge as one such artifact placed the onus on knowledge to show itself as true, or meaningful, in light ofthe fact that other historical periods relied on different facts and generated different truths or meanings. The problem for him was not just determining what the role of history is, but moreover to discover how knowledge could make any claim as true knowledge. As he stated, there is a problem of "historical anarchy"!' Martin Heidegger picked up these two strands of Dilthey's thought and wanted to answer the problem of truth and meaning in order to solve the problem of historicism. This problem underscored, perhaps for the first time, that societal presuppositions about the past and present oftheir era are not immutable. Penetrating to the core of the raison d'etre of the age was an historical reflection about the past which was now conceived as separated both temporally and attitudinally from the present. But further than this, Heidegger's focus on asking the question of the meaning of Being meant that history must be ontologically explicated not merely ontically treated. Heidegger hopes to remove barriers to a genuine ontology by II 1 3 including history into an assessment ofprevious philosophical systems. He does this in order that the question of Being be more fully explicated, which necessarily for him includes the question of the Being of history. One approach to the question ofwhat history is, given the information that we get from historical knowledge, is whether such knowledge can be formalized into a science. Additionally, we can approach the question of what the essence and role of history is by revealing its underlying characteristics, that is, by focussing on historicality. Thus we will begin with an expository look at Dilthey's conception of history and historicality. We will then explore these issues first in Heidegger's Being and Time, then in the third chapter his middle and later works. Finally, we shall examine how Heidegger's conception may reflect a development in the conception of historicality over Dilthey's historicism, and what such a conception means for a contemporary historical understanding. The problem of existing in a common world which is perceived only individually has been philosophically addressed in many forms. Escaping a pure subjectivist interpretation of 'reality' has occupied Western thinkers not only in order to discover metaphysical truths, but also to provide a foundation for politics and ethics. Many thinkers accept a solipsistic view as inevitable and reject attempts at justifying truth in an intersubjective world. The problem ofhistoricality raises similar problems. We 4 -. - - - - exist in a common historical age, presumably, yet are only aware ofthe historicity of the age through our own individual thoughts. Thus the question arises, do we actually exist within a common history or do we merely individually interpret this as communal? What is the reality of history, individual or communal? Dilthey answers this question by asserting a 'reality' to the historical age thus overcoming solipsism by encasing individual human experience within the historical horizon of the age. This however does nothing to address the epistemological concern over the discoverablity of truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, rejects a metaphysical construel of history and seeks to ground history first within the ontology ofDasein, and second, within the so called "sending" of Being. Thus there can be no solipsism for Heidegger because Dasein's Being is necessarily "cohistorical", Being-with-Others, and furthermore, this historical-Being-in-the-worldwith- Others is the horizon of Being over which truth can appear. Heidegger's solution to the problem of solipsism appears to satisfy that the world is not just a subjective idealist creation and also that one need not appeal to any universal measures of truth or presumed eternal verities. Thus in elucidating Heidegger's notion of history I will also confront the issues ofDasein's Being-alongside-things as well as the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world so that Dasein's historicality is explicated vis-a-vis the "sending of Being" (die Schicken des S eins).