Cognitive coaching : a multiple case study /

The purpose of this qualitative study was to investigate the application of Cognitive Coaching as a school-based professional development program to improve instructional thought and decision making as well as to enhance staff perceptions, coUegiality and school culture. This topic emerged from personal and professional issues related to the role ofthe reflective practitioner in improving the quality of education, yet cognizant of the fact that little professional development was available to train teachers to become reflective. This case study, positioned within the interpretive sciences, focused on three teachers and how their experiences with cognitive coaching affected their teaching practices. Their knowledge, understanding and use of the four stages of instructional thought (preactive, interactive, reflective and projective) were tested before and at the end of eight coaching cycles, and again after two months to determine whether they had continued to use the reflective process. They were also assessed on whether their attitude towards peer coaching had changed, whether their feelings about teaching had become more positive and whether their professional dialogue had increased. Three methods of data collection were selected to assess growth: interviews, observations and joumaling. Analysis primarily consisted of coding and organizing data according to emerging themes. Although the professed aim of cognitive coaching was to teach the process in order that the teachers would become self-analytical and self-modifying, this study found that the value of the coaching, after trust had been established in both the coach and the process, was in the dialoguing and the time set aside to do it. Once the coaching stopped providing the time to dialogue, to examine one's meanings and beliefs, so did the critical self-reflection. As a result ofthe cognitive coaching experience though, all participants grew in their feelings of efficacy, craftsmanship, flexibility, consciousness and interdependence. The actual and potential significance ofthis study was discussed according to implications for teacher supervision, professional development, school culture, further areas of research and to my personal growth and development.

From inference to affordance : the problem of visual depth-perception in the optical writings of Descartes, Berkeley, and Gibson

This thesis explores the debate and issues regarding the status of visual ;,iferellces in the optical writings of Rene Descartes, George Berkeley and James 1. Gibson. It gathers arguments from across their works and synthesizes an account of visual depthperception that accurately reflects the larger, metaphysical implications of their philosophical theories. Chapters 1 and 2 address the Cartesian and Berkelean theories of depth-perception, respectively. For Descartes and Berkeley the debate can be put in the following way: How is it possible that we experience objects as appearing outside of us, at various distances, if objects appear inside of us, in the representations of the individual's mind? Thus, the Descartes-Berkeley component of the debate takes place exclusively within a representationalist setting. Representational theories of depthperception are rooted in the scientific discovery that objects project a merely twodimensional patchwork of forms on the retina. I call this the "flat image" problem. This poses the problem of depth in terms of a difference between two- and three-dimensional orders (i.e., a gap to be bridged by one inferential procedure or another). Chapter 3 addresses Gibson's ecological response to the debate. Gibson argues that the perceiver cannot be flattened out into a passive, two-dimensional sensory surface. Perception is possible precisely because the body and the environment already have depth. Accordingly, the problem cannot be reduced to a gap between two- and threedimensional givens, a gap crossed with a projective geometry. The crucial difference is not one of a dimensional degree. Chapter 3 explores this theme and attempts to excavate the empirical and philosophical suppositions that lead Descartes and Berkeley to their respective theories of indirect perception. Gibson argues that the notion of visual inference, which is necessary to substantiate representational theories of indirect perception, is highly problematic. To elucidate this point, the thesis steps into the representationalist tradition, in order to show that problems that arise within it demand a tum toward Gibson's information-based doctrine of ecological specificity (which is to say, the theory of direct perception). Chapter 3 concludes with a careful examination of Gibsonian affordallces as the sole objects of direct perceptual experience. The final section provides an account of affordances that locates the moving, perceiving body at the heart of the experience of depth; an experience which emerges in the dynamical structures that cross the body and the world.