Electrical Development Company of Ontario certificate of stock ownership, ca. 1910.

The Electrical Development Company of Ontario was created in 1903. It was one of three private power companies that had water power leases with the Niagara Parks Commission, but was the only one that was financed with Canadian capital. The company built the Toronto Power Generating Station at Niagara Falls beginning in 1906, and the power house was completed in 1913. During the construction, there was much debate about whether the utility should remain privately operated or become a public utility. In 1920, the company became part of the public utility.

Liquidity, institutional ownership and regulation fair disclosure

There is a body of academic literature addressing two issues of importance for leveling the playing field for all classes of investors: 1) the impact of institutional investors on liquidity; and 2) the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on institutional investors and liquidity. Our study addresses both issues with the purpose of attaining a better understanding and explanation of this relationship. We classify institutional ownership according to Bushee's (1998, 2001) methodology; transient institutions, dedicated institutions and quasi-indexers. Our results indicate that while transient institutions and quasi-indexers have a positive impact on liquidity, dedicated institutional ownership is negatively associated with liquidity. This result is consistent with prior theoretical studies. We also find that the effectiveness ofthe Regulation Fair Disclosure in improving liquidity is limited to firms with higher transient institutional ownership, whereas quasi-indexed institutions have not been significantly affected by the regulations. In fact, the liquidity of firms is lower for firms with higher dedicated institutional holdings, which is evidence of the "chilling effect".

Managerial Risk-Taking and CEO Excess Compensation

This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, I provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, I find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation

Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance, And Managerial Risk-Taking

This dissertation investigates the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and managerial risk-taking, as well as the differences in governance structure that affect this association. Using a sample of US public firms from 1995 to 2009, we find that firms with strong CSR records engage in higher risk-taking. Furthermore, we find that this relationship is robust when accounting for differences in governance structure and correcting for endogeneity via simultaneous equations modeling. Additional testing indicates that performance in the employee relations dimension of CSR in particular increases with risk-taking, while high firm visibility dampens the association between CSR and the accounting-based measures of risk-taking. Prior literature establishes that high managerial risk-tolerance is necessary for the undertaking of risky yet value-enhancing investment decisions. Thus, the main findings suggest that CSR, rather than being a waste of scarce corporate resources, is instead an important aspect of shareholder value creation. They contribute to the debate on CSR by documenting that corporate risk-taking is one mechanism among others through which CSR maps into higher firm value.