Buried Treasure: The Economics of Leak Detection and Water Loss Prevention in Ontario

On average approximately 13% of the water that is withdrawn by Canadian municipal water suppliers is lost before it reaches final users. This is an important topic for several reasons: water losses cost money, losses force water agencies to draw more water from lakes and streams thereby putting more stress on aquatic ecosystems, leaks reduce system reliability, leaks may contribute to future pipe failures, and leaks may allow contaminants to enter water systems thereby reducing water quality and threatening the health of water users. Some benefits of leak detection fall outside water agencies’ accounting purview (e.g. reduced health risks to households connected to public water supply systems) and, as a result, may not be considered adequately in water agency decision-making. Because of the regulatory environment in which Canadian water agencies operate, some of these benefits-especially those external to the agency or those that may accrue to the agency in future time periods- may not be fully counted when agencies decide on leak detection efforts. Our analysis suggests potential reforms to promote increased efforts for leak detection: adoption of a Canada-wide goal of universal water metering; development of full-cost accounting and, pricing for water supplies; and co-operation amongst the provinces to promulgate standards for leak detection efforts and provide incentives to promote improved efficiency and rational investment decision-making.

Managerial Risk-Taking and CEO Excess Compensation

This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, I provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, I find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation

Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance, And Managerial Risk-Taking

This dissertation investigates the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and managerial risk-taking, as well as the differences in governance structure that affect this association. Using a sample of US public firms from 1995 to 2009, we find that firms with strong CSR records engage in higher risk-taking. Furthermore, we find that this relationship is robust when accounting for differences in governance structure and correcting for endogeneity via simultaneous equations modeling. Additional testing indicates that performance in the employee relations dimension of CSR in particular increases with risk-taking, while high firm visibility dampens the association between CSR and the accounting-based measures of risk-taking. Prior literature establishes that high managerial risk-tolerance is necessary for the undertaking of risky yet value-enhancing investment decisions. Thus, the main findings suggest that CSR, rather than being a waste of scarce corporate resources, is instead an important aspect of shareholder value creation. They contribute to the debate on CSR by documenting that corporate risk-taking is one mechanism among others through which CSR maps into higher firm value.