Towards a just community: an examination of the development of cultural citizenship rights in Canada from a communitarian perspective

The notion of citizenship, while a basic human right, has come under scrutiny. It was once assumed a liberal inspired regime of citizenship rights would reign as the primary ideological perspective in the Western world, however this has not been the case. Numerous competing paradigms have questioned the premise upon which liberal guarantees of citizenship rights are based. In particular, communitarianism has subjected liberal rights discourse to a closer examination. Communitarian theory holds that universalist principles negate any articulation of community and its internal diversity, such as cultural citizenship. It is this understanding of citizenship that has taken hold in Canada. The Canadian political experience illustrates a number of attributes associated with communitarian thought. It is a collectivist society that articulates a notion of the common good, acknowledges the internal diversity of its citizens and possesses a highly developed deliberative democratic process. To this end, Canada can be described as being more communitarian than liberal in nature in the process it has adopted to address citizenship rights. However, the type of commuIiitarianism displayed in Canada differs from the political models examined by such scholars as Michael Sandel, Iris Marion Young or Will Kymlicka. Cultural citizenship rights are fluid and malleable in Canada. While no clear guarantees of citizenship rights exist, there is a common commitment by Canadians to engage in a fair, open and inclusive deliberative process. This model is unique to Canada; it cannot be exported in that it is a product of Canadian political culture. As a result, the contemporary demands of cultural citizenship are dealt with effectively and democratically in Canada in that the proper mechanisms for public deliberation exist.

Children's rights and parenting beliefs : a study of attitudes, values and emotions

The conceptualization of childhood has changed over the centuries and appears to be undergoing further change in our post-modern culture. While the United Nations Convention on the Right of the Child is designed to give children everywhere basic human rights while taking into consideration their special needs, no recent research has examined adult attitudes toward those rights. In an attempt to understand the attitudes adults hold regarding autonomy rights and to look for some factors that could predict those attitudes, the current study considers values, parenting style, emotions and the issue of parent status as possible predictor variables. A total of 90 participants took part in the research, which had both written and interview components. Results generally failed to establish a reliable set of predictors. However, some interesting information was obtained regarding the endorsement of children's autonomy rights and some general conclusions were reached about our view of children and their rights at the end of the twentieth century.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Buddhism and the earth : environmental thought in early Buddhist philosophy

Introduction Fundamental to the philosophy of Buddhism, is the insight that there is "unsatisfactohness" (dukkha) in the world and that it can be eliminated through the practice of the Noble Eight Fold Path. Buddhism also maintains that the world as we experience and entities that exist are bereft of any substantiality. Instead existence is manifest through dependent origination. All things are conditional; nothing is permanent. However, inherent in this dependent existence is the interconnectedness of all beings and their subjection to the cosmic law of karma. Part of cultivating the Eight Fold path includes a deep compassion for all other living things, 'trapped' within this cycle of dependent origination. This compassion or empathy (karuna) is crucial to the Buddhist path to enlightenment. It is this emphasis on karuna that shows itself in Mahayana Buddhism with respect to the theory of the boddhisatva (or Buddha-to-be) since the boddhisatva willingly postpones his/her own enlightenment to help others on the same path. One of the ramifications of the theory of dependent origination is that there is no anthropocentric bias placed on humans over the natural world. Paradoxically the doctrine of non-self becomes an ontology within Buddhism, culminating in the Mayahana realization that a common boundary exists between samsara and nirvana. Essential to this ontology is the life of dharma or a moral life. Ethics is not separated from ontology. As my thesis will show, this basic outlook of Buddhism has implications toward our understanding of the Buddhist world-view with respect to the current human predicament concerning the environment. While humans are the only ones who can 4 attain "Buddhahood", it is because of our ability to understand what it means to follow the Eight fold path and act accordingly. Because of the interconnectedness of all entities {dharmas), there is an ontological necessity to eliminate suffering and 'save the earth' because if we allow the earth to suffer, we ALL suffer. This can be understood as an ethical outlook which can be applied to our interaction with and treatment of the natural environment or environment in the broadest sense, not just trees plants rocks etc. It is an approach to samsara and all within it. It has been argued that there is no ontology in Buddhism due to its doctrine of "non-self". However, it is a goal of this thesis to argue that there does exist an original ontology in Buddhism; that according to it, the nature of Being is essentially neither "Being nor non-being nor not non-being" as illustrated by Nagarjuna. Within this ontology is engrained an ethic or 'right path' (samma marga) that is fundamental to our being and this includes a compassionate relationship to our environment. In this dissertation I endeavour to trace the implications that the Buddhist worldview has for the environmental issues that assail us in our age of technology. I will explore questions such as: can the Buddhist way of thinking help us comprehend and possibly resolve the environmental problems of our day and age? Are there any current environmental theories which are comparable to or share common ground with the classical Buddhist doctrines? I will elucidate some fundamental doctrines of early Buddhism from an environmental perspective as well as identify some comparable modern environmental theories such as deep ecology and general systems theory, that seem to share in the wisdom of classical Buddhism and have much to gain from a deeper appreciation of Buddhism.

Foreign trained teachers : the emergence of the right to practise their profession in Ontario

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the impact of 2 recent legal events, specifically the Fair Access to Regulated Professions Act (2006) and Siadat v. Ontario College of Teachers (2007) decision, with regards to the opportunity of foreign trained teachers to practice their profession in Ontario. The emphasis is on the case of Fatima Siadat, who was a teacher in Iran but was unable to satisfy all the licensing requirements of the Ontario College of Teachers and consequently was unable to practise her profession in Ontario. When the Ontario College of Teachers Appeals Committee upheld the previous decision of the Ontario College of Teachers Registrar to refuse to issue her a teacher's certificate, Ms. Fatima Siadat decided to initiate a lawsuit. Ms. Fatima Siadat challenged the decision ofthe Ontario College of Teachers Appeals Committee by raising a question of applicability of human rights legislation (i.e., The Ontario Human Rights Code, 1990) on the Ontario College of Teachers' decisions. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice decided in January of2007 in favour of Ms. Fatima Siadat (Siadat v. Ontario College of Teachers , 2007) and ordered that her licensing application be reconsidered by the Ontario College of Teachers Appeals Committee. In this thesis the author argues that the Fatima Siadat decision, together with the Fair Access to Regulated Professions Act, 2006, will likely make a significant contribution to enhancing the access of foreign trained teachers and other professionals to practice their regulated professions in Ontario.

"Re-huminization": the role of human-animal similarity in predicting prejudice towards immigrants and non-human animals

Research implies that there ~ay be an association between attitudes toward margil1alized human outgroups and non-human animals. Very few studies, however, have specifically tested this relation empirically. The general purpose of the present research was to determine if such a relation exists and if perceptions of human-animal similarity avail as a common predictor of both types of attitudes. Ideological orientations associated with prejudiced attitudes (Social Dominance Orientation, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, and Universal Orientation) were also examined as individual differences in predicting perceptions of human-animal similarity. As predicted, people who endorsed prejudiced attitudes toward human outgroups (Study 1) and immigrants in particular (Studies 2 and 3), were more likely to endorse prejudiced attitudes toward non-human animals. In Study 2, perceptions that humans are superior (versus similar) to other animals directly predicted higher levels of prejudice toward non-human animals, whereas the effect of human superiority beliefs on immigrant prejudice was mediated by dehumanization. In other words, greater perceptions of humans as superior (versus similar) to other animals "allowed for" greater dehumanization of immigrants, which in turn resulted in heightened immigrant prejudice. Furthermore, people higher in Social Dominance Orientation or Right-Wing Authoritarianism were particularly likely to perceive humans as superior (versus similar) to other animals, whereas people characterized by a greater Universal Orientation were more likely to perceive humans and non-human animals as similar. Study 3 examined whether inducing perceptions of human-animal similarity through experimental manipulation would lead to more favourable attitudes toward non-human animals and immigrants. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of four 11 editorials designed to highlight either the similarities or differences between humans and other animals (i.e., animals are similar to humans; humans are similar to animals;~~nimals are inferior to humans; humans are superior to animals) or to a neutral control condition. Encouragingly, when animals were described as similar to humans, prejudice towards non-human animals and immigrants was significantly lower, and to some extent this finding was also true for people naturally high in prejudice (i.e., high in Social Dominance Orientation or Right-Wing Authoritarianism). Inducing perceptions that nonhuman animals are similar to humans was particularly effective at reducing the tendency to dehumanize immigrants ("re-humanization"), lowering feelings of personal threat regarding one's animal-nature, and at increasing inclusive intergroup representations and empathy, all of which uniquely accounted for the significant decreases in prejudiced attitudes. Implications for research, theory and prejudice interventions are considered.

Youth with intellectual disabilities and the right to make choices : investigating the family context to inform a training program

People with intellectual disabilities (ID) are more likely to be victims of abuse and human rights violations than people without ID. The 3Rs: Rights, Respect, and Responsibility project has developed and is testing a human rights training program for adults with ID. The current project was conducted to make recommendations to adapt the 3Rs rights training program to be used with youth with ID and their families. An interpretive phenomenological framework was employed to investigate youth with ID, parents', and siblings' perceptions of the i r experiences with choice making, an enactment of rights, in the family context. Thematic analysis of interviews revealed that, consistent with previous research, family members consider family values, conventions, and family members' well being when making decisions. A training program should promote a consideration of expanded opportunities for youth with ID to make choices and should be flexible to address individual families' cultures, needs, and desires.

Perceived Deservingness and the Toleration of Human Rights Violations: The Problem and a Possible Solution

Despite general endorsement of universal human rights, people continue to tolerate specific human rights violations. I conducted a two-part study to investigate this issue. For Part I, I examined whether people tolerated torture (a human rights violation) based on the morality and deservingness of the target. Participants tolerated torture more when the target had committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression. This effect was mediated by the target’s perceived deservingness for harsh treatment, and held over and above participants’ abstract support for the right to humane treatment. For Part II, hypocrisy induction was used in an attempt to reduce participants’ toleration of the torture. Participants were assigned to either the hypocrisy induction or control condition. Unexpectedly, participants who tolerated the torture more in Part I reduced their toleration the most in the control condition, possibly because of consistency and floor effects. Limitations and implications of the findings are discussed.

Dipping is Easy...With Right Vat Design

The article discusses dipping vats and three basic types of dipping systems: Jump in Vat, Hydraulic Cage Vat, and the Box Sprayer.