An examination of existential faith in the writtings of Søren Kierkegaard

This thesis takes seriously the proposition that existentialism is a lived philosophy. While Descartes' proof for the existence of God initially sparked my interest in philosophy, the insights of existentialism have allowed me to appropriate philosophy as a way of life. I apply the insights of Kierkegaard's writings to my spiritual and philosophy development. Philosophy is personal, and Kierkegaard's writings deal with the development of the person in his aesthetic, ethical and religious dimensions. Philosophy is a struggle, and this thesis, reveals the existential struggle of the individual in despair. The thesis argues that authentic faith actually entails faith. The existential believer has this faith whereas the religious believer does not. The subjectively reflective existential believer recognizes that a leap of faith is needed; anything else, is just historical, speculative knowledge. The existential believer or, the Knight of Faith, realizes that a leap of faith is needed to become open in inwardness to receive the condition to understand the paradoxes that faith presents. I will present Kierkegaard's "Analogy of a House" which is in essence, the backbone of his philosophy. I will discuss the challenge of moving from one floor to the next. More specifically, I will discuss the anxiety that is felt in the very moment of the transition from the first floor to the second floor. I will outline eight paradoxes that must me resolved in order for the individual to continue on his journey to the top floor of the house. I will argue that Kierkegaard's example of Abraham as a Knight of Faith is incorrect, that Abraham was in fact not a Knight of Faith. I will also argue that we should find our own exemplars in our own lives by looking for Knight of Faith traits in people we know and then trying to emulate those people. I will also discuss Unamuno's "paradoxical faith" and argue that this kind of faith is a strong alternative to those who find that Kierkegaard's existential faith is not a possibility.

Kierkegaard : the temporality of becoming a self

Introduction In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze compares and contrasts Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's ideas of repetition. He argues that neither of them really give a representation of repetition. Repetition for them is a sort of selective task: the way in which they determine what is ethical and eternal. With Nietzsche, it is a theater of un belie f. ..... Nietzsche's leading idea is to found the repetition in the etemal return at once on the death of God and the dissolution of the self But it is a quite different alliance in the theater of faith: Kierkegaard dreams of alliance between a God and a self rediscovered. I Repetition plays a theatrical role in their thinking. It allows them to dramatically stage the interplay of various personnae. Deleuze does give a positive account ofKierkegaard's "repetition"; however, he does not think that Kierkegaard works out a philosophical model, or a representation of what repetition is. It is true that in the book Repetition, Constantin Constantius does not clearly and fully work out the concept of repetition, but in Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard gives a full explanation of the self and its temporality which can be connected with repetition. When Sickness Unto Death is interpreted according to key passages from Repetition and The Concept of Anxiety, a clear philosophical concept of repetition can be established. In my opinion, Kierkegaard's philosophy is about the task of becoming a self, and I will be attempting to show that he does have a model of the temporality of self-becoming. In Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard explains his notions of despair with reference to sin, self, self-becoming, faith, and repetition. Despair is a sickness of the spirit, of the self, and accordingly can take three forms: in despair not to be conscious of having a self (not despair in the strict sense); in despair not to will to be oneself; in despair to will to be oneself2 In relation to this definition, he defines a self as "a relation that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself relates to another.''3 Thus, a person is a threefold relationship, and any break in that relationship is despair. Despair takes three forms corresponding to the three aspects of a self s relation to itself Kierkegaard says that a selfis like a house with a basement, a first floor, and a second floor.4 This model of the house, and the concept of the stages on life's way that it illustrates, is central to Kierkegaard's philosophy. This thesis will show how he unpacks this model in many of his writings with different concepts being developed in different texts. His method is to work with the same model in different ways throughout his authorship. He assigns many of the texts to different pseudonyms, but in this thesis we will treat the model and the related concepts as being Kierkegaard's and not only the pseudonyms. This is justified as our thesis will show this modelremains the same throughout Kierkegaard's work, though it is treated in different ways by different pseudonyms. According to Kierkegaard, many people live in only the basement for their entire lives, that is, as aesthetes ("in despair not to be conscious of having a self'). They live in despair of not being conscious of having a self They live in a merely horizontal relation. They want to get what they desire. When they go to the first floor, so to speak, they reflect on themselves and only then do they begin to get a self In this stage, one acquires an ideology of the required and overcomes the strict commands of the desired. The ethical is primarily an obedience to the required whereas the aesthetic is an obedience to desire. In his work Fear and Trembling (Copenhagen: 1843), Johannes de Silentio makes several observations concerning this point. In this book, the author several times allows the desired ideality of esthetics to be shipwrecked on the required ideality of ethics, in order through these collisions to bring to light the religious ideality as the ideality that precisely is the ideality of actuality, and therefore just as desirable as that of esthetics and not as impossible as the ideality of ethics. This is accomplished in such a way that the religious ideality breaks forth in the dialectical leap and in the positive mood - "Behold all things have become new" as well as in the negative mood that is the passion of the absurd to which the concept "repetition" corresponds.s Here one begins to become responsible because one seeks the required ideality; however, the required ideality and the desired ideality become inadequate to the ethical individual. Neither of them satisfy him ("in despair not to will to be oneself'). Then he moves up to the second floor: that is, the mystical region, or the sphere of religiousness (A) ("despair to will to be oneself). Kiericegaard's model of a house, which is connected with the above definition ofdespair, shows us how the self arises through these various stages, and shows the stages of despair as well. On the second floor, we become mystics, or Knights of Infinite Resignation. We are still in despair because we despair ofthe basement and the first floor, however, we can be fiill, free persons only ifwe live on all the floors at the same time. This is a sort of paradoxical fourth stage consisting of all three floors; this is the sphere of true religiousness (religiousness (B)). It is distinguished from religiousness (A) because we can go back and live on all the floors. It is not that there are four floors, but in the fourth stage, we live paradoxically on three at once. Kierkegaard uses this house analogy in order to explain how we become a self through these stages, and to show the various stages of despair. Consequently, I will be explaining self-becoming in relation to despair. It will also be necessary to explain it in relation to faith, for faith is precisely the overcoming of despair. After explaining the becoming of the self in relation to despair and faith, I will then explain its temporality and thereby its repetition. What Kierkegaard calls a formula, Deleuze calls a representation. Unfortunately, Deleuze does not acknowledge Kierkegaard's formula for repetition. As we shall see, Kierkegaard clearly gives a formula for despair, faith, and selfbecoming. When viewed properly, these formulae yield a formula for repetition because when one hasfaith, the basement, firstfloor, and secondfloor become new as one becomes oneself The self is not bound in the eternity ofthe first floor (ethical) or the temporality of the basement (aesthete). I shall now examine the two forms of conscious despair in such a way as to point out also a rise in the consciousness of the nature of despair and in the consciousness that one's state is despair, or, what amounts to the same thing and is the salient point, a rise in the consciousness of the self The opposite to being in despair is to have faith. Therefore, the formula set forth above, which describes a state in which there is not despair at all, is entirely correct, and this formula is also the formula for faMi in ^elating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it.

Kierkegaardian intersubjectivity and the question of ethics and responsibility

Kierkegaardian Intersubjectivity and the Question of Ethics and Responsibility By Kevin Krumrei. Kierkegaard's contributions to philosophy are generally admitted and recognized as valuable in the history of Western philosophy, both as one of the great anti-Hegelians, as the founder (arguably) of existentialism, and as a religious thinker. However valid this may be, there is similarly a generally admitted critique of Kierkegaard in the Western tradition, that Kierkegaard's philosophy of the development of the self leads the individual into an isolated encounter with God, to the abandonment of the social context. In other words, a Kierkegaardian theory of intersubjectivity is a contradiction in terms. This is voiced eloquently by Emmanuel Levinas, among others. However, Levinas' own intersubjective ethics bears a striking resemblance to Kierkegaard's, with respect to the description and formulation of the basic problem for ethics: the problem of aesthetic egoism. Further, both Kierkegaard and Levinas follow similar paths in responding to the problem, from Kierkegaard's reduplication in Works of Love, to Levinas' notion of substitution in Otherwise than Being. In this comparison, it becomes evident that Levinas' reading of Kierkegaard is mistaken, for Kierkegaard's intersubjective ethics postulates, in fact, the inseparability and necessity of the self s responsible relation to others in the self s relation to God, found in the command, "you shall love your neighbour as yourself."

Anti-Oedipus en-procés : a comparative analysis of Kristeva and Deleuze & Guattari

The present thesis is an attempt to bring into dialogue what appear to be two radically different approaches of negotiating subjectivity in late Western Modernity. Here the thought of Julia Kristeva as well as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari are fully engaged. These thinkers, the latter two being considered as one, have until now remained strangers to one another. Consequently much confusion has amassed concerning their respective philosophical, as well as social/political projects. I take up the position that Deleuze and Guattari's account of subjectivity is a commendable attempt to understand a particular type of historical subject: late modern Western man. However I claim that their account comes up short insofar as I argue that they lack the theoretical language in order to fully, and successfully, make their point. Thus I argue that their system does not stand up to its own claims. On the contrary, by embracing the psychoanalytic tradition - staying rather close to the Freudian and Kleinian schools of thought - I argue that it is in fact Kristeva that is better equipped to provide an account of this particular subject. Considerable time is invested in fleshing out the notion of the Other insofar as this Other is central to the constitution of subjectivity. This Other - insofar as this Other is to be found in Kristeva's notion of the chora -- is something I claim that Deleuze and Guattari simply undervalued.

The Ontario Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Individual Privacy Act: an analysis of its application to school boards

In Canada freedom of information must be viewed in the context of governing -- how do you deal with an abundance of information while balancing a diversity of competing interests? How can you ensure people are informed enough to participate in crucial decision-making, yet willing enough to let some administrative matters be dealt with in camera without their involvement in every detail. In an age when taxpayers' coalition groups are on the rise, and the government is encouraging the establishment of Parent Council groups for schools, the issues and challenges presented by access to information and protection of privacy legislation are real ones. The province of Ontario's decision to extend freedom of information legislation to local governments does not ensure, or equate to, full public disclosure of all facts or necessarily guarantee complete public comprehension of an issue. The mere fact that local governments, like school boards, decide to collect, assemble or record some information and not to collect other information implies that a prior decision was made by "someone" on what was important to record or keep. That in itself means that not all the facts are going to be disclosed, regardless of the presence of legislation. The resulting lack of information can lead to public mistrust and lack of confidence in those who govern. This is completely contrary to the spirit of the legislation which was to provide interested members of the community with facts so that values like political accountability and trust could be ensured and meaningful criticism and input obtained on matters affecting the whole community. This thesis first reviews the historical reasons for adopting freedom of information legislation, reasons which are rooted in our parliamentary system of government. However, the same reasoning for enacting such legislation cannot be applied carte blanche to the municipal level of government in Ontario, or - ii - more specifially to the programs, policies or operations of a school board. The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 1989 (MFIPPA) was a neccessary step to ensure greater openness from school boards. Based on a review of the Orders made by the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario, it also assesses how successfully freedom of information legislation has been implemented at the municipal level of government. The Orders provide an opportunity to review what problems school boards have encountered, and what guidance the Commissioner has offered. Reference is made to a value framework as an administrative tool in critically analyzing the suitability of MFIPPA to school boards. The conclusion is drawn that MFIPPA appears to have inhibited rather than facilitated openness in local government. This may be attributed to several factors inclusive of the general uncertainty, confusion and discretion in interpreting various provisions and exemptions in the Act. Some of the uncertainty is due to the fact that an insufficient number of school board staff are familiar with the Act. The complexity of the Act and its legalistic procedures have over-formalized the processes of exchanging information. In addition there appears to be a concern among municipal officials that granting any access to information may be violating personal privacy rights of others. These concerns translate into indecision and extreme caution in responding to inquiries. The result is delay in responding to information requests and lack of uniformity in the responses given. However, the mandatory review of the legislation does afford an opportunity to address some of these problems and to make this complex Act more suitable for application to school boards. In order for the Act to function more efficiently and effectively legislative changes must be made to MFIPPA. It is important that the recommendations for improving the Act be adopted before the government extends this legislation to any other public entities.

Electrophysiological and behavioural correlates of facial identity and expression perception deficits following a closed head injury /

A large variety of social signals, such as facial expression and body language, are conveyed in everyday interactions and an accurate perception and interpretation of these social cues is necessary in order for reciprocal social interactions to take place successfully and efficiently. The present study was conducted to determine whether impairments in social functioning that are commonly observed following a closed head injury, could at least be partially attributable to disruption in the ability to appreciate social cues. More specifically, an attempt was made to determine whether face processing deficits following a closed head injury (CHI) coincide with changes in electrophysiological responsivity to the presentation of facial stimuli. A number of event-related potentials (ERPs) that have been linked specifically to various aspects of visual processing were examined. These included the N170, an index of structural encoding ability, the N400, an index of the ability to detect differences in serially presented stimuli, and the Late Positivity (LP), an index of the sensitivity to affective content in visually-presented stimuli. Electrophysiological responses were recorded while participants with and without a closed head injury were presented with pairs of faces delivered in a rapid sequence and asked to compare them on the basis of whether they matched with respect to identity or emotion. Other behavioural measures of identity and emotion recognition were also employed, along with a small battery of standard neuropsychological tests used to determine general levels of cognitive impairment. Participants in the CHI group were impaired in a number of cognitive domains that are commonly affected following a brain injury. These impairments included reduced efficiency in various aspects of encoding verbal information into memory, general slower rate of information processing, decreased sensitivity to smell, and greater difficulty in the regulation of emotion and a limited awareness of this impairment. Impairments in face and emotion processing were clearly evident in the CHI group. However, despite these impairments in face processing, there were no significant differences between groups in the electrophysiological components examined. The only exception was a trend indicating delayed N170 peak latencies in the CHI group (p = .09), which may reflect inefficient structural encoding processes. In addition, group differences were noted in the region of the N100, thought to reflect very early selective attention. It is possible, then, that facial expression and identity processing deficits following CHI are secondary to (or exacerbated by) an underlying disruption of very early attentional processes. Alternately the difficulty may arise in the later cognitive stages involved in the interpretation of the relevant visual information. However, the present data do not allow these alternatives to be distinguished. Nonetheless, it was clearly evident that individuals with CHI are more likely than controls to make face processing errors, particularly for the more difficult to discriminate negative emotions. Those working with individuals who have sustained a head injury should be alerted to this potential source of social monitoring difficulties which is often observed as part of the sequelae following a CHI.