21 resultados para Human-nature relationship
em Brock University, Canada
Resumo:
Elizabeth Hall was a managing editor of Psychology Today, who on separate occasions interviewed Oxford ethologist Nikolaas Tinbergen (1907-1988) and psychologist Bruno Bettelheim (1903-1990). Her 1973 interview with Tinbergen, conducted at his vacation home in the Cumberland region of northern England, was published later that year in Psychology Today. She left the magazine in 1976 to run the journal Human Nature, but left this position in 1979. She continued to contribute articles to various magazines, but most notably to Psychology Today. Her interview with Bruno Bettelheim appeared in that magazine in 1981.
Resumo:
There are a considerable number of programs and agencies that count on the existence of a unique relationship between nature and human development. In addition, there are significant bodies of literature dedicated to understanding developmentally focused nature-based experiences. This research project was designed to flirther the understanding of this phenomenon. Consequently, the purpose of this research endeavour was to discover the essence ofthe intersection ofpersonal transformation and nature-based leisure, culminating in a rich and detailed account of this otherwise tacit phenomenon. As such, this research built on the assumption of this beneficial intersection of nature and personal transformation and contributes to the understanding ofhow this context is supporting or generating of selfactualization and positive development. Heuristic methods were employed because heuristics is concerned with the quality and essence of an experience, not causal relationships (Moustakas, 1990). Heuristic inquiry begins with the primary researcher and her personal experience and knowledge of the phenomenon. This study also involved four other coresearchers who had also experienced this phenomenon intensely. Co-researchers were found through purposeful and snowball sampling. Rich narrative descriptions of their experiences were gathered through in-depth, semi-structured interviews, and artifact elicitation was employed as a means to get at co-researchers' tacit knowledge. Each coresearcher was interviewed twice (the first interview focused on personal transformation, the second on nature) for approximately four and a half hours in total. Transcripts were read repeatedly to discern patterns that emerged from the study of the narratives and were coded accordingly. Individual narratives were consolidated to create a composite narrative of the experience. Finally, a creative synthesis was developed to represent the essence of this tacit experience. In conclusion the essence of the intersection of nature-based leisure and personal transformation was found to lie in the convergence of the lived experience of authenticity. The physical environment of nature was perceived and experienced to be a space and context of authenticity, leisure experiences were experienced as an engagement of authenticity, and individuals themselves encountered a true or authentic self that emanated from within. The implications of these findings are many, offering suggestions, considerations and implications from reconsidered approaches to environmental education to support for selfdirected human development.
Resumo:
Conflicts over human rights in relations between East Asia and the West have increased since the end of the Cold War. Western governments express concern about human rights standards in East Asian countries. In the East, these expressions have been perceived as interference in internal affairs. Due to dramatic economic development, East Asian nations recently have gained in pride and self-confidence as global actors. Such development is observed with suspicion in the West. Concerned about the decline of global U.S. influence, some American scholars have re-invented the notion of "culture" to point at an alleged East Asian threat. Also East Asian statesmen use the cultural argument by claiming the existence of so-called 'Asian values', which they allege are the key to Eastern economic success. This thesis argues that issues of human rights in East-West relations are not only a consequence of well-intended concern by Western governments regarding the human rights and welfare of the citizens of East Asian nations, but are in fact dominated by and used as a pawn in interplay with more complicated questions of global power and economic relations between East and West. The thesis reviews the relevance of culture in East-West relations. In the West, particularly Samuel P. Huntington with his prediction of the Clash of Civilizations stands out. Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew has been very vocal on the Eastern side. Whereas the West tries to cope with its decrease of global influence, after hundreds of years under Western hegemonism, the East believes in an Asian way of development without interference form the West. Most of this dispute revolves around the issue of human rights. The West claims the universality of rights which in fact emphasizes political and civil rights. Western countries critizise poor human rights standards in East Asia. The East, in return, accuses the West of hypocritical policies that seek global dominance. East Asian governments assert that due to a different stage of development they have to stress first their rights to development in order to assure stability. In particular, China argues this way. The country's leadership, however, shows concern about human rights and has already improved its human rights record over the past years. This thesis analyses the dispute over human rights in a case study on Germany and China. Both countries have a mutual interest in trade relations which has conflicted with Germany's criticism of China's problematic human rights record. In 1996, the two countries clashed after the German parliament passed a resolution condemning China's treatment of Tibet. This caused a lot of damage to the Chinese-German relationship which in the course of the year went back to normality. In the light of these frictions a German human rights policy that focuses on unspectacular grass-roots support of China, for example in strengthening China's legal system, would be preferable. Such co-operation must be based on mutual respect.
Resumo:
Through this descriptive exploratory study, the ways that wilderness recreation leaders experience nature are illuminated, deconstructing the assumed environmental benefits of and practices used in outdoor recreation (Haluza-Delay, 2001). This study also offers a foundation for advancing an environmental ethic among wilderness recreation leaders, participants, and organizations. With the continued degradation of and threats to natural environments, and the rising popularity of outdoor recreation participation, the outdoor recreation professional can be a leader in promoting human reconnections to the Earth (Henderson, 1999). Leaders of outdoor recreation experiences play an important role in encouraging these revived relationships to natural settings and can contribute to the necessary environmental consciousness shift needed within Western society (Hanna, 1995; Jordan, 1996). The purpose of this research was to describe the lived-experience in nature of wilderness recreation leaders. Specifically, a phenomenological method of inquiry was used to describe the meaning of nature, the connections and relationships to nature, and the behaviours and emotions experienced in nature by a group of wilderness canoe trip leaders employed by a residential summer camp. In addition to the implications of this research, achieving this outcome provides a rich descriptive understanding of wilderness leaders' experiences—a basis from which to extend future research endeavours and programmatic practices that promote effective environmental outcomes of outdoor recreation participation. Each of the five study participants was employed in the summer of 2003 by an Ontario residential summer camp organization that sponsors extended wilderness river canoe trips for youth. Two in-depth and semi-structured interviews were performed with each participant, asking them to reflect on the canoe trip that they led for the summer camp organization during 2003. Phenomenological data was analyzed according to Colaizzi's (1978) thematic analysis process. Consistent with van Manen's (1997) emphasis on phenomenological writing, the final result presents the essence of the nature experiences of wilderness recreation leaders in the format of a narrative description. This narrative piece is the culmination of this research effort. Throughout the journey, however, various foundations within the outdoor recreation field, such as minimum impact principles, environmentally responsible behaviours, anthropocentric and ecocentric worldviews, and effective leadership are deconstructed and discussed.
Resumo:
The human a-tocopherol transfer protein (h-a-TTP) is understood to be the entity responsible for the specific retention of a-tocopherol (a-toc) in human tissues over all other forms of vitamin E obtained from the diet. a-Tocopherol is the most biologically active form of vitamin E, and to date has been studied extensively with regard to its antioxidant properties and its role of terminating membrane lipid peroxidation chain reactions. However, information surrounding the distribution of a-tocopherol, specifically its delivery to intracellular membranes by a-TTP, is still unclear and the molecular factors influencing transfer remain elusive. To investigate the mechanism of ligand transfer by the h-a-TTP, a fluorescent analogue of a-toc has been used in the development of a fluorescence resonance energy transfer (FRET) assay. (/?)-2,5,7,8-tetramethyl-2-[9-(7-nitro-benzo[l,2,5]oxdiazol-4-ylamino)-nonyl]- chroman-6-ol (NBD-toc) has allowed for the development of the FRET-based ligand transfer assay. This ligand has been utilized in a series of experiments where changes were made to acceptor lipid membrane concentration and composition, as well as to the ionic strength and viscosity of the buffer medium. Such changes have yielded evidence supporting a collisional mechanism of ligand transfer by a-TTP, and have brought to light a new line of inquiry pertaining to the nature of the forces governing the collisional transfer interaction. Through elucidation of the transfer mechanism type, a deeper understanding of the transfer event and the in vivo fate of a-tocopherol have been obtained. Furthermore, the results presented here allow for a deeper investigation of the forces controlling the collisional protein-membrane interaction and their effect on the transfer of a-toc to membranes. Future investigation in this direction will raise the possibility of a complete understanding of the molecular events surrounding the distribution of a-toc within the cell and to the body's tissues.
Resumo:
Introduction The question of the meaning, methods and philosophical manifestations of history is currently rife with contention. The problem that I will address in an exposition of the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, centers around the intersubjectivity of an historical world. Specifically, there are two interconnected issues. First, since all knowledge occurs to a person from within his or her historical age how can any person in any age make truth claims? In order to answer this concern we must understand the essence and role of history. Yet how can we come to an individual understanding ofwhat history is when the meanings that we use are themselves historically enveloped? But can we, we who are well aware of the knowledge that archaeology has dredged up from old texts or even from 'living' monuments of past ages, really neglect to notice these artifacts that exist within and enrich our world? Charges of wilful blindness would arise if any attempt were made to suggest that certain things of our world did not come down to us from the past. Thus it appears more important 2 to determine what this 'past' is and therefore how history operates than to simply derail the possibility for historical understanding. Wilhelm Dilthey, the great German historicist from the 19th century, did not question the existence of historical artifacts as from the past, but in treating knowledge as one such artifact placed the onus on knowledge to show itself as true, or meaningful, in light ofthe fact that other historical periods relied on different facts and generated different truths or meanings. The problem for him was not just determining what the role of history is, but moreover to discover how knowledge could make any claim as true knowledge. As he stated, there is a problem of "historical anarchy"!' Martin Heidegger picked up these two strands of Dilthey's thought and wanted to answer the problem of truth and meaning in order to solve the problem of historicism. This problem underscored, perhaps for the first time, that societal presuppositions about the past and present oftheir era are not immutable. Penetrating to the core of the raison d'etre of the age was an historical reflection about the past which was now conceived as separated both temporally and attitudinally from the present. But further than this, Heidegger's focus on asking the question of the meaning of Being meant that history must be ontologically explicated not merely ontically treated. Heidegger hopes to remove barriers to a genuine ontology by II 1 3 including history into an assessment ofprevious philosophical systems. He does this in order that the question of Being be more fully explicated, which necessarily for him includes the question of the Being of history. One approach to the question ofwhat history is, given the information that we get from historical knowledge, is whether such knowledge can be formalized into a science. Additionally, we can approach the question of what the essence and role of history is by revealing its underlying characteristics, that is, by focussing on historicality. Thus we will begin with an expository look at Dilthey's conception of history and historicality. We will then explore these issues first in Heidegger's Being and Time, then in the third chapter his middle and later works. Finally, we shall examine how Heidegger's conception may reflect a development in the conception of historicality over Dilthey's historicism, and what such a conception means for a contemporary historical understanding. The problem of existing in a common world which is perceived only individually has been philosophically addressed in many forms. Escaping a pure subjectivist interpretation of 'reality' has occupied Western thinkers not only in order to discover metaphysical truths, but also to provide a foundation for politics and ethics. Many thinkers accept a solipsistic view as inevitable and reject attempts at justifying truth in an intersubjective world. The problem ofhistoricality raises similar problems. We 4 -. - - - - exist in a common historical age, presumably, yet are only aware ofthe historicity of the age through our own individual thoughts. Thus the question arises, do we actually exist within a common history or do we merely individually interpret this as communal? What is the reality of history, individual or communal? Dilthey answers this question by asserting a 'reality' to the historical age thus overcoming solipsism by encasing individual human experience within the historical horizon of the age. This however does nothing to address the epistemological concern over the discoverablity of truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, rejects a metaphysical construel of history and seeks to ground history first within the ontology ofDasein, and second, within the so called "sending" of Being. Thus there can be no solipsism for Heidegger because Dasein's Being is necessarily "cohistorical", Being-with-Others, and furthermore, this historical-Being-in-the-worldwith- Others is the horizon of Being over which truth can appear. Heidegger's solution to the problem of solipsism appears to satisfy that the world is not just a subjective idealist creation and also that one need not appeal to any universal measures of truth or presumed eternal verities. Thus in elucidating Heidegger's notion of history I will also confront the issues ofDasein's Being-alongside-things as well as the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world so that Dasein's historicality is explicated vis-a-vis the "sending of Being" (die Schicken des S eins).
Resumo:
years 8 months) and 24 older (M == 7 years 4 months) children. A Monitoring Process Model (MPM) was developed and tested in order to ascertain at which component process ofthe MPM age differences would emerge. The MPM had four components: (1) assessment; (2) evaluation; (3) planning; and (4) behavioural control. The MPM was assessed directly using a referential communication task in which the children were asked to make a series of five Lego buildings (a baseline condition and one building for each MPM component). Children listened to instructions from one experimenter while a second experimenter in the room (a confederate) intetjected varying levels ofverbal feedback in order to assist the children and control the component ofthe MPM. This design allowed us to determine at which "stage" ofprocessing children would most likely have difficulty monitoring themselves in this social-cognitive task. Developmental differences were obselVed for the evaluation, planning and behavioural control components suggesting that older children were able to be more successful with the more explicit metacomponents. Interestingly, however, there was no age difference in terms ofLego task success in the baseline condition suggesting that without the intelVention ofthe confederate younger children monitored the task about as well as older children. This pattern ofresults indicates that the younger children were disrupted by the feedback rather than helped. On the other hand, the older children were able to incorporate the feedback offered by the confederate into a plan ofaction. Another aim ofthis study was to assess similar processing components to those investigated by the MPM Lego task in a more naturalistic observation. Together the use ofthe Lego Task ( a social cognitive task) and the naturalistic social interaction allowed for the appraisal of cross-domain continuities and discontinuities in monitoring behaviours. In this vein, analyses were undertaken in order to ascertain whether or not successful performance in the MPM Lego Task would predict cross-domain competence in the more naturalistic social interchange. Indeed, success in the two latter components ofthe MPM (planning and behavioural control) was related to overall competence in the naturalistic task. However, this cross-domain prediction was not evident for all levels ofthe naturalistic interchange suggesting that the nature ofthe feedback a child receives is an important determinant ofresponse competency. Individual difference measures reflecting the children's general cognitive capacity (Working Memory and Digit Span) and verbal ability (vocabulary) were also taken in an effort to account for more variance in the prediction oftask success. However, these individual difference measures did not serve to enhance the prediction oftask performance in either the Lego Task or the naturalistic task. Similarly, parental responses to questionnaires pertaining to their child's temperament and social experience also failed to increase prediction oftask performance. On-line measures ofthe children's engagement, positive affect and anxiety also failed to predict competence ratings.
Resumo:
It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.
Resumo:
Introduction Man can be described as the being who shows himself in speech, and from birth to death is continually speaking. Communication is so close to us, so woven into our very being, that we have little understanding of the way it is constituted; for it is as hard to obtain distance from communication as it is to obtain distance from ourselves. All communication is not alike. There are two basic modesl of communication, the inauthentic and the authentic, between which there occurs a constant tension. It is in the inauthentic mode, points out Heidegger, that we find ourselves "proximately and for the most part"; 1. Being and Time, pg. 68 Dasein decides as to the way it will comport itself in taking up its task of having being as an issue for it. " •.• it~, in its very being 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself or only "seem" to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic--that is, something of its own--can it have lost itself and not yet won itself." 2. therefore Heidegger also terms it "everydayness".2 Caught up in the world of everydayness, our speaking covers over and conceals3 our rootedness in being, leaving us in the darkness of untruth. The image of darkness may be inferred from Heidegger's use of the image of "clearing,,4 to depict being as 2. ibid. pg. 69 "Dasein's average everydayness, however, is not to be taken as a mere 'aspect'. Here too, and even in the mode of inauthenticity, the structure of existentiality lies ~ priori and here too Dasein's being is an issue for it in a definite way; and Dasein comports itself towards it the mode of average everydayness, even if this is only the mode of fleeing in the face of it and forgetfulness thereof." 3. ibid. pg. 59 "covering over" and "concealing" are 1;yays Dasein tries to flee its task of having being as an issue for itself. " ••• This being can be covered up so extensively that it becomes forgotten and no question arises about it or its meaning ••• n How everyday speaking accomplishes this will be taken up in detail in the second chapter which explores Dasein's everyday speech. 4. ibid, pg. 171 lI ••• we have in mind nothing other than the Existential - ontological structure of this entity (Dasein), that it is in such a way as to be its 'there'. To say that it is -' illuminated' [tlerleuchtet"] means that as Being-in-theworld it is cleared [gelichtetJ in itself7 not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing. Only for an entity which is eXistentially cleared in this way does what is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark •••• " 3 dis-coveredness and truth. Our first task will be to explore the nature of communication in general and then to explore each of the modes manifested in turn. The structure of the inauthentic mode of communication can be explored by asking the following questions: What is this speaking about? Who is it that is speaking and who is spoken to? Does this speaking show man in his speech? The authentic mode is distinguished by the rarity with which we encounter it; as the inauthentic conceals, so the authentic reveals our rootedness in being. Yet this rarity makes it difficult to delineate its elusive structure clearly. Its constituent elements can be brought into focus by asking the same questions of this mode that we previously asked of the inauthentic mode. Our initial response to the disclosure of the authentic mode is to attempt to abandon the inauthentic mode and leave the darkness behind dwelling only in the "lighted place". All through the ages, some men pushing this to extreme, have, upon uncovering their relatedness to being, experienced a deep longing to dwell in such a "place" of pure truth and oft times denigrated or attempted to exclude the everyday world. Such 4. flight is twice mistaken: first it atbempts to fix truth as unchanging and static and secondly, it opposes this to untruth which it seeks to abolish. This is both the wrong view of truth and the wrong view of untruth as Heidegger points out in The Origin of The-Work of Art: The Way-to-be of truth, i.e., of discoveredness, is under the sway of refusal. But this refusal is no lack or privation, as if truth could be simply discoveredness rid of all covers. If it could be that, it would no longer be itself . ••• Truth in its way-to-be is untruth.5 Pure light is not the nature of Being nor is pure unconcealedness possible for man. Failure to remember this is the failure to realize that communication destroys itself in such flight because it no longer maintains the contingency of its task, i.e., the dis-closedness of being. We are reminded of the strong attraction this flight from darkness held for Plato. Light, truth and Being are all beyond the darkness and have nothing to do with it. In Book VII of the R~public, Socrates' explanation of the Allegory of the Cave to Glaucon points to a decided preference men have for the "lighted place". 5. The Origin Of The Work Of Art, pg. 42 5. Come then, I said, and join me in this further thought, and do not be surprised that those who attained to this height are not willing to occupy themselves with the affairs of men, but their souls ever feel the upward urge and yearning for that sojourn above. For this, I take it, is likely if in this point too the likeliness of our image holds. 6 Despite the attraction to pure truth, human communication is more complex than putting down one mode of communication and picking up another. Due to the fact that we are always on the way, the title of my thesis will have to be amended: OUT OF THE DARKNESS AND INTO THE LIGHT--AGAIN AND AGAIN. It must be this way because this is what it means to be human. This is the point made by Mephisto to Faust in pointing out that man, standing between God and the devil, needs both darkness and light: Er findet sich in einem ewigen Gl~t Uns hat er in die Finsternis gebracht, Und euch taugt einzig Tag und Nacht. 7 6. Republic z (517 c & d) It should be noted however, that while the philosopherking must be compelled to return to the cave for purely political reasons, once he has taken adequate view of the "brightest region of being" he has the full truth and his return to darkness adds nothing to the truth. 7. Faust, pg. 188 6. This thesis proposes to examine the grounds that give rise to communication, uncovering the structure of its inauthentic and authentic modes and paying close attention to tpeir interrelationship and to their relationship to language as "the house of Being": language that both covers and opens up man's rootedness in Being, transforming him as he moves along his way, taking up his "ownmost task" of becoming who he is. roots. He is the being who shows himself inn that reflects his forgetfulness or remembrance of his rootedness in being. Man comes into an already existent world and is addressedl through things in the world which are c
Resumo:
There is a great deal of evidence to support the examination of an interactive relationship between the medium and the viewer in the interpretation of mainstream media. The exact nature of this relationship, however, is not well understood. The current study was carried out to assess the variables that may help explain why certain people interpret media, such as music videos, differently than others. Jensen's concept of reception analysis describes the relationship between the medium and the audience, and thus remains a strong focus within this study. Differences in the interpretation of music videos were investigated as a function of Absorption, gender role, screen size, age and viewing experience. Multiple regression analyses uncovered independent predictions of sexuality and violence scores by absorption and experience, as well as an interaction between absorption and screen size in the sexuality rating of the music videos.
Resumo:
This thesis undertakes an exploration of the nature of alternative food projects in Niagara. A review of various theoretical approaches to the study of food and agriculture, suggests that actor-network theory offers the most useful lens through which to understand these projects. In particular, actor-network theory facilitates non-dualistic theorisations of power and scale and a commitment to the inclusion of non-humans in the 'social' sciences. The research is based on 19 in-depth interviews with actors involved in various urban and rural projects including community supported agriculture, community gardens, chefs using local seasonal food, a winery that grows organically, the good food box, a value-added small business, and organic producers. The analysis consists of four themes. The first analytical section pays special attention to the prominence of agri-tourism in Niagara, and examines the ways in which the projects in the sample interact with agri-tourist networks. In the second section the discussion focuses on the discourses and practices of resistance among Niagara alternative food actors. The participants' interviews suggest there are more discourses of resistance toward agri-tourist than toward dominant food networks. The third section questions commodity chain theorisations of alternative food projects. In particular, this section shows how the inclusion of non-human actors in an analysis confounds conceptualisations of 'short' and 'local' chains. The final analytical section assesses relations of power in Niagara alternative food projects. Three important conclusions arise from this research. First, Niagara alternative food projects cannot be conceptualised as operating at the 'local' scale. Broadening the scope of analysis to include non-human actors, it becomes apparent that these projects actually draw on a variety of extra-local actors. They are at once local and global. Second, the projects in this sample are simultaneously part of alternative, dominant and agri-tourist networks. While Niagara alternative food projects do perform many of the roles characteristic of alternative food systems, they are also involved in practices of development, business, and class distinction. Thus, alternative food networks should not be understood as separate from and in direct opposition to dominant food networks. Despite the second conclusion, this research determines that Niagara alternative food projects have made significant strides in the reworking of power. The projects represented in this thesis do engage in resistant practices and are associated with increased levels ofjustice.
Resumo:
Introduction Fundamental to the philosophy of Buddhism, is the insight that there is "unsatisfactohness" (dukkha) in the world and that it can be eliminated through the practice of the Noble Eight Fold Path. Buddhism also maintains that the world as we experience and entities that exist are bereft of any substantiality. Instead existence is manifest through dependent origination. All things are conditional; nothing is permanent. However, inherent in this dependent existence is the interconnectedness of all beings and their subjection to the cosmic law of karma. Part of cultivating the Eight Fold path includes a deep compassion for all other living things, 'trapped' within this cycle of dependent origination. This compassion or empathy (karuna) is crucial to the Buddhist path to enlightenment. It is this emphasis on karuna that shows itself in Mahayana Buddhism with respect to the theory of the boddhisatva (or Buddha-to-be) since the boddhisatva willingly postpones his/her own enlightenment to help others on the same path. One of the ramifications of the theory of dependent origination is that there is no anthropocentric bias placed on humans over the natural world. Paradoxically the doctrine of non-self becomes an ontology within Buddhism, culminating in the Mayahana realization that a common boundary exists between samsara and nirvana. Essential to this ontology is the life of dharma or a moral life. Ethics is not separated from ontology. As my thesis will show, this basic outlook of Buddhism has implications toward our understanding of the Buddhist world-view with respect to the current human predicament concerning the environment. While humans are the only ones who can 4 attain "Buddhahood", it is because of our ability to understand what it means to follow the Eight fold path and act accordingly. Because of the interconnectedness of all entities {dharmas), there is an ontological necessity to eliminate suffering and 'save the earth' because if we allow the earth to suffer, we ALL suffer. This can be understood as an ethical outlook which can be applied to our interaction with and treatment of the natural environment or environment in the broadest sense, not just trees plants rocks etc. It is an approach to samsara and all within it. It has been argued that there is no ontology in Buddhism due to its doctrine of "non-self". However, it is a goal of this thesis to argue that there does exist an original ontology in Buddhism; that according to it, the nature of Being is essentially neither "Being nor non-being nor not non-being" as illustrated by Nagarjuna. Within this ontology is engrained an ethic or 'right path' (samma marga) that is fundamental to our being and this includes a compassionate relationship to our environment. In this dissertation I endeavour to trace the implications that the Buddhist worldview has for the environmental issues that assail us in our age of technology. I will explore questions such as: can the Buddhist way of thinking help us comprehend and possibly resolve the environmental problems of our day and age? Are there any current environmental theories which are comparable to or share common ground with the classical Buddhist doctrines? I will elucidate some fundamental doctrines of early Buddhism from an environmental perspective as well as identify some comparable modern environmental theories such as deep ecology and general systems theory, that seem to share in the wisdom of classical Buddhism and have much to gain from a deeper appreciation of Buddhism.
Resumo:
This qualitative research was a constructivist grounded theory designed to develop an understanding of how firefighters perceive and cope with stressful situations and the impact this has on their perceptions of health. This study was framed in a social ecological perspective with the community of firefighting providing the environment within which to explore stress and coping. Of particular concern here are the stressors associated with firefighting. Prior research with firefighters has often been epidemiological and statistical in nature, focusing on measures of cardiovascular disease, cancer, and depression (Baker & Williams, 2001 ; Brown et al., 2002; Murphy et al.,1999; Regehr et al., 2002; Regehr et al., 2003). Qualitative research examining the perception of stress among firefighters that includes personal stories allows firefighters the opportunity to describe what it is like to be met with physically and mentally challenging situations on a daily basis. Twelve in-depth, semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with a brief questionnaire were conducted with firefighters from a Southern Ontario Fire Department. Four main themes emerged describing the persona of the firefighter, the stressors of firefighters, coping strategies of firefighters, and firefighters' perceptions of health. Stressors include requirements of the job, traumatic calls, tensions with co-workers, the struggle between the family at home and the family at work, political stressors with the City, and the inner struggle. Avoidance coping, approach coping, and gaining perspective emerged as the three coping styles of firefighters. Health was defined as including physical, mental, social and spiritual aspects. A model of the findings is provided that depicts the cyclical nature of the stress-coping-health relationship among firefighters.
Resumo:
Research implies that there ~ay be an association between attitudes toward margil1alized human outgroups and non-human animals. Very few studies, however, have specifically tested this relation empirically. The general purpose of the present research was to determine if such a relation exists and if perceptions of human-animal similarity avail as a common predictor of both types of attitudes. Ideological orientations associated with prejudiced attitudes (Social Dominance Orientation, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, and Universal Orientation) were also examined as individual differences in predicting perceptions of human-animal similarity. As predicted, people who endorsed prejudiced attitudes toward human outgroups (Study 1) and immigrants in particular (Studies 2 and 3), were more likely to endorse prejudiced attitudes toward non-human animals. In Study 2, perceptions that humans are superior (versus similar) to other animals directly predicted higher levels of prejudice toward non-human animals, whereas the effect of human superiority beliefs on immigrant prejudice was mediated by dehumanization. In other words, greater perceptions of humans as superior (versus similar) to other animals "allowed for" greater dehumanization of immigrants, which in turn resulted in heightened immigrant prejudice. Furthermore, people higher in Social Dominance Orientation or Right-Wing Authoritarianism were particularly likely to perceive humans as superior (versus similar) to other animals, whereas people characterized by a greater Universal Orientation were more likely to perceive humans and non-human animals as similar. Study 3 examined whether inducing perceptions of human-animal similarity through experimental manipulation would lead to more favourable attitudes toward non-human animals and immigrants. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of four 11 editorials designed to highlight either the similarities or differences between humans and other animals (i.e., animals are similar to humans; humans are similar to animals;~~nimals are inferior to humans; humans are superior to animals) or to a neutral control condition. Encouragingly, when animals were described as similar to humans, prejudice towards non-human animals and immigrants was significantly lower, and to some extent this finding was also true for people naturally high in prejudice (i.e., high in Social Dominance Orientation or Right-Wing Authoritarianism). Inducing perceptions that nonhuman animals are similar to humans was particularly effective at reducing the tendency to dehumanize immigrants ("re-humanization"), lowering feelings of personal threat regarding one's animal-nature, and at increasing inclusive intergroup representations and empathy, all of which uniquely accounted for the significant decreases in prejudiced attitudes. Implications for research, theory and prejudice interventions are considered.
Resumo:
Vitamin E is a well known fat soluble chain breaking antioxidant. It is a general tenn used to describe a family of eight stereoisomers of tocopherols. Selective retention of a-tocopherol in the human circulation system is regulated by the a -Tocopherol Transfer Protein (a-TIP). Using a fluorescently labelled a-tocopherol (NBD-a-Toc) synthesized in our laboratory, a fluorescence resonance energy transfer (FRET) assay was developed to monitor the kinetics of ligand transfer by a-hTTP in lipid vesicles. Preliminary results implied that NBD-a-Toe simply diffused from 6-His-a-hTTP to acceptor membranes since the kinetics of transfer were not responsive to a variety of conditions tested. After a series of trouble shooting experiments, we identified a minor contaminant, E coli. outer membrane porin F (OmpF) that co-purified with 6-His-a-hTTP from the metal affinity column as the source of the problem. In order to completely avoid OmpF contamination, a GST -a-hTTP fusion protein was purified from a glutathione agarose column followed by an on-column thrombin digestion to remove the GST tag. We then demonstrated that a-hTTP utilizes a collisional mechanism to deliver its ligand. Furthennore, a higher rate of a-tocopherol transfer to small unilamellar vesicles (SUV s) versus large unilamellar vesicles (LUV s) indicated that transfer is sensitive to membrane curvature. These findings suggest that ahTTP mediated a-Toc transfer is dominated by the hydrophobic nature of a-hTTP and the packing density of phospholipid head groups within acceptor membranes. Based on the calculated free energy change (dG) when a protein is transferred from water to the lipid bilayer, a model was generated to predict the orientation of a-hTTP when it interacts with lipid membranes. Guided by this model, several hydrophobic residues expected to penetrate deeply into the bilayer hydrophobic core, were mutated to either aspartate or alanine. Utilizing dual polarization interferometry and size exclusion vesicle binding assays, we identified the key residues for membrane binding to be F 165, F 169 and 1202. In addition, the rates of ligand transfer of the u-TTP mutants were directly correlated to their membrane binding capabilities, indicating that membrane binding was likely the rate limiting step in u-TTP mediated transfer of u-Toc. The propensity of u-TTP for highly curved membrane provides a connection to its colocalization with u-Toc in late endosomes.