On the formulation and the calculation of the harmonic contributions to the Debye-Waller factor in metals (sodium)

The algebraic expressions for the anharmonic contributions to the Debye-Waller factor up to 0(A ) and 0 L% ) £ where ^ is the scattering wave-vector] have been derived in a form suitable for cubic metals with small ion cores where the interatomic potential extends to many neighbours. This has been achieved in terms of various wave-vector dependent tensors, following the work of Shukla and Taylor (1974) on the cubic anharmonic Helmholtz free energy. The contribution to the various wave-vector dependent tensors from the coulomb and the electron-ion terms in the interatomic metallic potential has been obtained by the Ewald procedure. All the restricted multiple whole B r i l l o u i n zone (B.Z.) sums are reduced to single whole B.Z. sums by using the plane wave representation of the delta function. These single whole B.Z. sums are further reduced to the •%?? portion of the B.Z. following Shukla and Wilk (1974) and Shukla and Taylor (1974). Numerical calculations have been performed for sodium where the Born-Mayer term in the interatomic potential has been neglected because i t is small £ Vosko (1964)3 • *n o^er to compare our calculated results with the experimental results of Dawton (1937), we have also calculated the r a t io of the intensities at different temperatures for the lowest five reflections (110), (200), (220), (310) and (400) . Our calculated quasi-harmonic results agree reasonably well with the experimental results at temperatures (T) of the order of the Debye temperature ( 0 ). For T » © ^ 9 our calculated anharmonic results are found to be in good agreement with the experimental results.The anomalous terms in the Debye-Waller factor are found not to be negligible for certain reflections even for T ^ ©^ . At temperature T yy Op 9 where the temperature is of the order of the melting temperature (Xm) » "the anomalous terms are found to be important almost for all the f i ve reflections.

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