10 resultados para Granger causality.
em Brock University, Canada
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We assess the predictive ability of three VPIN metrics on the basis of two highly volatile market events of China, and examine the association between VPIN and toxic-induced volatility through conditional probability analysis and multiple regression. We examine the dynamic relationship on VPIN and high-frequency liquidity using Vector Auto-Regression models, Granger Causality tests, and impulse response analysis. Our results suggest that Bulk Volume VPIN has the best risk-warning effect among major VPIN metrics. VPIN has a positive association with market volatility induced by toxic information flow. Most importantly, we document a positive feedback effect between VPIN and high-frequency liquidity, where a negative liquidity shock boosts up VPIN, which, in turn, leads to further liquidity drain. Our study provides empirical evidence that reflects an intrinsic game between informed traders and market makers when facing toxic information in the high-frequency trading world.
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Research Question: What are the psychosocial factors that affect causality assessment in early phase oncology clinical trials? Methods: Thirty-two qualitative interviews were explicated with the aid of “Naturalistic Decision Making”. Data explication consisted of phenomenological reduction, delineating and clustering meaning units, forming themes, and creating a composite summary. Participants were members of the National Cancer Institute of Canada’s Clinical Trial Group Investigative New Drug committee. Results: The process of assigning causality is extremely subjective and full of uncertainty. Physicians had no formal training, nor a tool to assist them with this process. Physicians were apprehensive about their decisions and felt pressure from their patients, as well as the pharmaceutical companies sponsoring the trial. Conclusions: There are many problem areas when attributing causality, all of which have serious consequences, but clinicians used a variety of methods to cope with these problem areas.
Stress, social support, and health risk behaviours as mediators of the forgiveness-health relation /
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The mediating roles of stress, social support, and health risk behaviours in the relationships between dispositional forgiveness and mental and physical health were examined. Participants were 748 undergraduate students (554 women, 194 men) entering their first year of studies at Brock University. Participants, ranging in age from 17 to 25 years, completed the Brock University First Year Health Study and were provided monetary compensation. Dispositional forgiveness, stress, social support, health risk behaviours, mental health, and physical health were measured using self-report methods. The data were analyzed separately for women and men because there were significant mean differences on many of the study'S variables. Analyses revealed that the mediated relationships between dispositional forgiveness and health were generally stronger for women than men. Stress was the most robust mediator of the forgiveness-health relation for both women and men. The only health risk behaviour that mediated the forgivenesshealth relation was physical fitness and this result was found for women only. Social support mediated several of the relationships between forgiveness and health but not others. Results were discussed with reference to the literature on forgiveness and health. Several directions for future research were offered, such as conducting longitudinal research designs to assess the direction of causality better, investigating moderator variables of the forgiveness-health relation, and building models, which incorporate multiple mediators using structural equation modelling techniques.
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Beliefs about the rightness or wrongness of engaging in various antisocial acts, referred to here as nonnative beliefs legitimizing antisocial behaviour (nblab), have been shown to playa role in the emergence oflater antisocial behaviour. The current study represented an attempt to understand whether parental monitoring and parent-child attachment have differential relationships with these antisocial nonnative beliefs in adolescents of different temperaments. The participants, 7135 adolescents in 25 high schools (ages 10- 18 years, M = 15.7) completed a wide-ranging questionnaire as part of the broad Youth Lifestyle Choices - Community University Research Alliance project, whose goal is to identify and describe the major developmental pathways of risk behaviours and resilience in youth. Two aspects of monitoring (monitoring knowledge and surveillance/tracking), attachment security, and two measures of temperament (activity level and approach) were examined for main effects and in interactions as predictors of adolescent nonnative beliefs. All of these measures were based on adolescent self-ratings on either 3- or 4-point Likert-type scales. Several important results emerged from the study. Males were higher than females in nblab; parental monitoring knowledge and adolescent attachment security were negatively related to nblab; and temperamental activity level was positively related. Monitoring knowledge, the strongest of the predictors, was much more strongly related to nonnative beliefs than was parental surveillance/tracking, supporting the contention that it is how much parents actually know, and not their surveillance efforts, that predict adolescent nonnative beliefs. A surprising finding that is of the utmost importance was that, although several of the interactions tested were significant, none were considered to be of a meaningful magnitude (defined as sr^ > .01). The current study supported the suggestion that normative beliefs legitimizing antisocial behaviour are multiply determined, and the results were discussed with respect to the observed differential relations of parental monitoring, parent-child attachment, temperament, age, and gender to antisocial normative beliefs in adolescents. Also discussed were the need to test other parenting, temperament, and other variables that may be involved in the development of nblab; the need to directly test possible mechanisms explaining the links among the variables; and the usefulness of longitudinal research in determining possible directions of causality and developmental changes in the relationships.
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The purpose of this meta-analytic investigation was to review the empirical evidence specific to the effect of physical activity context on social physique anxiety (SP A). English language studies were located from computer and manual literature searches. A total of 146 initial studies were coded. Studies included in the meta-analysis presented at least one empirical effect for SPA between physical activity participants (i.e., athletes or exercisers) and non-physical activity participants. The final sample included thirteen studies, yielding 14 effect sizes, with a total sample size of 2846. Studies were coded for mean SPA between physical activity participants and non-physical activity participants. Moderator variables related to demographic and study characteristics were also coded. Using Hunter and Schmidt's (2004) protocol, statistical artifacts were corrected. Results indicate that, practically speaking, those who were physically active reported lower levels of SPA than the comparison group (dcorr = -.12; SDeorr.-=-;22). Consideration of the magnitude of the ES, the SDeorr, and confidence interval suggests that this effect is not statistically significant. While most moderator analyses reiterated this trend, some differences were worth noting. Previous research has identified SPA to be especially salient for females compared to males, however, in the current investigation, the magnitude of the ES' s comparing physical activity participants to the comparison group was similar (deorr = -.24 for females and deorr = -.23 for males). Also, the type of physical activity was investigated, and results showed that athletes reported lower levels of SP A than the comparison group (deorr = -.19, SDeorr = .08), whereas exercisers reported higher levels of SPA than the comparison group (deorr = .13, SDeorr = .22). Results demonstrate support for the dispositional nature of SP A. Consideration of practical significance suggests that those who are involved in physical activity may experience slightly lower levels of SPA than those not reporting physical activity participation. Results potentially offer support for the bi-directionality of the relationship between physical activity and SP A; however, a causality may not be inferred. More information about the type of physical activity (i.e., frequency/nature of exercise behaviour, sport classificationllevel of athletes) may help clarify the role of physical activity contexts on SPA.
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Abstract: Nietzsche's Will-to-Power Ontology: An Interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil § 36 By: Mark Minuk Will-to-power is the central component of Nietzsche's philosophy, and passage 36 of Beyond Good and Evil is essential to coming to an understanding of it. 1 argue for and defend the thesis that will-to-power constitutes Nietzsche's ontology, and offer a new understanding of what that means. Nietzsche's ontology can be talked about as though it were a traditional substance ontology (i.e., a world made up of forces; a duality of conflicting forces described as 'towards which' and 'away from which'). However, 1 argue that what defines this ontology is an understanding of valuation as ontologically fundamental—^the basis of interpretation, and from which a substance ontology emerges. In the second chapter, I explain Nietzsche's ontology, as reflected in this passage, through a discussion of Heidegger's two ontological categories in Being and Time (readiness-to-hand, and present-at-hand). In a nutshell, it means that the world of our desires and passions (the most basic of which is for power) is ontologically more fundamental than the material world, or any other interpretation, which is to say, the material world emerges out of a world of our desires and passions. In the first chapter, I address the problematic form of the passage reflected in the first sentence. The passage is in a hypothetical style makes no claim to positive knowledge or truth, and, superficially, looks like Schopenhaurian position for the metaphysics of the will, which Nietzsche rejects. 1 argue that the hypothetical form of the passage is a matter of style, namely, the style of a free-spirit for whom the question of truth is reframed as a question of values. In the third and final chapter, 1 address the charge that Nietzsche's interpretation is a conscious anthropomorphic projection. 1 suggest that the charge rests on a distinction (between nature and man) that Nietzsche rejects. I also address the problem of the causality of the will for Nietzsche, by suggesting that an alternative, perspectival form of causality is possible.
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It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.
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A vindication of Jefferson's administration.
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Youth-Adult Partnerships (Y-APs) have been found to foster youth engagement and positive youth development. However, existing research tends to confound the characteristics of Y-APs with their general outcomes and the existing methods of evaluating Y-APs tend to be based on correlational methodologies. I sought to create a measure of Y-AP success that did not confound the characteristics of a successful Y-AP with outcomes. Using the existing literature as a guide, three components were selected for inclusion in the Y-AP success measure: 1) perceptions of productivity; 2) positive affect; and 3) having one's contributions welcomed and considered. Using this new measure, I tested a model to assess how adult warmth and expertise interacted with task difficulty to influence three components of Y-AP success. Participants included 402 university students (M = 19.27, SD = 1.28, 89.1 % female) from Brock University and Cape Breton University. Video clips of an adult, depicting all possible combinations of warmth and expertise were created for this study, as well as a pair of hypothetical tasks designed to elicit differential degrees of perceived difficulty. Participants were exposed to one video of a hypothetical adult and two hypothetical tasks and responded to the Y-AP success measures twice, for each ofthe tasks. Results from mixed-model ANOVAs revealed that the adult and task characteristics were not consistently related to all components of Y-AP success. However, several significant interactions suggested that youth perceptions of task difficulty and their impressions of adult partners influenced the extent to which they expected a Y-AP to be successful. The results are discussed in the context of how they support or conflict with the existing literature and serve as a first step in the inference of causality within the study of Y-APs.
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1. Notice of a testimonial to Samuel Zimmerman to be held at Moffatt’s Hotel, Niagara Falls on Feb. 13th 1854. Members of the committee were Walter H. Dickson, Daniel McDougal, William Kingsmill and Joseph A. Woodruff, 1854. 2. Business card of Granger and Billings House, Sign and Ornamental Painters of Queen Street, Niagara Falls, 1855. 3. Membership card of Agricultural Society, Electoral Division No. 25 of the Town and Township of Niagara made out to W. S. Winterbottom, 1881. 4. Invitation to the Centennial Celebration of the settlement of the Niagara District by the United Empire Loyalists to be held on Aug. 14, 1884. The card is from Dan Servos, secretary of the committee, June 1884.