A game-theoretic network formation model

We study the dynamics of a game-theoretic network formation model that yields large-scale small-world networks. So far, mostly stochastic frameworks have been utilized to explain the emergence of these networks. On the other hand, it is natural to seek for game-theoretic network formation models in which links are formed due to strategic behaviors of individuals, rather than based on probabilities. Inspired by Even-Dar and Kearns (2007), we consider a more realistic model in which the cost of establishing each link is dynamically determined during the course of the game. Moreover, players are allowed to put transfer payments on the formation of links. Also, they must pay a maintenance cost to sustain their direct links during the game. We show that there is a small diameter of at most 4 in the general set of equilibrium networks in our model. Unlike earlier model, not only the existence of equilibrium networks is guaranteed in our model, but also these networks coincide with the outcomes of pairwise Nash equilibrium in network formation. Furthermore, we provide a network formation simulation that generates small-world networks. We also analyze the impact of locating players in a hierarchical structure by constructing a strategic model, where a complete b-ary tree is the seed network.

Zero-sum problems in finite cyclic groups

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate some open problems in the area of combinatorial number theory referred to as zero-sum theory. A zero-sequence in a finite cyclic group G is said to have the basic property if it is equivalent under group automorphism to one which has sum precisely IGI when this sum is viewed as an integer. This thesis investigates two major problems, the first of which is referred to as the basic pair problem. This problem seeks to determine conditions for which every zero-sequence of a given length in a finite abelian group has the basic property. We resolve an open problem regarding basic pairs in cyclic groups by demonstrating that every sequence of length four in Zp has the basic property, and we conjecture on the complete solution of this problem. The second problem is a 1988 conjecture of Kleitman and Lemke, part of which claims that every sequence of length n in Zn has a subsequence with the basic property. If one considers the special case where n is an odd integer we believe this conjecture to hold true. We verify this is the case for all prime integers less than 40, and all odd integers less than 26. In addition, we resolve the Kleitman-Lemke conjecture for general n in the negative. That is, we demonstrate a sequence in any finite abelian group isomorphic to Z2p (for p ~ 11 a prime) containing no subsequence with the basic property. These results, as well as the results found along the way, contribute to many other problems in zero-sum theory.

The von Neumann Minimax Theorem and its relatives and a study of externality in on-line auctions

This work consists of a theoretical part and an experimental one. The first part provides a simple treatment of the celebrated von Neumann minimax theorem as formulated by Nikaid6 and Sion. It also discusses its relationships with fundamental theorems of convex analysis. The second part is about externality in sponsored search auctions. It shows that in these auctions, advertisers have externality effects on each other which influence their bidding behavior. It proposes Hal R.Varian model and shows how adding externality to this model will affect its properties. In order to have a better understanding of the interaction among advertisers in on-line auctions, it studies the structure of the Google advertisements networ.k and shows that it is a small-world scale-free network.