ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF EMERGING MARKET MUTUAL FUNDS IN CANADA

Emerging markets have received wide attention from investors around the globe because of their return potential and risk diversification. This research examines the selection and timing performance of Canadian mutual funds which invest in fixed-income and equity securities in emerging markets. We use (un)conditional two- and five-factor benchmark models that accommodate the dynamics of returns in emerging markets. We also adopt the cross-sectional bootstrap methodology to distinguish between ‘skill’ and ‘luck’ for individual funds. All the tests are conducted using a comprehensive data set of bond and equity emerging funds over the period of 1989-2011. The risk-adjusted measures of performance are estimated using the least squares method with the Newey-West adjustment for standard errors that are robust to conditional heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The performance statistics of the emerging funds before (after) management-related costs are insignificantly positive (significantly negative). They are sensitive to the chosen benchmark model and conditional information improves selection performance. The timing statistics are largely insignificant throughout the sample period and are not sensitive to the benchmark model. Evidence of timing and selecting abilities is obtained in a small number of funds which is not sensitive to the fees structure. We also find evidence that a majority of individual funds provide zero (very few provide positive) abnormal return before fees and a significantly negative return after fees. At the negative end of the tail of performance distribution, our resampling tests fail to reject the role of bad luck in the poor performance of funds and we conclude that most of them are merely ‘unlucky’.

Effect of executive compensation on firm performance

The paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders.

Is Brand Equity an Asset or a Liability in Brand Harm Crisis? Buffering and Amplifying Effects and Contingent Conditions

Brand harm crisis often result in negative consumer responses. This thesis addresses the buffering and amplifying theoretical perspectives of brand equity effects. We theorize that brand equity may interplay with the nature of brand-harm crisis in shaping consumer reactions. Results from focus group studies provide interesting insights into the amplifying and buffering effects. Moreover, research findings from two experiment studies show that brand equity amplifies consumer negative responses in a performance-related crisis but only when the crisis is extremely severe. When the crisis becomes less severe, the amplifying effect diminishes from outset. However, in a value-related crisis, the amplifying effect of brand equity is pervasive regardless of the level of crisis severity. The current thesis adds to the extant literature by demonstrating that brand equity can have very complex effects on consumer responses, which are contingent on the severity and domain of a crisis. Theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.

Returns (copy) showing the quantities of each article transported on the Welland Canal during the year 1859-1861 and the amount of tolls collected thereon for each year

Returns (copy) showing the quantities of each article transported on the Welland Canal during the year 1859-1861 and the amount of tolls collected thereon for each year. The title on this document is General Return 1859, but this has been crossed out in pencil within the document and the years have been changed (Port Robinson), 1859-1861.