Heidegger's tragic Greeks : the relation between presence and deinon

Martin Heidegger's interpretation of the ancients was born out of something like a crisis in the interpretation of the Greeks, which can be characterized as nothing other than the realization of the idea that the Greek philosophers put a serious question mark over existence. This idea, which had its germination in Prussia with Jakob Burckhart and his teacher, but first came to be seriously cultivated in the Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, was the first in depth investigation into whether the Greeks, on the one hand, questioned existence or, on the other hand, put a question mark over existence. To question existence is rather innocuous, since it amounts to little more, in the end, than a child looking up at the stars and asking what it all means. To put a question mark over existence, however, is another business entirely. For the Greeks, as the life work of Martin Heidegger amply demonstrates, the nature of Greek thinking and the objects towards which it is directed follows so absolutely from the tragic view of the human person that, in a certain sense, philosophy is Greek and could only have developed in Greece. Perhaps stating it a little less categorically, philosophy could have developed elsewhere at least to the extent that something like they way the Greeks understood life was at the forefront: presence, in other words. This thesis deals with the problem ofHeidegger's relation to the Greeks, specifically in terms of his understanding of the Greeks and presence. It is the position of this dissertation that the Greek notion of presence is, as Heidegger understands it, the homeliness of the hearth that radiates through all the things that humans concern themselves with. This is thought by Heidegger, as the Greeks did, specifically in contrast with the uncanninesslunhomeliness of the hqrnan apart from his or her concern with things. Therefore, the thesis is an attempt at exposing the relation between presence and the unhomely by situating it withing Greek existence and the meaning of the Greek Philosopher. In order to support this position, the thesis has been divided into five parts. The first two chapters deal with Heidegger's explanation of the relation between Greek notion of physics (Phusis), metaphysics (specifically in relation to an analysis of time and motion in Greek thought), and what Heidegger calls the fundamental attunement of Dasein (boredom). More exactly, it deals with these issues only so far as they allow us to bring out something like the notion of 'presence' in relation to things and homelessness or restlessness in relation to the human being. The rationale for these two chapters in relation to the central problem of the paper is that in Heidegger's elucidation of physics and metaphysics, he conducts his analysis in such a way that he explicitly uncovers that dimension of human existence that he calls the fundamental attunement of Dasein. This fundamental attunement is, in tum, similar to what the Greeks understood as the deinon, the uncanninesslunhomeliness of the human. The third and fourth chapters take as their explicit themes the problem of the Greek understanding of the assertion and the ways in which the person can comport himlherself toward things, two issues which are not separable. The rationale for these two chapters in relation to the central theme of the paper is that Heidegger's analysis of these two areas in Greek thought brings out precisely why the philosopher and the philosophical way of life is the highest mode of existence for the Greeks and how this is thought specifically in tenns of the uncanniness of humans. The final cijapter gives a complete elucidation of presence as the homeliness of the hearth and shows specifically how this is thought of in contradistinction to the uncanny/unhomely for the Greeks. 1I1 This last chapter also explains Martin Heidegger's reaction to the Greek's interpretation of the highest mode of existence, and what he posited as a counter-thought. The essay as a whole is an attempt to fully concertize an important dimension of Heidegger' s understanding of the Greeks, that is, the relation between presence and the deinon or Greek notion ofunhomely, which, to my la)owledge, has not been offered anywhere in commentaries on Heidegger.

Intraspecific and interspecific social variation in the sweat bee Lasioglossum Malachurum and other members of the subgenus Evylaeus

Sweat bees exhibit a range of social behaviours, from solitary nesting, in which no workers are produced, to strong eusociality, in which workers exhibit a high degree of altruism, behaviour that is measured by the degree of personal reproductive sacrifice. Field studies were carried out for seven weeks during May-June 2000 in southern Greece in order to investigate intraspecific social variation, and test the hypothesis of a north-south cline of decreasing eusociality in the obligately eusocial sweat bee L. (E.) malachurum. A comparative study, using principal components analysis, was performed to determine if patterns of intraspecific social variation in L. malachurum reflect the patterns of social variation within the subgenus, Evylaeus, as a whole. The results of the field study reveal that, in Greece, two worker broods were produced followed by a third brood consisting of gynes, males and some workers, indicating that there was an overlap in worker and gyne production. There was strong caste distinction between queens and workers. Workers actively foraged and participated in nest construction as most workers (58%, n=303) had a high degree of mandibular wear. Workers did not participate in the oviposition of Brood 3 gynes since only 0.7% (n=278) of workers were mated. Furthermore, queen survival until the end of Brood 3 and a substantial size differential of 10.6% between queens and workers suggested that queen domination over worker behaviour during the early to mid-part of the colony cycle was plausible. Male production in Brood 3 by some workers was likely, since the timing of worker ovarian development corresponded with the timing of male production. These findings suggest that workers of the first two broods were primarily altruistic, but some (28%) Brood 1 (9%) and Brood 2 (19%) workers produced males, indicating that the degree of altruistic behaviour declined during the lifetime of the colony. In comparison with other L. malachurum populations in Europe, the Greek population of L. malachurum had a weaker social level as a result of the higher proportion of workers potentially involved in male production, thus 3 supporting the hypothesis of a southerly cline of decreasing eusociality. Furthermore, intraspecific variation in social level across Europe appears to be due to longer breeding seasons in more southerly locations that would promote the production of larger colonies and provide opportunities for workers to evade queen control. The comparative study using principal components analysis on 20 solitary (of the subgenera Evylaeus and Lasioglossum), eusocial and socially polymorphic Evylaeus species and populations reveals that six traits are closely associated with stronger eusociality in Evylaeus. These traits are: (1) a reduction in the proportion of males in the early brood(s); (2) a reduction in the proportion of females that mate; (3) an increase in the mean number of first brood workers; (4) a reduction in the proportion of females with developed ovaries; (5) an increase in size dimorphism between castes, and (6) nest guarding. These are traits that most significantly define principal component one and therefore distinguish social type as indicated by a clear separation of the eusocial and the solitary populations, with a socially polymorphic species falling in between. Furthermore, most of these traits are under foundress control and may suggest that the evolutionary loss or gain of eusociality is based on selection pressures on a founding female. Colony size and female ovarian development are common factors distinguishing social variation in L. malachurum and within the subgenus as a whole. The principal components analysis excluding the solitary species and the socially aberrant L. marginatum populations show the L. malachurum populations separated based on an increasing proportion of workers with developed ovaries as populations are found more south, lending further support to the hypothesis of a north-south cline of decreasing eusociality.

Gender and Healing in the Hippocratic Corpus

Hippocratic physicians sought to establish themselves as medical authorities in ancient Greece. An examination of the deontological texts of the Hippocratic corpus reveals that the Hippocratics created a medical authority based on elite male characteristics. The key quality of the Hippocratic physician was sōphrosunē, a quality closely associated with men and used in the differentiation of genders in the Greek world. Women were not believed to innately possess this quality and so their healing activities were restricted within the Hippocratic framework. Women’s healing activities are only mentioned in the corpus when women are involved in the treatment of other women or self-treatment. The Hippocratic construction of medicine as a male domain fit within a Classical cultural framework, as the cultural anxiety concerning women healers and women’s use of pharmaka are evident in both Greek myth and literature.

Thistle Theatre

Located inside Brock's Thistle Complex, the Thistle Theatre, which has since been renamed the Sean O'Sullivan Theatre, features a thrust stage and steep rising tiers of seats in a semi circular 'bowl'. Although often described as a 550 seat theatre, in actuality it originally had exactly 543 seats. It is interesting to note that the official number of seats is now 538. The very first production to be held at the theatre was Lysistrata, the Greek comedy by Aristophanes, on July 29, 1969. Since it's opening in 1969, it has been the centre of a great many cultural events and other performances ranging from concerts and plays to lectures and speeches.

A comparison of two computer-assisted remedial reading programs for adolescent unskilled readers : component reading skills and repeated reading

This study compared the relative effectiveness of two computerized remedial reading programs in improving the reading word recognition, rate, and comprehension of adolescent readers demonstrating significant and longstanding reading difficulties. One of the programs involved was Autoskill Component Reading Subskills Program, which provides instruction in isolated letters, syllables, and words, to a point of rapid automatic responding. This program also incorporates reading disability subtypes in its approach. The second program, Read It Again. Sam, delivers a repeated reading strategy. The study also examined the feasibility of using peer tutors in association with these two programs. Grade 9 students at a secondary vocational school who satisfied specific criteria with respect to cognitive and reading ability participated. Eighteen students were randomly assigned to three matched groups, based on prior screening on a battery of reading achievement tests. Two I I groups received training with one of the computer programs; the third group acted as a control and received the remedial reading program offered within the regular classroom. The groups met daily with a trained tutor for approximately 35 minutes, and were required to accumulate twenty hours of instruction. At the conclusion of the program, the pretest battery was repeated. No significant differences were found in the treatment effects of the two computer groups. Each of the two treatment groups was able to effect significantly improved reading word recognition and rate, relative to the control group. Comprehension gains were modest. The treatment groups demonstrated a significant gain, relative to the control group, on one of the three comprehension measures; only trends toward a gain were noted on the remaining two measures. The tutoring partnership appeared to be a viable alternative for the teacher seeking to provide individualized computerized remedial programs for adolescent unskilled readers. Both programs took advantage of computer technology in providing individualized drill and practice, instant feedback, and ongoing recordkeeping. With limited cautions, each of these programs was considered effective and practical for use with adolescent unskilled readers.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Scottish Rite (Masonic Order) French Language Collection, 1787-1825, 1907, n.d.

The origins of the Scottish Rite of Freemasonry can be traced to France around 1754, when a Chapter of Claremont was founded in Paris. Initially this chapter had seven degrees, but by 1758 there were twenty-five degrees, known as the Rite of Perfection. In 1761, Stephen Morin was appointed to introduce the Rite into the New World. He began with Kingston, Jamaica and San Domingo. Further establishments were made in New Orleans, LA(1763); Albany, NY (1767); Philadelphia, PA (1782); and Charleston, SC (1783). In order to improve the disorganized state of the degrees in Europe, “Grand Constitutions” were enacted in 1786. These Constitutions formally brought into existence the “Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite”. None of the degrees of the Scottish Rite would seem to have origins in Scotland. “Scottish” is translated from the French word “Ecossais”, which is found in some of the French titles of some of the degrees of the Rite of Perfection. It is possible that the Scottish connection is a result of the involvement of a Scotsman, Andrew Michael Ramsey, who may have devised some of the degrees.