Buried Treasure: The Economics of Leak Detection and Water Loss Prevention in Ontario

On average approximately 13% of the water that is withdrawn by Canadian municipal water suppliers is lost before it reaches final users. This is an important topic for several reasons: water losses cost money, losses force water agencies to draw more water from lakes and streams thereby putting more stress on aquatic ecosystems, leaks reduce system reliability, leaks may contribute to future pipe failures, and leaks may allow contaminants to enter water systems thereby reducing water quality and threatening the health of water users. Some benefits of leak detection fall outside water agencies’ accounting purview (e.g. reduced health risks to households connected to public water supply systems) and, as a result, may not be considered adequately in water agency decision-making. Because of the regulatory environment in which Canadian water agencies operate, some of these benefits-especially those external to the agency or those that may accrue to the agency in future time periods- may not be fully counted when agencies decide on leak detection efforts. Our analysis suggests potential reforms to promote increased efforts for leak detection: adoption of a Canada-wide goal of universal water metering; development of full-cost accounting and, pricing for water supplies; and co-operation amongst the provinces to promulgate standards for leak detection efforts and provide incentives to promote improved efficiency and rational investment decision-making.

Perceptions of Technology and Manifestations of Language Learner Autonomy

a grounded theory study investigating perceptions of technology by learners of English as a second language

Is technology a threat to education? : the contribution of George Parkin Grant

Thesis (M.Ed.)-- Brock University, 1995.

CEO Compensation, Compensation Risk, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Technology Firms

Literature suggests that CEOs of technology firms earn higher pay than CEOs of non-technology firms. I investigate whether compensation risk explains the difference in compensation between technology firms and non-technology firms. Controlling for firm size and performance, I find that CEOs in technology firms have higher pay, but also have much higher compensation risk compared to non-technology firms. Compensation risk explains the major part of the difference in CEO pay. My study is consistent with the labor market economics view that CEOs earn competitive risk-adjusted total compensation.