The nature of avidyÄ in Buddhism and VedÄ nta

This thesis deals with the nature of ignorance as it was interpreted in the Upani~adic tradition, specifically in Advaita Vedanta, and in early and Mahayana Buddhism , e specially in the Madhyamika school of Buddhism. The approach i s a historical and comparative one. It examines the early thoughts of both the upanis.a ds and Buddhism abou t avidya (ignorance), shows how the notion was treated by the more speculative and philosphically oriented schools which base d themselves on the e arly works, and sees how their views differ. The thesis will show that the Vedinta tended to treat avidya as a topic for metaphysical s peculation as t he s chool developed, drifting from its initial e xistential concerns, while the Madhyamika remained in contact with the e xistential concerns evident in the first discourses of the Buddha. The word "notion" has been chosen for use in referring t o avidya, even though it may have non-intellectual and emotional connotations, to avoid more popular a lternatives such as "concept" or "idea". In neither the Upani,ads, Advaita Vedanta, or Buddhism is ignorance merely a concept or an idea. Only in a secondary sense, in texts and speech , does it become one. Avidya has more to do with the lived situation in which man finds himself, with the subjectobject separation in which he f eels he exists, than with i i i intel lect ual constr ucts . Western thought has begun to r ealize the same with concerns such as being in modern ontology, and has chosen to speak about i t i n terms of the question of being . Avidya, however, i s not a 'question' . If q ue stions we r e to be put regarding the nature of a vidya , they would be more of t he sort "What is not avidya?", though e ven here l anguage bestows a status t o i t which avidya does not have. In considering a work of the Eastern tradition, we f ace t he danger of imposing Western concepts on it. Granted t hat avidya is customari ly r endered i n English as ignorance, the ways i n which the East and West view i gno rance di f f er. Pedagogically , the European cultures, grounded in the ancient Greek culture, view ignorance as a l ack or an emptiness. A child is i gnorant o f certain t hings and the purpose o f f ormal education , in f act if not in theory, is to fill him with enough knowledge so that he can cope wit h t he complexities and the e xpectations of s ociety. On another level, we feel t hat study and research will l ead t o the discovery o f solutions, which we now lack , for problems now defying solut i on . The East, on the o t her hand, sees avidya in a d i fferent light.Ignorance isn't a lack, but a presence. Religious and philosophical l iterature directs its efforts not towards acquiring something new, but at removing t.he ideas and opinions that individuals have formed about themselves and the world. When that is fully accomplished, say the sages , t hen Wisdom, which has been obscured by those opinions, will present itself. Nothing new has to be learned, t hough we do have t o 'learn' that much. The growing interest in t he West with Eastern religions and philosophies may, in time, influence our theoretical and practical approaches to education and learning, not only in the established educati onal institutions, but in religious , p sychological, and spiritual activities as well. However, the requirements o f this thesis do no t permit a formulation of revolutionary method or a call to action. It focuses instead on the textual arguments which attempt to convince readers that t he world in which they take themselves to exist is not, in essence, real, on the ways i n which the l imitations of language are disclosed, and on the provisional and limited schemes that are built up to help students see through their ignorance. The metaphysic s are provisional because they act only as spurs and guides. Both the Upanisadic and Buddhist traditions that will be dealt with here stress that language constantly fails to encompass the Real. So even terms s uch as 'the Real', 'Absolute', etc., serve only to lead to a transcendent experience . The sections dealing with the Upanisads and Advaita Vedanta show some of the historical evolution of the notion of avidya, how it was dealt with as maya , and the q uestions that arose as t o its locus. With Gau?apada we see the beginnings of a more abstract treatment of the topic, and , the influence of Buddhism. Though Sankhara' S interest was primarily directed towards constructing a philosophy to help others attain mok~a ( l iberation), he too introduced t echnica l t e rminology not found in the works of his predecessors. His work is impressive , but areas of it are incomplete. Numbers of his followers tried to complete the systematic presentation of his insi ghts . Their work focuses on expl anat i ons of adhyasa (superimposition ) , t he locus and object of ignorance , and the means by which Brahman takes itself to be the jiva and the world. The section on early Buddhism examines avidya in the context o f the four truths, together with dubkha (suffering), the r ole it p l ays in t he chain of dependent c ausation , a nd t he p r oblems that arise with t he doctrine of anatman. With t he doct rines of e arly Buddhism as a base, the Madhyamika elaborated questions that the Buddha had said t e nded not t o edi f ication. One of these had to do with own - being or svabhava. Thi s serves a s a centr e around which a discussion o f i gnorance unfolds, both i ndividual and coll ective ignorance. There follows a treatment of the cessation of ignorance as it is discussed within this school . The final secti on tries to present t he similarities and differences i n the natures o f ignorance i n t he two traditions and discusses the factors responsible for t hem . ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Dr. Sinha for the time spent II and suggestions made on the section dealing with Sankara and the Advait.a Vedanta oommentators, and Dr. Sprung, who supervised, direoted, corrected and encouraged the thesis as a whole, but especially the section on Madhyamika, and the final comparison.

Weight-preoccupation, personality and depression in university students : an interactionist perspective

The present research was designed to examine Beck's (1983; 1987) cognitive diathesis-stress model of depression in a new context. Specifically, this cross-sectional study investigated whether Beck's cognitive-personality traits of sociotropy and autonomy interacted with a specific daily hassle/stressor, weightpreoccupation, in the prediction of depressed mood in women and men. Weightpreoccupation was chosen as the particular daily stressor, because, according to Kanner, Coyne, Schaeffer, and Lazarus (1981). concern about weight and physical appearance were two of the most troublesome daily hassles among university students. ContraIy to current stereotypes, men also express concerns with weight and appearance (Cash, Winstead, &, landi, 1986), in both the direction of weight loss and weight/muscle gain (Drewnowski &, Yee, 1987). Thus, unique to this study was the examination of weight-preoccupation in men, not only in the direction of weight loss, but also in the direction of weight and muscle gain. Two hundred and fifty-one undergraduates were administered the revised SociotropyAutonomy Scale (SAS), the Beck Depression Inventory (BDij, the Hassles and Uplifts Scale, the Eating Disorders Inventory (EDI), and the Restraint Scale (RS). Through a process of model building, a final model was devised in which depression (ie., BDI total scores) was regressed on personality (Le., SAS Sociotropy) and weight-preoccupation (i.e., Drive for Thinness, Body Dissatisfaction, and the Restraint Scale). Separate hierarchical multiple regression analyses, with BDI as the dependent variable, were carried out for each of the 2 3 weight-preoccupation variables. Results revealed a specific congruent interaction between weight,..preoccupation and personality. Specifically, drive for thinness and body dissatisfaction interacted with sociotropy to predict depressed mood in both women and men, but the interaction between sociotropy and the Restraint Scale was marginal. Findings suggested that weight-preoccupied women and men experienced depressed mood to the extent that they were characterized as more highly sociotropic. As predicted, personality (i.e., sociotropy), moderated the relationship between daily stress (i.e., weight-preoccupation) and depression. Thus, results revealed that the proposed diathesis-stress model seemed to operate in the same manner for women and men. Moreover, the examination of weightpreoccupation among men (i.e., in the direction of both weight loss and weight/muscle gain) further revealed that, when curvilinearity was taken into account, highly sociotropic men, who had a low desire to gain weight and muscle mass (i.e., most likely those who desired to lose weight), experienced higher levels of depressed mood than those who had a "medium" desire for weight and muscle gain. However, the highest levels of depressed mood was experienced by highly sociotropic men who were highly weight-preoccupied in the direction of wanting to gain weight and muscle mass. In addition, possible reasons for the present fmdings, as wen as iimitations and impiicalions for future research are discussed.