Phonon dispersion curves and atomic mean square displacement for several fcc and bcc materials

The atomic mean square displacement (MSD) and the phonon dispersion curves (PDC's) of a number of face-centred cubic (fcc) and body-centred cubic (bcc) materials have been calclllated from the quasiharmonic (QH) theory, the lowest order (A2 ) perturbation theory (PT) and a recently proposed Green's function (GF) method by Shukla and Hiibschle. The latter method includes certain anharmonic effects to all orders of anharmonicity. In order to determine the effect of the range of the interatomic interaction upon the anharmonic contributions to the MSD we have carried out our calculations for a Lennard-Jones (L-J) solid in the nearest-neighbour (NN) and next-nearest neighbour (NNN) approximations. These results can be presented in dimensionless units but if the NN and NNN results are to be compared with each other they must be converted to that of a real solid. When this is done for Xe, the QH MSD for the NN and NNN approximations are found to differ from each other by about 2%. For the A2 and GF results this difference amounts to 8% and 7% respectively. For the NN case we have also compared our PT results, which have been calculated exactly, with PT results calculated using a frequency-shift approximation. We conclude that this frequency-shift approximation is a poor approximation. We have calculated the MSD of five alkali metals, five bcc transition metals and seven fcc transition metals. The model potentials we have used include the Morse, modified Morse, and Rydberg potentials. In general the results obtained from the Green's function method are in the best agreement with experiment. However, this improvement is mostly qualitative and the values of MSD calculated from the Green's function method are not in much better agreement with the experimental data than those calculated from the QH theory. We have calculated the phonon dispersion curves (PDC's) of Na and Cu, using the 4 parameter modified Morse potential. In the case of Na, our results for the PDC's are in poor agreement with experiment. In the case of eu, the agreement between the tlleory and experiment is much better and in addition the results for the PDC's calclliated from the GF method are in better agreement with experiment that those obtained from the QH theory.

CEO Compensation, Compensation Risk, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Technology Firms

Literature suggests that CEOs of technology firms earn higher pay than CEOs of non-technology firms. I investigate whether compensation risk explains the difference in compensation between technology firms and non-technology firms. Controlling for firm size and performance, I find that CEOs in technology firms have higher pay, but also have much higher compensation risk compared to non-technology firms. Compensation risk explains the major part of the difference in CEO pay. My study is consistent with the labor market economics view that CEOs earn competitive risk-adjusted total compensation.

Managerial Risk-Taking and CEO Excess Compensation

This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, I provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, I find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation

Effect of executive compensation on firm performance

The paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders.