3 resultados para Data Driven Modeling

em Brock University, Canada


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This study occurred in 2009 and questioned how Ontario secondary school principals perceived their role had changed, over a 7 year period, in response to the increased demands of data-driven school environments. Specifically, it sought to identify principals' perceptions on how high-stakes testing and data-driven environments had affected their role, tasks, and accountability responsibilities. This study contextualized the emergence of the Education Quality and Accountability Offices (EQAO) as a central influence in the creation of data-driven school environments, and conceptualized the role of the principal as using data to inform and persuade a shift in thinking about the use of data to improve instruction and student achievement. The findings of the study suggest that data-driven environments had helped principals reclaim their positional power as instructional leaders, using data as an avenue back into the classroom. The use of data shifted the responsibilities of the principal to persuade teachers to work collaboratively to improve classroom instruction in order to demonstrate accountability.

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Very little research has examined K–12 educational technology decision-making in Canada. This collective case study explores the technology procurement process in Ontario’s publicly funded school districts to determine if it is informed by the relevant research, grounded in best practices, and enhances student learning. Using a qualitative approach, 10 senior leaders (i.e., chief information officers, superintendents, etc.) were interviewed. A combination of open-ended and closed-ended questions were used to reveal the most important factors driving technology acquisition, research support, governance procedures, data use, and assessment and return on investment (ROI) measures utilized by school districts in their implementation of educational technology. After participants were interviewed, the data were transcribed, member checked, and then submitted to “Computer-assisted NCT analysis” (Friese, 2014) using ATLAS.ti. The findings show that senior leaders are making acquisitions that are not aligned with current scholarship and not with student learning as the focus. It was also determined that districts struggle to use data-driven decision-making to support the governance of educational technology spending. Finally, the results showed that districts do not have effective assessment measures in place to determine the efficacy or ROI of a purchased technology. Although data are limited to the responses of 10 senior leaders, findings represent the technology leadership for approximately 746,000 Ontario students. The study is meant to serve as an informative resource for senior leaders and presents strategic and research-validated approaches to technology procurement. Further, the study has the potential to refine technology decision-making, policies, and practices in K–12 education.

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This paper develops a model of short-range ballistic missile defense and uses it to study the performance of Israel’s Iron Dome system. The deterministic base model allows for inaccurate missiles, unsuccessful interceptions, and civil defense. Model enhancements consider the trade-offs in attacking the interception system, the difficulties faced by militants in assembling large salvos, and the effects of imperfect missile classification by the defender. A stochastic model is also developed. Analysis shows that system performance can be highly sensitive to the missile salvo size, and that systems with higher interception rates are more “fragile” when overloaded. The model is calibrated using publically available data about Iron Dome’s use during Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012. If the systems performed as claimed, they saved Israel an estimated 1778 casualties and $80 million in property damage, and thereby made preemptive strikes on Gaza about 8 times less valuable to Israel. Gaza militants could have inflicted far more damage by grouping their rockets into large salvos, but this may have been difficult given Israel’s suppression efforts. Counter-battery fire by the militants is unlikely to be worthwhile unless they can obtain much more accurate missiles.