CEO Compensation, Compensation Risk, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Technology Firms

Literature suggests that CEOs of technology firms earn higher pay than CEOs of non-technology firms. I investigate whether compensation risk explains the difference in compensation between technology firms and non-technology firms. Controlling for firm size and performance, I find that CEOs in technology firms have higher pay, but also have much higher compensation risk compared to non-technology firms. Compensation risk explains the major part of the difference in CEO pay. My study is consistent with the labor market economics view that CEOs earn competitive risk-adjusted total compensation.

Managerial Risk-Taking and CEO Excess Compensation

This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, I provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, I find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation

The effect of governance mechanism and structure on fees and performance of Mutual Funds in Canada

Taking advantage of the unique Canadian setting, this study empirically analyzes the impact of presence of the board of directors, as an internal governance mechanism, on fees and performance of mutual funds. Further, the impact of the board structure on fees and performance of corporate class funds is analyzed. We find that corporate class funds, which have a separate board of directors for the fund, charge higher fees; however, they also provide superior performance than trust funds. Furthermore, we find that for corporate class funds, smaller board, with higher percentage of independent directors, and with the fund CEO acting as the chairman of the board is likely to charge lower fees. Also, more independent boards are strongly associated with superior fee-adjusted performance.

Donald Ziraldo Fonds, 1968-2012, n.d.

Donald J. P. Ziraldo, C.M., BSc., LLD was born in St. Catharines, Ontario on October 13, 1948 to Fredrick and Irma (Schiratti) Ziraldo. He graduated Denis Morris High School in St. Catharines in 1967, and received his B.Sc. in Agriculture at the University of Guelph in 1971. In 1974, Ziraldo was running Ziraldo Nurseries when he met Austrian born schoolteacher, chemist and winemaker Karl J. Kaiser. They realized that there was a gap in the premium varietal wine market and decided to plant a premium traditional European variety of grape vine species, the Vitis vinifera. This was an innovation in the Niagara region because the current wine producers were not using premium European grapes at the time. Ziraldo and Kaiser founded and then formally incorporated Inniskillin Wines Inc. in Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario on July 31, 1975. Ziraldo successfully lobbied General George Kitching, CEO of the LCBO, for a winery license. In 1975, Kitching granted him a winery license, the first in Ontario since Prohibition ended. From the beginning, there was a division of labour where Kaiser focused on the winemaking and Ziraldo focused on the marketing and promotion of the wines. Ziraldo also became president of the company. Ziraldo and Kaiser worked on improving their winemaking techniques and promoting their products and company. Ziraldo has been called ‘one of the founding fathers of the Canadian wine industry’, and it is widely acknowledged that both men played a large role in the success and growth of the Canadian wine industry. Together they pioneered the estate winery movement in Canada. A major turning point Inniskillin came in 1984 when Karl Kaiser successfully harvested the first Icewine crop from frozen grapes on the vine and bottled Eiswein Vidal (Icewine). In 1990, Inniskillin received worldwide recognition for this Icewine when their 1989 Vidal Icewine won the most prestigious award in the wine world, the Grand Prix d’Honneur, given at Vinexpo in France. This victory has been called ‘the award heard round the world’ and it launched Inniskillin into the international wine arena. At the same time, this helped lift the profile of Canadian wines in general. Inniskillin not only became Canada’s leading producer of Icewine, but it also became known for producing ‘one of the world’s great wines’. After the 1990 award, Ziraldo began a major public relations campaign to promote Inniskillin and build Icewine into a worldwide brand. He travelled broadly every year to promote the brand and products and networked extensively with politicians, celebrities, chefs, sommeliers, etc. To ensure worldwide and long-term success, Ziraldo introduced Icewine to Asia and the United States which were new markets. He developed a new Icewine glass with George Riedel. Tony Aspler has called Ziraldo ‘Canada’s Wine Ambassador’. Ziraldo was President of Inniskillin Wines Inc. (Niagara) from 1975 to 2006. In 1992, Inniskillin merged with Cartier Wines, and in 1993 Cartier Inniskillin Vintners Inc. merged with T.G. Bright & Co. Limited, forming the new company Vincor International Inc. Inniskillin wines was now a subsidiary of Vincor. Ziraldo became a Director at Vincor International Inc. from 1993 to 2004. From 1989 to the mid 1990s, Ziraldo also became President of Inniskillin Napa, in Napa Valley, California. Inniskillin purchased Napa Valley vineyards and produced wines under the Terra label. In 1994, Ziraldo set up a subsidiary estate winery of Inniskillin in Oliver, British Columbia which was called Inniskillin Okanagan Vineyards Inc. He became President of the winery. This started as a partnership between Inniskillin and the local Inkameep Indian Band in the Okanagan. In 2006, Ziraldo left Inniskillin and since that time he has been involved in other Icewine related ventures such as running Ziraldo Estate Winery and producing Ziraldo Riesling Icewine 2007. He also is in partnership with the Niagara based Equifera Estate Winery to produce Equifera Icewine. His most recent projects include planting Picolit grapes in his parent’s hometown, in a project called Picolit Di Fagagna and becoming Managing Director of the Senhora Do Convento Port Winery in Portugal. Donald Ziraldo was instrumental in the creation of the Vintners Quality Alliance (VQA) in Ontario and was its founding Chair from 1988-1995. The VQA was established as a regulatory and appellation system which secured the quality and origin of Canadian wines made under this system. The VQA designation and bottle label gave the consumer confidence that the wines they were purchasing were 100% local products. The VQA system was set up first in Ontario and then in British Columbia.

Letter - Johnny Lombardi to Donald Ziraldo, 2000

A letter from President and CEO of CHIN radio and television, Johnny Lombardi. Mr. Lombardi thanks Mr. Ziraldo for his "good wishes" as he celebrated his 84th birthday. Lombardi also mentions the CHIN Winter Picnic to happen soon in Acapulco. There is a handwritten note at the bottom that appears to be written in Italian.

Effect of executive compensation on firm performance

The paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders.