An investigation of the nature and role of historicality in the thought of Dilthey and Heidegger

Introduction The question of the meaning, methods and philosophical manifestations of history is currently rife with contention. The problem that I will address in an exposition of the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, centers around the intersubjectivity of an historical world. Specifically, there are two interconnected issues. First, since all knowledge occurs to a person from within his or her historical age how can any person in any age make truth claims? In order to answer this concern we must understand the essence and role of history. Yet how can we come to an individual understanding ofwhat history is when the meanings that we use are themselves historically enveloped? But can we, we who are well aware of the knowledge that archaeology has dredged up from old texts or even from 'living' monuments of past ages, really neglect to notice these artifacts that exist within and enrich our world? Charges of wilful blindness would arise if any attempt were made to suggest that certain things of our world did not come down to us from the past. Thus it appears more important 2 to determine what this 'past' is and therefore how history operates than to simply derail the possibility for historical understanding. Wilhelm Dilthey, the great German historicist from the 19th century, did not question the existence of historical artifacts as from the past, but in treating knowledge as one such artifact placed the onus on knowledge to show itself as true, or meaningful, in light ofthe fact that other historical periods relied on different facts and generated different truths or meanings. The problem for him was not just determining what the role of history is, but moreover to discover how knowledge could make any claim as true knowledge. As he stated, there is a problem of "historical anarchy"!' Martin Heidegger picked up these two strands of Dilthey's thought and wanted to answer the problem of truth and meaning in order to solve the problem of historicism. This problem underscored, perhaps for the first time, that societal presuppositions about the past and present oftheir era are not immutable. Penetrating to the core of the raison d'etre of the age was an historical reflection about the past which was now conceived as separated both temporally and attitudinally from the present. But further than this, Heidegger's focus on asking the question of the meaning of Being meant that history must be ontologically explicated not merely ontically treated. Heidegger hopes to remove barriers to a genuine ontology by II 1 3 including history into an assessment ofprevious philosophical systems. He does this in order that the question of Being be more fully explicated, which necessarily for him includes the question of the Being of history. One approach to the question ofwhat history is, given the information that we get from historical knowledge, is whether such knowledge can be formalized into a science. Additionally, we can approach the question of what the essence and role of history is by revealing its underlying characteristics, that is, by focussing on historicality. Thus we will begin with an expository look at Dilthey's conception of history and historicality. We will then explore these issues first in Heidegger's Being and Time, then in the third chapter his middle and later works. Finally, we shall examine how Heidegger's conception may reflect a development in the conception of historicality over Dilthey's historicism, and what such a conception means for a contemporary historical understanding. The problem of existing in a common world which is perceived only individually has been philosophically addressed in many forms. Escaping a pure subjectivist interpretation of 'reality' has occupied Western thinkers not only in order to discover metaphysical truths, but also to provide a foundation for politics and ethics. Many thinkers accept a solipsistic view as inevitable and reject attempts at justifying truth in an intersubjective world. The problem ofhistoricality raises similar problems. We 4 -. - - - - exist in a common historical age, presumably, yet are only aware ofthe historicity of the age through our own individual thoughts. Thus the question arises, do we actually exist within a common history or do we merely individually interpret this as communal? What is the reality of history, individual or communal? Dilthey answers this question by asserting a 'reality' to the historical age thus overcoming solipsism by encasing individual human experience within the historical horizon of the age. This however does nothing to address the epistemological concern over the discoverablity of truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, rejects a metaphysical construel of history and seeks to ground history first within the ontology ofDasein, and second, within the so called "sending" of Being. Thus there can be no solipsism for Heidegger because Dasein's Being is necessarily "cohistorical", Being-with-Others, and furthermore, this historical-Being-in-the-worldwith- Others is the horizon of Being over which truth can appear. Heidegger's solution to the problem of solipsism appears to satisfy that the world is not just a subjective idealist creation and also that one need not appeal to any universal measures of truth or presumed eternal verities. Thus in elucidating Heidegger's notion of history I will also confront the issues ofDasein's Being-alongside-things as well as the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world so that Dasein's historicality is explicated vis-a-vis the "sending of Being" (die Schicken des S eins).

A black-focused school : black Canadian youth and the mainstream curriculum

ABSTRACT When asked about the proposal for a black-focused school, black youth from the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) voiced their agreement with elements of the proposal, but resisted the idea of implementing the proposal by creating a separate school. Although media representations and Dei (1996, 2006) provide insight into what Torontonians' reactions are to the proposed blackfocused school there has been no such information documented on what black youth in the GTA think about the project. This is the first known study that attempts to fill that gap by providing a representation of black youths' voices obtained via focus groups. The study examines what black youth know and think about the proposal, and why they largely disagree with the blackfocused school proposal. While the findings of this study indicate that the participants saw many positive elements of the proposal, they did not support the implementation of a black-focused school as they saw the creation of a separate space for the school as a negative thing. The youth had trouble conceptualizing 'black-focused schooling' as an alternative approach to mainstream education, which had an impact on whether they choose to, or could, respond to questions that precisely related to the black-focused school project. The study concludes that the youth could not visualize what the school would look like and how it would operate because they draw on liberal racist discourses (e.g. colour-blindness, blaming the victim, and equal opportunity) when thinking about their educational experiences; however, there was a clear contradiction in the way the youths' voices reflected an awareness of the role of race in education experiences. It was evident when they talked about fear of stigmatization, but when using liberal discourses the youth discounted the role of race, and seemed not to be aware of its role in educational experiences. These findings pose important implications for educators, would-be educators, administrators, the TDSB and proponents of the black-focused school.

Liberation and Non-Attachment: Arjuna’s Fear in the Bhagavad-Gītā

This thesis takes liberation to be supreme knowledge of the unity underlying the world of multiplicity. This knowledge is always already attained, so all are eternally liberated, but it is unrecognized in ordinary experience. We will look at the Bhagavad-Gītā to consider why this is so. When Arjuna saw Kṛṣṇa’s imperishable Self, he saw all beings standing as one in Kṛṣṇa; thus, he was confronted by supreme knowledge. But he was overwhelmed with fear and confusion and took refuge in blindness. I argue that Arjuna was not prepared to face recognition because he was unpractised in non-attachment. Attached to his subjectivity, he trembled in the face of unity. The supreme goal is standing firm in recognition while living in the world.