Effectiveness of computer training on attentional skills

This paper presents two studies, both examining the efficacy of a computer programme (Captain's Log) in training attentional skills. The population of interest is the traumatically brain injured. Study #1 is a single-case design that offers recommendations for the second, .larger (N=5) inquiry. Study #2 is an eight-week hierarchical treatment programme with a multi-based testing component. Attention, memory, listening comprehension, locus-of-control, self-esteem, visuo-spatial, and general outcome measures are employed within the testing schedule. Results suggest that any improvement was a result of practice effects. With a few single-case exceptions, the participants showed little improvement in the dependent measures.

Predicting performance on fluid intelligence from speed of processing, working memory, and controlled attention

Fluid inteliigence has been defined as an innate ability to reason which is measured commonly by the Raven's Progressive Matrices (RPM). Individual differences in fluid intelligence are currently explained by the Cascade model (Fry & Hale, 1996) and the Controlled Attention hypothesis (Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999; Kane & Engle, 2002). The first theory is based on a complex relation among age, speed, and working memory which is described as a Cascade. The alternative to this theory, the Controlled Attention hypothesis, is based on the proposition that it is the executive attention component of working memory that explains performance on fluid intelligence tests. The first goal of this study was to examine whether the Cascade model is consistent within the visuo-spatial and verbal-numerical modalities. The second goal was to examine whether the executive attention component ofworking memory accounts for the relation between working memory and fluid intelligence. Two hundred and six undergraduate students between the ages of 18 and 28 completed a battery of cognitive tests selected to measure processing speed, working memory, and controlled attention which were selected from two cognitive modalities, verbalnumerical and visuo-spatial. These were used to predict performance on two standard measures of fluid intelligence: the Raven's Progressive Matrices (RPM) and the Shipley Institute of Living Scales (SILS) subtests. Multiple regression and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) were used to test the Cascade model and to determine the independent and joint effects of controlled attention and working memory on general fluid intelligence. Among the processing speed measures only spatial scan was related to the RPM. No other significant relations were observed between processing speed and fluid intelligence. As 1 a construct, working memory was related to the fluid intelligence tests. Consistent with the predictions for the RPM there was support for the Cascade model within the visuo-spatial modality but not within the verbal-numerical modality. There was no support for the Cascade model with respect to the SILS tests. SEM revealed that there was a direct path between controlled attention and RPM and between working memory and RPM. However, a significant path between set switching and RPM explained the relation between controlled attention and RPM. The prediction that controlled attention mediated the relation between working memory and RPM was therefore not supported. The findings support the view that the Cascade model may not adequately explain individual differences in fluid intelligence and this may be due to the differential relations observed between working memory and fluid intelligence across different modalities. The findings also show that working memory is not a domain-general construct and as a result its relation with fluid intelligence may be dependent on the nature of the working memory modality.

An Investigation of the Role of Attention in the Cross-Race Effect: An Ecological Approach

The current set of studies was conducted to examine the cross-race effect (CRE), a phenomenon commonly found in the face perception literature. The CRE is evident when participants display better own-race face recognition accuracy than other-race recognition accuracy (e.g. Ackerman et al., 2006). Typically the cross-race effect is attributed to perceptual expertise, (i.e., other-race faces are processed less holistically; Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung & Caldara, 2006), and the social cognitive model (i.e., other-race faces are processed at the categorical level by virtue of being an out-group member; Hugenberg, Young, Bernstein, & Sacco, 2010). These effects may be mediated by differential attention. I investigated whether other-race faces are disregarded and, consequently, not remembered as accurately as own-race (in-group) faces. In Experiment 1, I examined how the magnitude of the CRE differed when participants learned individual faces sequentially versus when they learned multiple faces simultaneously in arrays comprising faces and objects. I also examined how the CRE differed when participants recognized individual faces presented sequentially versus in arrays of eight faces. Participants’ recognition accuracy was better for own-race faces than other-race faces regardless of familiarization method. However, the difference between own- and other-race accuracy was larger when faces were familiarized sequentially in comparison to familiarization with arrays. Participants’ response patterns during testing differed depending on the combination of familiarization and testing method. Participants had more false alarms for other-race faces than own-race faces if they learned faces sequentially (regardless of testing strategy); if participants learned faces in arrays, they had more false alarms for other-race faces than own-races faces if ii i they were tested with sequentially presented faces. These results are consistent with the perceptual expertise model in that participants were better able to use the full two seconds in the sequential task for own-race faces, but not for other-race faces. The purpose of Experiment 2 was to examine participants’ attentional allocation in complex scenes. Participants were shown scenes comprising people in real places, but the head stimuli used in Experiment 1 were superimposed onto the bodies in each scene. Using a Tobii eyetracker, participants’ looking time for both own- and other-race faces was evaluated to determine whether participants looked longer at own-race faces and whether individual differences in looking time correlated with individual differences in recognition accuracy. The results of this experiment demonstrated that although own-race faces were preferentially attended to in comparison to other-race faces, individual differences in looking time biases towards own-race faces did not correlate with individual differences in own-race recognition advantages. These results are also consistent with perceptual expertise, as it seems that the role of attentional biases towards own-race faces is independent of the cognitive processing that occurs for own-race faces. All together, these results have implications for face perception tasks that are performed in the lab, how accurate people may be when remembering faces in the real world, and the accuracy and patterns of errors in eyewitness testimony.