Commodities and their fetishism

Many pr oblems present themselves in at tempting t o discuss Marx's noti on of the fetish characteristics of commodities. It has been argued that it is one of the central points of Marx's en tir e c or pus. 1 It has also been argued that it i s merely "a brilli an t s oci olog i cal genera lization l ! and, even furth er, that it is an Hi ndependent and separate entity, internally hardly related t o Marx's economic theory" .2 How could such a theory be understo od i n such drastically diff erent ways? Perhaps the clue is to be f ound somewhere in Marx' s discussion of the fetishism of commodities itself. Because of the difficulty in un derstanding fetishism , I intend t o examine what Marx himself has t o say first befor e dealing with any points related to the notion of fetishism. Thus , the first parts of this thesis will c onsist of l ong qu otations and repetition of what Marx has t o say. If a noti on may be called ' central' and yet 'hardly related' t o Marx's wor k at the same time, surely a clear examination of this section is necess ary. Aft er an examination of the initial secti ons of Cae ital ] I intend t G examine the f ollowing : the r e lation of fetishism t o the t he ory of alienati on; how one may regard f etishism as a pr oblem f or philosophy; and how, in f act, the theory of fetishism is of prime imp ortance f or an understan ding of Marx's wr itings. What I want to stress throughout is that with o u~ an understanding of what is inherent in the pr oduction of the commodity causing i t t o be necessarily fetishistic, it is practically imp ossible t o understand much of Marx's other writin gs. A commodity appears, at fir st sight, a very trivial thing and easi ly un derst ood. Itsanalysis shows that it i s , in r eality , a very queer thing , abo unding in ~taphysical s ubtleties and theological nic eties .

A game-theoretic network formation model

We study the dynamics of a game-theoretic network formation model that yields large-scale small-world networks. So far, mostly stochastic frameworks have been utilized to explain the emergence of these networks. On the other hand, it is natural to seek for game-theoretic network formation models in which links are formed due to strategic behaviors of individuals, rather than based on probabilities. Inspired by Even-Dar and Kearns (2007), we consider a more realistic model in which the cost of establishing each link is dynamically determined during the course of the game. Moreover, players are allowed to put transfer payments on the formation of links. Also, they must pay a maintenance cost to sustain their direct links during the game. We show that there is a small diameter of at most 4 in the general set of equilibrium networks in our model. Unlike earlier model, not only the existence of equilibrium networks is guaranteed in our model, but also these networks coincide with the outcomes of pairwise Nash equilibrium in network formation. Furthermore, we provide a network formation simulation that generates small-world networks. We also analyze the impact of locating players in a hierarchical structure by constructing a strategic model, where a complete b-ary tree is the seed network.