On affirmation and becoming : a Deleuzian reading of Nietzsche's critique of nihilism

The main thrust of this thesis is the re-exploration of Friedrich Nietzsche's "critique of nihilism" through the lenses of Gilles Deleuze. A Deleuzian reading of Nietzsche is motivated by a post-deconstrnctive style of interpretation, inasmuch as Deleuze goes beyond, or in between, henneneutics and deconstrnction. Deleuze's post-deconstrnctive reading of Nietzsche is, however, only secondary to the main aim of this thesis. The primary thrust of this study is the critique of a way of thinking characterized by Nietzsche as nihilistic. Therefore, it should be noted that this study is not about Deleuze's reading per se; rather, it is an appraisal of Nietzsche's "critique of nihilism" using Deleuze's experimental reading. We will accrue Nietzsche's critique and Deleuze's post-deconstrnctive reading in order to appraise Nietzsche's critique itself. Insofar as we have underscored Deleuze's purported experimentation of Nietzschean themes, this study is also an experiment in itself. Through this experimentation, we will find out whether it is possible to partly gloss Nietzsche's critique of nihilism through Deleuzian phraseology. Far from presenting a mere exposition of Nietzsche's text, we are, rather, re-reading, that is, re-evaluating Nietzsche's critique of nihilism through Deleuze's experimentation. This is our way of thinking with Nietzsche. Nihilism is the central problem upon which Nietzsche's philosophical musings are directed; he deems nihilism as a cultural experience and, as such, a phenomenon to be reckoned with. In our reconstruction of Nietzsche's critique of nihilism, we locate two related elements which constitute the structure of the prescription of a cure, Le., the ethics of affirmation and the ontology of becoming. Appraising Nietzsche's ethics and ontology amounts to clarifying what Deleuze thinks as the movement from the "dogmatic image of thought" to the "new image of thought." Through this new image of thought, Deleuze makes sense of a Nietzschean counterculture which is a perspective that resists traditional or representational metaphysics. Deleuze takes the reversal of Platonism or the transmutation of values to be the point of departure. We have to, according to Deleuze, abandon our old image of the world in order to free ourselves from the obscurantism of foundationalist or essentialist thinking. It is only through the transmutation of values that we can make sense of Nietzsche's ethics of affirmation and ontology of becoming. We have to think of Nietzsche's ethics as an "ethics" and not a moral philosophy, and we have to think of his ontology as 1/ ontology" and not as metaphysics. Through Deleuze, we are able to avoid reading Nietzsche as a moral philosopher and metaphysician. Rather, we are able to read Nietzsche as one espousing an ethical imperative through the thought of the eternal return and one advocating a theory of existence based on an immanent, as opposed to transcendent, image of the world.

Sketch of the ship "Jane C. Woodruff"

A black and white copy of a sketch of the ship "Jane C. Woodruff". This appears to have been in a scrapbook. There is a slight tear which affects the picture slightly. [The Jane C. Woodruff was a barquentine ship built in St. Catharines in 1866 by Lewis Shikeluna. The ship belonged to John Battle who was an associate of Samuel D. Woodruff. She was named in honour of Samuel and his wife, Jane Caroline. She originated as a square timber trade boat before being converted into a 3 masted schooner. She collided with the "Mary Battle" in a snow squall in Georgian Bay. The ship passed out of existence in 1902].

Heidegger's tragic Greeks : the relation between presence and deinon

Martin Heidegger's interpretation of the ancients was born out of something like a crisis in the interpretation of the Greeks, which can be characterized as nothing other than the realization of the idea that the Greek philosophers put a serious question mark over existence. This idea, which had its germination in Prussia with Jakob Burckhart and his teacher, but first came to be seriously cultivated in the Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, was the first in depth investigation into whether the Greeks, on the one hand, questioned existence or, on the other hand, put a question mark over existence. To question existence is rather innocuous, since it amounts to little more, in the end, than a child looking up at the stars and asking what it all means. To put a question mark over existence, however, is another business entirely. For the Greeks, as the life work of Martin Heidegger amply demonstrates, the nature of Greek thinking and the objects towards which it is directed follows so absolutely from the tragic view of the human person that, in a certain sense, philosophy is Greek and could only have developed in Greece. Perhaps stating it a little less categorically, philosophy could have developed elsewhere at least to the extent that something like they way the Greeks understood life was at the forefront: presence, in other words. This thesis deals with the problem ofHeidegger's relation to the Greeks, specifically in terms of his understanding of the Greeks and presence. It is the position of this dissertation that the Greek notion of presence is, as Heidegger understands it, the homeliness of the hearth that radiates through all the things that humans concern themselves with. This is thought by Heidegger, as the Greeks did, specifically in contrast with the uncanninesslunhomeliness of the hqrnan apart from his or her concern with things. Therefore, the thesis is an attempt at exposing the relation between presence and the unhomely by situating it withing Greek existence and the meaning of the Greek Philosopher. In order to support this position, the thesis has been divided into five parts. The first two chapters deal with Heidegger's explanation of the relation between Greek notion of physics (Phusis), metaphysics (specifically in relation to an analysis of time and motion in Greek thought), and what Heidegger calls the fundamental attunement of Dasein (boredom). More exactly, it deals with these issues only so far as they allow us to bring out something like the notion of 'presence' in relation to things and homelessness or restlessness in relation to the human being. The rationale for these two chapters in relation to the central problem of the paper is that in Heidegger's elucidation of physics and metaphysics, he conducts his analysis in such a way that he explicitly uncovers that dimension of human existence that he calls the fundamental attunement of Dasein. This fundamental attunement is, in tum, similar to what the Greeks understood as the deinon, the uncanninesslunhomeliness of the human. The third and fourth chapters take as their explicit themes the problem of the Greek understanding of the assertion and the ways in which the person can comport himlherself toward things, two issues which are not separable. The rationale for these two chapters in relation to the central theme of the paper is that Heidegger's analysis of these two areas in Greek thought brings out precisely why the philosopher and the philosophical way of life is the highest mode of existence for the Greeks and how this is thought specifically in tenns of the uncanniness of humans. The final cijapter gives a complete elucidation of presence as the homeliness of the hearth and shows specifically how this is thought of in contradistinction to the uncanny/unhomely for the Greeks. 1I1 This last chapter also explains Martin Heidegger's reaction to the Greek's interpretation of the highest mode of existence, and what he posited as a counter-thought. The essay as a whole is an attempt to fully concertize an important dimension of Heidegger' s understanding of the Greeks, that is, the relation between presence and the deinon or Greek notion ofunhomely, which, to my la)owledge, has not been offered anywhere in commentaries on Heidegger.

Letter - Lieut A. Watson Sime to Col. F.C. McCordick

A letter from Lieut. A. Watson to Col. F.C. McCordick dated only July 3rd. The letter reads "My dear Col. McCordick, If you haven't already heard, you will be surprised to get this letter from me - in Germany. It happened at that awful slaughter - the 3rd battle of Ypres, & even now when I think of it all, I doubt my reality of existence. Everything was O.K at 730am on the 2nd - a little morning hate in the way of trench mortars, that was all. I had just visited a few of my guns & had passed Gen.s Mercer & Williams & their aides, Lyman Gooderham and Fraser (two latter at this camp) on the way to the -- C.M.R Bn. Head Quarters when the storm broke. It last for 5 hours & by the time the Germans came over there were few left to oppose them. By a miracle, the 15 yard bay of the front line, where I was with 6 others, was not levelled like all the rest of the line & we did our best with rifle & bomb. I got a crack on the head & 3 hours later I found myself in a waterfilled shell hole. By night I tried to crawl back & through, but at dawn was caught. Am very comfortable here & glad to have company of Col. Usher, Capt. Light Bourne, Capt. Frank Park M.O. -- CMR) & about 20 other Canadians. Hope all is well with you & 35 - Good luck & best regards to all. A. Watson Sime, Lieut. Haus 62-B OFFIZIER-KRIEGSGEFANGENLAGER Gutersloh.

From absolutes to aesthetics : John Dewey and the art of experience /

In this thesis I sought to capture something of the integrity of John Dewey's larger vision. While recognizing this to be a difficult challenge, I needed to clear some of the debris of an overly narrow reading of Dewey's works by students of education. The tendency of reducing Dewey's larger philosophical vision down to neat theoretical snap shots in order to prop up their particular social scientific research, was in my estimation slowly damaging the larger integrity of Dewey's vast body of work. It was, in short, killing off the desire to read big works, because doing so was not necessary to satisfying the specialized interests of social scientific research. In this thesis then I made a plea for returning the Humanities to the center of higher education. It is there that students learn how to read and to think—skills required to take on someone of Dewey's stature. I set out in this thesis to do just that. I took Dewey's notion of experience as the main thread connecting all of his philosophy, and focused on two large areas of inquiry, science and its relation to philosophy, and aesthetic experience. By exploring in depth Dewey's understanding of human experience as it pertains to day-to-day living, my call was for a heightened mode of artful conduct within our living contexts. By calling on the necessity of appreciating the more qualitative dimensions of lived experience, I was hoping that students engaged in the Social Sciences might begin to bolster their research interests with more breadth and depth of reading and critical insight. I expressed this as being important to the survival and intelligent flourishing of democratic conduct.