Nietzsche's will-to-power ontology : an interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil

Abstract: Nietzsche's Will-to-Power Ontology: An Interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil § 36 By: Mark Minuk Will-to-power is the central component of Nietzsche's philosophy, and passage 36 of Beyond Good and Evil is essential to coming to an understanding of it. 1 argue for and defend the thesis that will-to-power constitutes Nietzsche's ontology, and offer a new understanding of what that means. Nietzsche's ontology can be talked about as though it were a traditional substance ontology (i.e., a world made up of forces; a duality of conflicting forces described as 'towards which' and 'away from which'). However, 1 argue that what defines this ontology is an understanding of valuation as ontologically fundamental—^the basis of interpretation, and from which a substance ontology emerges. In the second chapter, I explain Nietzsche's ontology, as reflected in this passage, through a discussion of Heidegger's two ontological categories in Being and Time (readiness-to-hand, and present-at-hand). In a nutshell, it means that the world of our desires and passions (the most basic of which is for power) is ontologically more fundamental than the material world, or any other interpretation, which is to say, the material world emerges out of a world of our desires and passions. In the first chapter, I address the problematic form of the passage reflected in the first sentence. The passage is in a hypothetical style makes no claim to positive knowledge or truth, and, superficially, looks like Schopenhaurian position for the metaphysics of the will, which Nietzsche rejects. 1 argue that the hypothetical form of the passage is a matter of style, namely, the style of a free-spirit for whom the question of truth is reframed as a question of values. In the third and final chapter, 1 address the charge that Nietzsche's interpretation is a conscious anthropomorphic projection. 1 suggest that the charge rests on a distinction (between nature and man) that Nietzsche rejects. I also address the problem of the causality of the will for Nietzsche, by suggesting that an alternative, perspectival form of causality is possible.

Metaphorical Interpretation: Measuring and Facilitating Growth.

Abstract A total of 378 grade 9 students participated in this study to address the problem that although metaphorical literacy and thought are expected and necessary for success in junior and senior high school and beyond, metaphorical concepts and thought are not required to be explicitly taught to these students. The students were from 20 different classes from 4 levels: English language learners (ELL), school to work (SSTW), applied, and academic. All were from 7 secondary schools within a board in southern Ontario. Nine classes made up the control group and 11 classes made up the treatment group. All classes were given 3 pretests and the posttest. The treatment group was given Socratic lessons and direct instruction on metaphorical thought and expressions during 1 semester and in conjunction with their other classroom material. The pretest scores (TOLD, Peabody, preproverbs concrete, and preproverbs abstract) did not reveal any effect of gender, but the academic students had higher scores than the applied students. The SSTW student results are more variable: (a) for the TOLD test, SSTW scores were between those of the academic and applied students; (b) for Peabody scores, SSTW students’ scores are the same as academic and are greater than applied; (c) for preproverbs concrete and preproverbs abstract, the SSTW scores are not different from the applied scores. The postproverbs concrete and postproverbs abstract scores for the treatment groups also showed no effect of gender but revealed that all students who received the treatment did better on their post scores. The positive changes of the treatment group illustrate a measured movement from literal understanding to abstract understanding using direct Socratic instruction and proverbs as a medium.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

The interpretation of music videos : an interactive relationship between medium and viewer

There is a great deal of evidence to support the examination of an interactive relationship between the medium and the viewer in the interpretation of mainstream media. The exact nature of this relationship, however, is not well understood. The current study was carried out to assess the variables that may help explain why certain people interpret media, such as music videos, differently than others. Jensen's concept of reception analysis describes the relationship between the medium and the audience, and thus remains a strong focus within this study. Differences in the interpretation of music videos were investigated as a function of Absorption, gender role, screen size, age and viewing experience. Multiple regression analyses uncovered independent predictions of sexuality and violence scores by absorption and experience, as well as an interaction between absorption and screen size in the sexuality rating of the music videos.

The interpretation of environmental sustainability (ES) by the IOC/Olympic Games 1994-2008

The purpose of this qualitative multi-case study was to examine the interpretation of environmental sustainability (ES) within the Olympic 11 Movement. Two research questions guided the inquiry - first, how has the concept of ES been defined by the International Olympic Committee (lOC), and second, how has the concept of ES been defined and enacted by the Organizing Committees ofthe Olympic Games (OCOGs)? During the past two decades, the International Olympic Committee (lOC) established several policies and programs related to ES. Its actions reflect a broader trend of environmentalism within economic and social spheres around the world (Milton-Smith, 2002). Despite the numerous initiatives, the Olympic Games continue to cause significant environmental damage. Frey, et al. (2007) argued that the Olympic Movement contradicts the fundamental premises of ES because the Games are hosted in a two week time period, are situated in a confined area, and accumulate operating and infrastructure costs in the billions of dollars. Further, Etzion (2007) stated "there is positive and significant correlation between firm siz~ and environmental performance" (p. 642) and in the context of the Olympics the sizeimpact relation is striking. Since 1972, the year the UN launched its international environmental awareness efforts, the Summer Olympics grew to 201 nations (39% increase), 10,500 athletes (32% increase), 28 sports (30% increase), and 302 events (43% increase) (Johnson, 2004; Girginov & Parry, 2005; Upegui, 2008). The proliferation of Games activities counters the ES principles that exist within many of the IOC declarations, policies and programs.

An Abstract Algebraic Theory of L-Fuzzy Relations for Relational Databases

Classical relational databases lack proper ways to manage certain real-world situations including imprecise or uncertain data. Fuzzy databases overcome this limitation by allowing each entry in the table to be a fuzzy set where each element of the corresponding domain is assigned a membership degree from the real interval [0…1]. But this fuzzy mechanism becomes inappropriate in modelling scenarios where data might be incomparable. Therefore, we become interested in further generalization of fuzzy database into L-fuzzy database. In such a database, the characteristic function for a fuzzy set maps to an arbitrary complete Brouwerian lattice L. From the query language perspectives, the language of fuzzy database, FSQL extends the regular Structured Query Language (SQL) by adding fuzzy specific constructions. In addition to that, L-fuzzy query language LFSQL introduces appropriate linguistic operations to define and manipulate inexact data in an L-fuzzy database. This research mainly focuses on defining the semantics of LFSQL. However, it requires an abstract algebraic theory which can be used to prove all the properties of, and operations on, L-fuzzy relations. In our study, we show that the theory of arrow categories forms a suitable framework for that. Therefore, we define the semantics of LFSQL in the abstract notion of an arrow category. In addition, we implement the operations of L-fuzzy relations in Haskell and develop a parser that translates algebraic expressions into our implementation.

Abstract of title of part of Lots no. 12 and 13 in the 8th Concession in the Township of Grantham

Abstract of title of parts of lots nos. 12 and 13 in the 8th Concession in the Township of Grantham – Orsen Phelps to Owen Cifford and abstract of title of parts of Lots nos. 10 and 11 in the 9th Concession in the Township of Grantham – David Grass to Owen Clifford. This is a handwritten 2 page summary. This is part of the Owen Clifford Estate signed by W.W. Powell, registrar, Feb. 20, 1871.

Application for Loan, Mortgage Loan Envelope, and Abstract of Title

Atkins, Sarah A. and Carlisle A. Gardner includes: Application for Loan, July 26, 1884; Mortgage Loan Envelope no. 255 for July 1, 1884 – July 1, 1889 and Abstract of Title, August 28, 1884.

Crew, Isaac M., includes: Application for Loan, Mortgage Loan Envelope, and Abstract of Title

Crew, Isaac M., includes: Application for Loan, March 10, 1885; Mortgage Loan Envelope no. 679 for Jan. 1, 1885 – Jan. 1, 1890 and Abstract of Title, April 13, 1885.

Dennis, George W. and Mary E. Dennis, includes: Application for Loan on Real Estate, and Abstract of Title

Dennis, George W. and Mary E. Dennis, includes: Application for Loan on Real Estate, July 10, 1882; and Abstract of Title, Sept. 2, 1882.

Schmidt, John, includes: Application for Loan, and Mortgage Loan Envelope, and Abstract of Title

Schmidt, John, includes: Application for Loan, Aug. 8, 1884 and Mortgage Loan Envelope no. 302 for July 1, 1884 – July 1, 1889 and Abstract of Title, Sept. 6, 1884.

Letter which was enclosed with the application, bond mortgage and abstract of the Jones and Mater accounts to Samuel Woodruff from Jarvis, Conklin and Co.

Letter which was enclosed with the application, bond mortgage and abstract of the Jones and Mater accounts to Samuel Woodruff from Jarvis, Conklin and Co., May 4, 1882.

Voucher #7 from the Engineer Department of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway Extension to W.G. Thompson accompanied by an abstract of vouchers and summaries of account paid by W.G. Thompson for surveys, Jan. 31, 1857

Voucher #7 from the Engineer Department of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway Extension to W.G. Thompson accompanied by an abstract of vouchers and summaries of account paid by W.G. Thompson for surveys, Jan. 31, 1857.

Voucher #9 from the Engineer Department of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway Extension to W. G. Thompson accompanied by an abstract of vouchers for surveys, Feb. 28, 1857

Voucher #9 from the Engineer Department of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway Extension to W. G. Thompson accompanied by an abstract of vouchers for surveys, Feb. 28, 1857

Abstract of the forging

Abstract of the forging (1 page, handwritten) n.d.