The backwoods of our backyards : Ontario pioneers and the crisis of ecology /

Early in his landmark ecocritical book The Comedy of Survival, Joseph Meeker develops an intriguing hypothesis about human behaviour. He remarks the species Homo sapiens tend to behave like an invasive or pioneering organism, entering a bio-geographical region and aggressively outcompeting all other species for space and resources. Moreover, he suggests, human cultural traditions, at least in the West, have reinforced such behaviour, continually insisting that the impulses he describes are both necessary and right. While Meeker's work goes on to assess a number of literary works in both the tragic and comic modes, his work never fully explores this hypothesis in the context of human pioneers; that is, there is no ~xploration o( how these themes manifest themselves within our culture and what role they might play in the culture of specific pioneering groups. This project is an attempt at just such an analysis, examining the validity of Meeker's hypothesis through a case study of settler literature in Upper Canada/Ontario between the . years 1800-1867. It explores Meeker's work within three main areas: first, Chapter Two situates his book historically within the field of ecocriticism, showing what came before and the explosion of ecocritical inquiry that followed its release. This chapter also delves into the rift between the natural sciences and humanities, arguing that a move towards deeper interdisciplinarity is r:tecessary for the future. Chapter Three examines the biological and ecological ground on which Meeker rests his hypothesis through exploring evolutionary biology as well as invasive and pioneer species behaviour. Lastly, Chapter Four examines how these ecological principles are manifested in the writings of early Canadian settlers, suggesting that Meeker's hypothesis indeed finds itself on stable footing.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

The falls of Niagara and their retrograde movement /

"From the proceedings of the Academy of Natural Sciences of Newchatel, 1854."

Perceptions of Adolescent Males and Their Parents as to Factors That Influence the Young Men's Academic Performance

Postsecondary enrolments of young males has been declining since the mid-1980s. The decline can be attributed, at least in part, to boys and young men being unable to compete for a fixed number of available places in institutions of higher learning, whether in community college or university. This inability to compete stems from their academic performance in secondary school. This study interviewed adolescent males and their parents as to their perceptions of a number of factors that may contribute to their academic performance. Those factors included noncognitive skills, dimensions of character, perceptions of teachers, general attitudes towards school, and likes and dislikes on a range of course subjects. One of the most important findings was that only one of the seven adolescent male participants was considering a future career that would require a university degree. Other findings showed the young men's noncognitive skills were weak, particularly in relation to time management skills and their unwillingness to ask for help with schoolwork and homework. Most of the young men expressed a dislike for mathematics beyond high school, a subject key to the study, of the natural sciences, engineering, technology, and business. Recommendations include school reforms both inside the classroom and beyond. Additionally, a framework using project management theory and practice has been proposed to improve noncognitive skills, dimensions of character, and executive function.

Variability in the Insect and Plant Adhesins, Mad1 and Mad2, within the Fungal Genus Metarhizium Suggest Plant Adaptation as an Evolutionary Force

Several species of the insect pathogenic fungus Metarhizium are associated with certain plant types and genome analyses suggested a bifunctional lifestyle; as an insect pathogen and as a plant symbiont. Here we wanted to explore whether there was more variation in genes devoted to plant association (Mad2) or to insect association (Mad1) overall in the genus Metarhizium. Greater divergence within the genus Metarhizium in one of these genes may provide evidence for whether host insect or plant is a driving force in adaptation and evolution in the genus Metarhizium. We compared differences in variation in the insect adhesin gene, Mad1, which enables attachment to insect cuticle, and the plant adhesin gene, Mad2, which enables attachment to plants. Overall variation for the Mad1 promoter region (7.1%), Mad1 open reading frame (6.7%), and Mad2 open reading frame (7.4%) were similar, while it was higher in the Mad2 promoter region (9.9%). Analysis of the transcriptional elements within the Mad2 promoter region revealed variable STRE, PDS, degenerative TATA box, and TATA box-like regions, while this level of variation was not found for Mad1. Sequences were also phylogenetically compared to EF-1a, which is used for species identification, in 14 isolates representing 7 different species in the genus Metarhizium. Phylogenetic analysis demonstrated that the Mad2 phylogeny is more congruent with 59 EF-1a than Mad1. This would suggest that Mad2 has diverged among Metarhizium lineages, contributing to clade- and species-specific variation, while it appears that Mad1 has been largely conserved. While other abiotic and biotic factors cannot be excluded in contributing to divergence, these results suggest that plant relationships, rather than insect host, have been a major driving factor in the divergence of the genus Metarhizium.

Mode of action of a Drosophila FMRFamide in inducing muscle contraction

Drosophila melanogaster is a model system for examining the mechanisms of action of neuropeptides. DPKQDFMRFamide was previously shown to induce contractions in Drosophila body wall muscle fibres in a Ca(2+)-dependent manner. The present study examined the possible involvement of a G-protein-coupled receptor and second messengers in mediating this myotropic effect after removal of the central nervous system. DPKQDFMRFamide-induced contractions were reduced by 70% and 90%, respectively, in larvae with reduced expression of the Drosophila Fmrf receptor (FR) either ubiquitously or specifically in muscle tissue, compared with the response in control larvae in which expression was not manipulated. No such effect occurred in larvae with reduced expression of this gene only in neurons. The myogenic effects of DPKQDFMRFamide do not appear to be mediated through either of the two Drosophila myosuppressin receptors (DmsR-1 and DmsR-2). DPKQDFMRFamide-induced contractions were not reduced in Ala1 transgenic flies lacking activity of calcium/calmodulin-dependent protein kinase (CamKII), and were not affected by the CaMKII inhibitor KN-93. Peptide-induced contractions in the mutants of the phospholipase C-β (PLCβ) gene (norpA larvae) and in IP3 receptor mutants were similar to contractions elicited in control larvae. The peptide failed to increase cAMP and cGMP levels in Drosophila body wall muscles. Peptide-induced contractions were not potentiated by 3-isobutyl-1-methylxanthine, a phosphodiesterase inhibitor, and were not antagonized by inhibitors of cAMP-dependent or cGMP-dependent protein kinases. Additionally, exogenous application of arachidonic acid failed to induce myogenic contractions. Thus, DPKQDFMRFamide induces contractions via a G-protein coupled FMRFamide receptor in muscle cells but does not appear to act via cAMP, cGMP, IP3, PLC, CaMKII or arachidonic acid.

Cyclotetrasiloxane Frameworks for the Chemoenzymatic Synthesis of Oligoesters

Immobilized lipase B from Candida antarctica (Novozym® 435, N435) was utilized as part of a chemoenzymatic strategy for the synthesis of branched polyesters based on a cyclotetrasiloxane core in the absence of solvent. Nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy and matrix-assisted laser desorption ionization time-of-flight mass spectrometry were utilized to monitor the reactions between tetraester cyclotetrasiloxanes and aliphatic diols. The enzyme-mediated esterification reactions can achieve 65– 80% consumption of starting materials in 24–48 h. Longer reaction times, 72–96 h, resulted in the formation of cross-linked gel-like networks. Gel permeation chromatography of the polymers indicated that the masses were Mw ¼ 11 400, 13 100, and 19 400 g mol 1 for the substrate pairs of C7D4 ester/ octane-1,8-diol, C10D4 ester/pentane-1,5-diol and C10D4 ester/octane-1,8-diol respectively, after 48 h. Extending the polymerization for an additional 24 h with the C10D4 ester/octane-1,8-diol pair gave Mw ¼ 86 800 g mol 1. To the best of our knowledge this represents the first report using lipase catalysis to produce branched polymers that are built from a cyclotetrasiloxane core.