Neural mechanisms underlying conscious and unconscious vision. Evidence from event-related potentials and transcranial magnetic stimulation

Vision affords us with the ability to consciously see, and use this information in our behavior. While research has produced a detailed account of the function of the visual system, the neural processes that underlie conscious vision are still debated. One of the aims of the present thesis was to examine the time-course of the neuroelectrical processes that correlate with conscious vision. The second aim was to study the neural basis of unconscious vision, that is, situations where a stimulus that is not consciously perceived nevertheless influences behavior. According to current prevalent models of conscious vision, the activation of visual cortical areas is not, as such, sufficient for consciousness to emerge, although it might be sufficient for unconscious vision. Conscious vision is assumed to require reciprocal communication between cortical areas, but views differ substantially on the extent of this recurrent communication. Visual consciousness has been proposed to emerge from recurrent neural interactions within the visual system, while other models claim that more widespread cortical activation is needed for consciousness. Studies I-III compared models of conscious vision by studying event-related potentials (ERP). ERPs represent the brain’s average electrical response to stimulation. The results support the model that associates conscious vision with activity localized in the ventral visual cortex. The timing of this activity corresponds to an intermediate stage in visual processing. Earlier stages of visual processing may influence what becomes conscious, although these processes do not directly enable visual consciousness. Late processing stages, when more widespread cortical areas are activated, reflect the access to and manipulation of contents of consciousness. Studies IV and V concentrated on unconscious vision. By using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) we show that when early visual cortical processing is disturbed so that subjects fail to consciously perceive visual stimuli, they may nevertheless guess (above chance-level) the location where the visual stimuli were presented. However, the results also suggest that in a similar situation, early visual cortex is necessary for both conscious and unconscious perception of chromatic information (i.e. color). Chromatic information that remains unconscious may influence behavioral responses when activity in visual cortex is not disturbed by TMS. Our results support the view that early stimulus-driven (feedforward) activation may be sufficient for unconscious processing. In conclusion, the results of this thesis support the view that conscious vision is enabled by a series of processing stages. The processes that most closely correlate with conscious vision take place in the ventral visual cortex ~200 ms after stimulus presentation, although preceding time-periods and contributions from other cortical areas such as the parietal cortex are also indispensable. Unconscious vision relies on intact early visual activation, although the location of visual stimulus may be unconsciously resolved even when activity in the early visual cortex is interfered with.

The neural processes generating visual phenomenal consciousness: ERP and neuronavigated brain stimulation studies

One of the greatest conundrums to the contemporary science is the relation between consciousness and brain activity, and one of the specifi c questions is how neural activity can generate vivid subjective experiences. Studies focusing on visual consciousness have become essential in solving the empirical questions of consciousness. Th e main aim of this thesis is to clarify the relation between visual consciousness and the neural and electrophysiological processes of the brain. By applying electroencephalography and functional magnetic resonance image-guided transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), we investigated the links between conscious perception and attention, the temporal evolution of visual consciousness during stimulus processing, the causal roles of primary visual cortex (V1), visual area 2 (V2) and lateral occipital cortex (LO) in the generation of visual consciousness and also the methodological issues concerning the accuracy of targeting TMS to V1. Th e results showed that the fi rst eff ects of visual consciousness on electrophysiological responses (about 140 ms aft er the stimulus-onset) appeared earlier than the eff ects of selective attention, and also in the unattended condition, suggesting that visual consciousness and selective attention are two independent phenomena which have distinct underlying neural mechanisms. In addition, while it is well known that V1 is necessary for visual awareness, the results of the present thesis suggest that also the abutting visual area V2 is a prerequisite for conscious perception. In our studies, the activation in V2 was necessary for the conscious perception of change in contrast for a shorter period of time than in the case of more detailed conscious perception. We also found that TMS in LO suppressed the conscious perception of object shape when TMS was delivered in two distinct time windows, the latter corresponding with the timing of the ERPs related to the conscious perception of coherent object shape. Th e result supports the view that LO is crucial in conscious perception of object coherency and is likely to be directly involved in the generation of visual consciousness. Furthermore, we found that visual sensations, or phosphenes, elicited by the TMS of V1 were brighter than identically induced phosphenes arising from V2. Th ese fi ndings demonstrate that V1 contributes more to the generation of the sensation of brightness than does V2. Th e results also suggest that top-down activation from V2 to V1 is probably associated with phosphene generation. The results of the methodological study imply that when a commonly used landmark (2 cm above the inion) is used in targeting TMS to V1, the TMS-induced electric fi eld is likely to be highest in dorsal V2. When V1 was targeted according to the individual retinotopic data, the electric fi eld was highest in V1 only in half of the participants. Th is result suggests that if the objective is to study the role of V1 with TMS methodology, at least functional maps of V1 and V2 should be applied with computational model of the TMS-induced electric fi eld in V1 and V2. Finally, the results of this thesis imply that diff erent features of attention contribute diff erently to visual consciousness, and thus, the theoretical model which is built up of the relationship between visual consciousness and attention should acknowledge these diff erences. Future studies should also explore the possibility that visual consciousness consists of several processing stages, each of which have their distinct underlying neural mechanisms.

Alterations in The States and Contents of Consciousness: Empirical and Theoretical Aspects

The main purpose of the present doctoral thesis is to investigate subjective experiences and cognitive processes in four different types of altered states of consciousness: naturally occurring dreaming, cognitively induced hypnosis, pharmacologically induced sedation, and pathological psychosis. Both empirical and theoretical research is carried out, resulting in four empirical and four theoretical studies. The thesis begins with a review of the main concepts used in consciousness research, the most influential philosophical and neurobiological theories of subjective experience, the classification of altered states of consciousness, and the main empirical methods used to study consciousness alterations. Next, findings of the original studies are discussed, as follows. Phenomenal consciousness is found to be dissociable from responsiveness, as subjective experiences do occur in unresponsive states, including anaesthetic-induced sedation and natural sleep, as demonstrated by post-awakening subjective reports. Two new tools for the content analysis of subjective experiences and dreams are presented, focusing on the diversity, complexity and dynamics of phenomenal consciousness. In addition, a new experimental paradigm of serial awakenings from non-rapid eye movement sleep is introduced, which enables more rapid sampling of dream reports than has been available in previous studies. It is also suggested that lucid dreaming can be studied using transcranial brain stimulation techniques and systematic analysis of pre-lucid dreaming. For blind judges, dreams of psychotic patients appear to be indistinguishable from waking mentation reports collected from the same patients, which indicates a close resemblance of these states of mind. However, despite phenomenological similarities, dreaming should not be treated as a uniform research model of psychotic or intact consciousness. Contrary to this, there seems to be a multiplicity of routes of how different states of consciousness can be associated. For instance, seemingly identical time perception distortions in different alterations of consciousness may have diverse underlying causes for these distortions. It is also shown that altered states do not necessarily exhibit impaired cognitive processing compared to a baseline waking state of consciousness: a case study of time perception in a hypnotic virtuoso indicates a more consistent perceptual timing under hypnosis than in a waking state. The thesis ends with a brief discussion of the most promising new perspectives for the study of alterations of consciousness.