Statistical variation of weld profiles and their expected influence on fatigue strength

The general objective of this study was to conduct astatistical analysis on the variation of the weld profiles and their influence on the fatigue strength of the joint. Weld quality with respect to its fatigue strength is of importance which is the main concept behind this thesis. The intention of this study was to establish the influence of weld geometric parameters on the weld quality and fatigue strength. The effect of local geometrical variations of non-load carrying cruciform fillet welded joint under tensile loading wasstudied in this thesis work. Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics was used to calculate fatigue strength of the cruciform fillet welded joints in as-welded condition and under cyclic tensile loading, for a range of weld geometries. With extreme value statistical analysis and LEFM, an attempt was made to relate the variation of the cruciform weld profiles such as weld angle and weld toe radius to respective FAT classes.

Diversification benefits for a Finnish non-industrial private forest investor: Real Estate Investment Trusts in the USA

This thesis examined both domestic and international forest investment options for a Finnish non-industrial private forest investor. The focus was on forest-based investment instruments. The influence of movements of currency exchange rates on foreign returns were also taken into account. Annual data from 1995 to 2011 was used. The main portfolio optimization model in this study was the Mean-Variance model but the results were also validated by using the Value at Risk and Expected Shortfall models. In addition, the exchange rate risk hedging was established by using one-week-maturity forward contracts. The results suggested that 75 % of the total wealth should be invested in Finnish private forests and the rest, 25 %, to a US REIT, in this case Rayonier. With hedging, the total return on the portfolio was 7.21 % (NIPF 5.3%) with the volatility of 6.63 % (NIPF 7.9%). Taxation supported US investments in this case. As a conclusion, a Finnish private forest investor may, as evidenced, benefit in diversifying a portfolio using REITs in the US.

Competitive Effects of Non-Controlling Minority Acquisitions – Sufficient to merit further EU merger regulation?

Partial ownership interests are a widespread phenomenon in modern corporate environment. Unless minority shareholding affords the target to exercise control over the target, they do currently not have to be notified to the European Commission under EU merger regime. However, economic research has long suggested that when linking competing or non-horizontally positioned undertakings particularly in industries with few competitors, minority shareholdings even far below the majority of shares or voting rights could lead to higher prices or lower output volumes to the detriment of consumers. The Commission has recognized this issue and proceeded to suggest an extension of the merger regime to catch also certain non-controlling minority acquisitions. Horizontal non-controlling minority shareholdings create a positive correlation between the sales revenues of the partial acquirer and target. Through the equity interest the acquirer will internalise a fraction, proportional to the financial rights attached to the shareholding, of the profit of the target. This will incentivise the acquirer to contribute to increasing the target’s business profits by increasing its own sales price (horizontal unilateral effects). When a minority stake is held in a vertically related or a conglomerate company, the minority acquirer could be allowed to hamper or eliminate the target’s rivals’ access either to inputs (input foreclosure) or customers (customer foreclosure), depending on which level of the supply chain the parties are (vertical unilateral effects). Under certain circumstances minority share acquisitions could also lessen competition because they facilitate collusion between companies active in the market (coordinated effects). Economic theory confirms that non-controlling minority shareholdings may under certain circumstances create anti-competitive effects that are unlikely to be remedies by pro-competitive effects. However, they are likely to be of less significant nature than anticompetitive effects created by full mergers. This derives fore mostly from the fact that a minority share acquirer carries all the costs associated with its unilateral action but will internalise only a fraction of the lost profits. This is likely to limit the acquirer’s incentive to raise price and the profitability of such behavior. Having in mind that the number of potentially problematic cases is expected to be next to negligible, the limited potential competitive effects of non-controlling minority share acquisitions cannot be seen to clearly merit extension of the scope of the EUMR. The system suggested by the Commission is particularly ill-fitted for such purpose given the clear lack of legal certainty and considerable administrative burden associated with it.