Addiction in Action

As human action, drinking alcohol or smoking cigarettes, for instance, are phenomena that are familiar to most people. We recognise when people use drugs or gamble whether that happens in the television or around us. Sometimes we call these actions addictions. Addictive actions are actions that puzzle us. This puzzlement has raised different kinds of views on addiction that describe the phenomenon in different ways. The proponents of the views pick features that they consider to be sufficient in capturing the phenomenon. The disease view emphasises that addicted individuals are not in control over their own actions, whereas the choice view highlights addicted individuals’ capacity to act according to their own preferences. Some see addiction as a defect of will and addictive action is a manifestation of that. Sometimes they all insist on referring to the same group of people and describing the same actions with seemingly contradictory terms. What happens when an addicted individual acts in accordance with his addiction? This thesis also tries to answer this question and make this kind of action and agency understandable. By showing that these three common views fall short of capturing the phenomenon, I will provide characteristics that jointly suffice for something to be labelled addiction, but which are not, however, individually necessary (or sufficient) for addiction. Those characteristics are strong desire, myopia, biased decision-making, and weakness of will. Furthermore, they should be understood in the framework of diachronic, active agency. They contribute to a view on addictive action that consists of different kinds of actions. Acknowledging the variety of nuanced human action, the understanding of addictive action is increased and this may also be utilised in addiction-related policies and treatment. The emphasis of my study lies specifically on understanding addiction as action by the means of analytical philosophy.