Issues in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: A critical discourse analysis

Negotiating trade agreements is an important part of government trade policies, economic planning and part of the globally operating trading system of today. European Union and the United States have been active in the formation of trade agreements in global comparison. Now these two economic giants are engaged in negotiations to form their own trade agreement, the so called Transnational Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The purpose of this thesis is to understand the reasons for making a trade agreement between two economic areas and understanding the issues it may include in the case of the TTIP. The TTIP has received a great deal of attention in the media. The opinions towards the partnership have been extreme, and the debate has been heated. The purpose of this study is to introduce the nature of the public discussion regarding the TTIP from Spring 2013 until 2014. The research problem is to find out what are the main issues in the agreement and what are the values influencing them. The study was conducted applying methods of critical discourse analysis to the chosen data. This includes gathering the issues from the data based on the attention each has received in the discussion. The underlying motives for raising different issues were analysed by investigating the authors’ position in the political, economic and social circuits. The perceived economic impacts of the TTIP are also under analysis with the same criteria. Some of the most respected economic newspapers globally were included in the research material as well as papers or reports published by the EU and global organisations. The analysis indicates a clear dichotomy of the attitudes towards the TTIP. Key problems include lack of transparency in the negotiations, the misunderstood investor-state dispute settlement, the constantly expanding regulatory issues and the risk of protectionism. The theory and data does suggest that the removal of tariffs is an effective tool for reaching economic gains in the TTIP and even more effective would be the reducing of non-tariff barriers, such as protectionism. Critics are worried over the rising influence of corporations over governments. The discourse analysis reveals that the supporters of the TTIP have values related to increasing welfare through economic growth. Critics do not deny the economic benefits but raise the question of inequality as a consequence. Overall they represent softer values such as sustainable development and democracy as a counter-attack to the corporate values of efficiency and the maximising of profits.

Naisasialiikkeen esiäitejä

Kirjallisuusarvostelu

Saksa protestanttisen lähetystyön synnyinmaana ja islamilaisen muuttoliikkeen kohdemaana

Kirjallisuusarvostelu

The feasibility of torrefaction for the co-firing of wood in pulverised-fuel boilers

Torrefaction is the partial pyrolysis of wood characterised by thermal degradation of predominantly hemicellulose under inert atmosphere. Torrefaction can be likened to coffee roasting but with wood in place of beans. This relatively new process concept makes wood more like coal. Torrefaction has attracted interest because it potentially enables higher rates of co-firing in existing pulverised-coal power plants and hence greater net CO2 emission reductions. Academic and entrepreneurial interest in torrefaction has sky rocketed in the last decade. Research output has focused on the many aspects of torrefaction – from detailed chemical changes in feedstock to globally-optimised production and supply scenarios with which to sustain EU emission-cutting directives. However, despite its seemingly simple concept, torrefaction has retained a somewhat mysterious standing. Why hasn’t torrefied pellet production become fully commercialised? The question is one of feasibility. This thesis addresses this question. Herein, the feasibility of torrefaction in co-firing applications is approached from three directions. Firstly, the natural limitations imposed by the structure of wood are assessed. Secondly, the environmental impact of production and use of torrefied fuel is evaluated and thirdly, economic feasibility is assessed based on the state of the art of pellet making. The conclusions reached in these domains are as follows. Modification of wood’s chemical structure is limited by its naturally existing constituents. Consequently, key properties of wood with regards to its potential as a co-firing fuel have a finite range. The most ideal benefits gained from wood torrefaction cannot all be realised simultaneously in a single process or product. Although torrefaction at elevated pressure may enhance some properties of torrefied wood, high-energy torrefaction yields are achieved at the expense of other key properties such as heating value, grindability, equilibrium moisture content and the ability to pelletise torrefied wood. Moreover, pelletisation of even moderately torrefied fuels is challenging and achieving a standard level of pellet durability, as required by international standards, is not trivial. Despite a reduced moisture content, brief exposure of torrefied pellets to water from rainfall or emersion results in a high level of moisture retention. Based on the above findings, torrefied pellets are an optimised product. Assessment of energy and CO2-equivalent emission balance indicates that there is no environmental barrier to production and use of torrefied pellets in co-firing. A long product transport distance, however, is necessary in order for emission benefits to exceed those of conventional pellets. Substantial CO2 emission reductions appear possible with this fuel if laboratory milling results carry over to industrial scales for direct co-firing. From demonstrated state-of-the-art pellet properties, however, the economic feasibility of torrefied pellet production falls short of conventional pellets primarily due to the larger capital investment required for production. If the capital investment for torrefied pellet production can be reduced significantly or if the pellet-making issues can be resolved, the two production processes could be economically comparable. In this scenario, however, transatlantic shipping distances and a dry fuel are likely necessary for production to be viable. Based on demonstrated pellet properties to date, environmental aspects and production economics, it is concluded that torrefied pellets do not warrant investment at this time. However, from the presented results, the course of future research in this field is clear.

The TTIP, ISDS and the shift towards transparency in investor-state arbitration

The negotiations between the EU and the US over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have generated a lot of discussion about investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). This discussion provided the inspiration for this thesis, with the TTIP in the background, setting the scene. In this thesis I study the nature of ISDS and the principle of transparency within investor-state arbitration. I aim to determine whether the use of ISDS is restricted to international arbitration and whether ISDS can be considered to constitute a system or regime. Furthermore, I consider whether the introduction of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (2014, the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules) changes investor-state arbitration in relation to transparency. To achieve this, I examine ISDS provisions in several different international investment agreements (IIAs) and evaluate the ways in which transparency is incorporated into investment law. Moreover, I compare the provisions on transparency and confidentiality in institutional arbitration rules with the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules. I have formed several conclusions, including that the ISDS provisions may contain methods other than international arbitration and that ISDS does not constitute a system. Furthermore, the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules do change – theoretically, at least – investor-state arbitration to become more transparent. Whether the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules will make investor-state arbitration fully transparent depends on the actions of the contracting state parties when negotiating new IIAs and whether they choose to incorporate the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules in the IIAs already concluded.