Issuant views of hell in contemporary Anglo-American theology

This problem of hell is a specific form of the problem of evil that can be expressed in terms of a set of putatively incompatible statements: 1. An omnipotent God could create a world in which all moral agents freely choose life with God. 2. An omnibenevolent God would not create a world with the foreknowledge that some (perhaps a significant proportion) of God’s creatures would end up in hell. 3. An omniscient God would know which people will end up in hell. 4. Some people will end up forever in hell. Since the late twentieth century, a number of British and North American philosophical theologians, inspired by C.S. Lewis, have developed a new approach to answering the problem of hell. Very little work has been done to systematize this category of perspectives on the duration, quality, purpose and finality of hell. Indeed, there is no consensus among scholars as to what such an approach should be called. In this work, however, I call this perspective issuantism. Starting from the works of a wide range of issuantist scholars, I distill what I believe to be the essence of issuantist perspectives on hell: hell is a state that does not result in universal salvation and is characterized by the insistance that both heaven and hell must issue from the love of God, an affirmation of libertarian human freedom and a rejection of retributive interpretations of hell. These sine qua non characteristics form what I have labeled basic issuantism. I proceed to show that basic issuantism by itself does not provide an adequate answer to the problem of hell. The issuantist scholars themselves, however, recognize this weakness and add a wide range of possible supplements to their basic issuantism. Some of these supplemented versions of issuantism succeed in presenting reasonable answers to the problem of hell. One of the key reasons for the development of issuantist views of hell is a perceived failure on the part of conditionalists, universalists and defenders of hell as eternal conscious torment to give adequate answers to the problem of hell. It is my conclusion, however, that with the addition of some of the same supplements, versions of conditionalism and hell as eternal conscious torment can be advanced that succeed just as well in presenting answers to the problem of hell as those advanced by issuantists, thus rendering some of the issuantist critique of non-issuantist perspectives on hell unfounded.

IN DUBIO PRO NATURA? A Philosophical Analysis of the Precautionary Principle in Environmental and Health Risk Governance

In this book, I apply a philosophical approach to study the precautionary principle in environmental (and health) risk decision-making. The principle says that unacceptable environmental and health risks should be anticipated, and they ought to be forestalled before the damage comes to fruition even if scientific understanding of the risks is inadequate. The study consists of introductory chapters, summary and seven original publications which aim at explicating the principle, critically analysing the debate on the principle, and constructing a basis for the well-founded use of the principle. Papers I-V present the main thesis of this research. In the two last papers, the discussion is widened to new directions. The starting question is how well the currently embraced precautionary principle stands up to critical philosophical scrutiny. The approach employed is analytical: mainly conceptual, argumentative and ethical. The study draws upon Anglo-American style philosophy on the one hand, and upon sources of law as well as concrete cases and decision-making practices at the European Union level and in its member countries on the other. The framework is environmental (and health) risk governance, including the related law and policy. The main thesis of this study is that the debate on the precautionary principle needs to be shifted from the question of whether the principle (or its weak or strong interpretation) is well-grounded in general to questions about the theoretical plausibility and ethical and socio-political justifiability of specific understandings of the principle. The real picture of the precautionary principle is more complex than that found (i.e. presumed) in much of the current academic, political and public debate surrounding it. While certain presumptions and interpretations of the principle are found to be sound, others are theoretically flawed or include serious practical problems. The analysis discloses conceptual and ethical presumptions and elementary understandings of the precautionary principle, critically assesses current practices invoked in the name of the precautionary principle and public participation, and seeks to build bridges between precaution, engagement and philosophical ethics. Hence, it is intended to provide a sound basis upon which subsequent academic scrutiny can build.

Dialogue in the crisis of representation : realism and antirealism in the context of the conversation between theologians and quantum physicists in Göttingen 1949-1961

The aim of this study is to analyse the content of the interdisciplinary conversations in Göttingen between 1949 and 1961. The task is to compare models for describing reality presented by quantum physicists and theologians. Descriptions of reality indifferent disciplines are conditioned by the development of the concept of reality in philosophy, physics and theology. Our basic problem is stated in the question: How is it possible for the intramental image to match the external object?Cartesian knowledge presupposes clear and distinct ideas in the mind prior to observation resulting in a true correspondence between the observed object and the cogitative observing subject. The Kantian synthesis between rationalism and empiricism emphasises an extended character of representation. The human mind is not a passive receiver of external information, but is actively construing intramental representations of external reality in the epistemological process. Heidegger's aim was to reach a more primordial mode of understanding reality than what is possible in the Cartesian Subject-Object distinction. In Heidegger's philosophy, ontology as being-in-the-world is prior to knowledge concerning being. Ontology can be grasped only in the totality of being (Dasein), not only as an object of reflection and perception. According to Bohr, quantum mechanics introduces an irreducible loss in representation, which classically understood is a deficiency in knowledge. The conflicting aspects (particle and wave pictures) in our comprehension of physical reality, cannot be completely accommodated into an entire and coherent model of reality. What Bohr rejects is not realism, but the classical Einsteinian version of it. By the use of complementary descriptions, Bohr tries to save a fundamentally realistic position. The fundamental question in Barthian theology is the problem of God as an object of theological discourse. Dialectics is Barth¿s way to express knowledge of God avoiding a speculative theology and a human-centred religious self-consciousness. In Barthian theology, the human capacity for knowledge, independently of revelation, is insufficient to comprehend the being of God. Our knowledge of God is real knowledge in revelation and our words are made to correspond with the divine reality in an analogy of faith. The point of the Bultmannian demythologising programme was to claim the real existence of God beyond our faculties. We cannot simply define God as a human ideal of existence or a focus of values. The theological programme of Bultmann emphasised the notion that we can talk meaningfully of God only insofar as we have existential experience of his intervention. Common to all these twentieth century philosophical, physical and theological positions, is a form of anti-Cartesianism. Consequently, in regard to their epistemology, they can be labelled antirealist. This common insight also made it possible to find a common meeting point between the different disciplines. In this study, the different standpoints from all three areas and the conversations in Göttingen are analysed in the frameworkof realism/antirealism. One of the first tasks in the Göttingen conversations was to analyse the nature of the likeness between the complementary structures inquantum physics introduced by Niels Bohr and the dialectical forms in the Barthian doctrine of God. The reaction against epistemological Cartesianism, metaphysics of substance and deterministic description of reality was the common point of departure for theologians and physicists in the Göttingen discussions. In his complementarity, Bohr anticipated the crossing of traditional epistemic boundaries and the generalisation of epistemological strategies by introducing interpretative procedures across various disciplines.

Vårdande och icke-vårdande tröst

The aim of the thesis is, from a caring science perspective including a caring theology perspective, to illustrate the meaning of the phenomenon consolation and howconsolation relates to suffering and care. Two studies were completed where staff and elderly care receivers were interviewed and a third study focused on an analysis of consolation as it is presented in the Book of Job in the Old Testament. These studies deal with carers' experiences of consolation and consoling, elderly care receivers' experiences of consolation, and Job's experience of consolation. Phenomenology and hermeneutics form the basis for the methodological approach. A phenomenological- hermeneutic method, inspired by Paul Ricoeur, has been used for the text analyses. The thesis also covers significant aspects of poetical and religious texts. The metaphors that occur in the interview studies with the carers and the elderly are analysed in order to take care of the excess of meaning that, according to Ricoeur, can be expressed in metaphors. The result showfive overall meanings: The contradictory consolation, The bonding consolation, The mute and rigid consolation, The uncontrolled consolation and The restful consolation. A caring consolation is contradictory in the sense that it entails that the sufferer on the one hand passes on his or her suffering to someone else and on the other hand that the suffering can be returned to be suffered. Consolation can thus entail suffering. The bonding consolation is present, i.e. is with the sufferer and is based on that person's suffering. This consolation is characterised by a close fellowship, a feeling of being understood at a deeper level. The results also reveal a consolation that is mute and rigid. This consolation does not respond to the sufferer's experience of his or her suffering, is shapeless and therefore unable to follow the suffering. An example of a mute, rigid and non-caring consolation is the consolation of the friends in the Book of Job. This consolation is not capable of consoling because it does not correspond to where Job is, i.e. in his experience of his suffering. A caring consolation is also uncontrolled because it is on the one hand spontaneous and on the other hand helps the sufferer to lose control over the suffering. To lose control entails, amongst other things, the sufferer giving up trying to understand suffering and instead lets that which is incomprehensible be incomprehensible. A consoling and health-bringing rest in or from the struggle with suffering presents itself by giving up what in various ways is tied to the suffering. The result as a whole is interpreted from a caring science perspective with the following important concepts: caring relationship, faith, health and sacrifice. Consolation as health is considered on the basis of a theoretical model inspired by Katie Eriksson's ontological health model. The research is also illustrated from a philosophical-ethical perspective, mainly based on the work of Emmanuel Levinas. The findings are discussed in relation to previous research and also to caring science, society and care.

Teologis-filosofista aatehistoriaa uusissa väitöskirjoissa

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