Does speed matter? : the impact of the EU membership incentive on rule adoption in minority language rights protection

Denna avhandling tar sin utgångspunkt i ett ifrågasättande av effektiviteten i EU:s konditionalitetspolitik avseende minoritetsrättigheter. Baserat på den rationalistiska teoretiska modellen, External Incentives Model of Governance, syftar denna hypotesprövande avhandling till att förklara om tidsavståndet på det potentiella EU medlemskapet påverkar lagstiftningsnivån avseende minoritetsspråksrättigheter. Mätningen av nivån på lagstiftningen avseende minoritetsspråksrättigheter begränsas till att omfatta icke-diskriminering, användning av minoritetsspråk i officiella sammanhang samt minoriteters språkliga rättigheter i utbildningen. Metodologiskt används ett jämförande angreppssätt både avseende tidsramen för studien, som sträcker sig mellan 2003 och 2010, men även avseende urvalet av stater. På basis av det \"mest lika systemet\" kategoriseras staterna i tre grupper efter deras olika tidsavstånd från det potentiella EU medlemskapet. Hypotesen som prövas är följande: ju kortare tidsavstånd till det potentiella EU medlemskapet desto större sannolikhet att staternas lagstiftningsnivå inom de tre områden som studeras har utvecklats till en hög nivå. Studien visar att hypotesen endast bekräftas delvis. Resultaten avseende icke-diskriminering visar att sambandet mellan tidsavståndet och nivån på lagstiftningen har ökat markant under den undersökta tidsperioden. Detta samband har endast stärkts mellan kategorin av stater som ligger tidsmässigt längst bort ett potentiellt EU medlemskap och de två kategorier som ligger närmare respektive närmast ett potentiellt EU medlemskap. Resultaten avseende användning av minoritetsspråk i officiella sammanhang och minoriteters språkliga rättigheter i utbildningen visar inget respektive nästan inget samband mellan tidsavståndet och utvecklingen på lagstiftningen mellan 2003 och 2010.

Islandora Sync: Enabling Administrators and Developers

Presentation at Open Repositories 2014, Helsinki, Finland, June 9-13, 2014

Handbook of oriental collections in Finland: manuscripts, xylographs, inscriptions, and Russian minority literature

Addenda: Turcica, Arabica, Persica and Caucasica. Studia Orientalia, vol. 64, 1988.

Enhancing Security of Linux OS against Administrators

Inside cyber security threats by system administrators are some of the main concerns of organizations about the security of systems. Since operating systems are controlled and managed by fully trusted administrators, they can negligently or intentionally break the information security and privacy of users and threaten the system integrity. In this thesis, we propose some solutions for enhancing the security of Linux OS by restricting administrators’ access to superuser’s privileges while they can still manage the system. We designed and implemented an interface for administrators in Linux OS called Linux Admins’ User Interface (LAUI) for managing the system in secure ways. LAUI along with other security programs in Linux like sudo protect confidentiality and integrity of users’ data and provide a more secure system against administrators’ mismanagement. In our model, we limit administrators to perform managing tasks in secure manners and also make administrators accountable for their acts. In this thesis we present some scenarios for compromising users’ data and breaking system integrity by system administrators in Linux OS. Then we evaluate how our solutions and methods can secure the system against these administrators’ mismanagement.

Competitive Effects of Non-Controlling Minority Acquisitions – Sufficient to merit further EU merger regulation?

Partial ownership interests are a widespread phenomenon in modern corporate environment. Unless minority shareholding affords the target to exercise control over the target, they do currently not have to be notified to the European Commission under EU merger regime. However, economic research has long suggested that when linking competing or non-horizontally positioned undertakings particularly in industries with few competitors, minority shareholdings even far below the majority of shares or voting rights could lead to higher prices or lower output volumes to the detriment of consumers. The Commission has recognized this issue and proceeded to suggest an extension of the merger regime to catch also certain non-controlling minority acquisitions. Horizontal non-controlling minority shareholdings create a positive correlation between the sales revenues of the partial acquirer and target. Through the equity interest the acquirer will internalise a fraction, proportional to the financial rights attached to the shareholding, of the profit of the target. This will incentivise the acquirer to contribute to increasing the target’s business profits by increasing its own sales price (horizontal unilateral effects). When a minority stake is held in a vertically related or a conglomerate company, the minority acquirer could be allowed to hamper or eliminate the target’s rivals’ access either to inputs (input foreclosure) or customers (customer foreclosure), depending on which level of the supply chain the parties are (vertical unilateral effects). Under certain circumstances minority share acquisitions could also lessen competition because they facilitate collusion between companies active in the market (coordinated effects). Economic theory confirms that non-controlling minority shareholdings may under certain circumstances create anti-competitive effects that are unlikely to be remedies by pro-competitive effects. However, they are likely to be of less significant nature than anticompetitive effects created by full mergers. This derives fore mostly from the fact that a minority share acquirer carries all the costs associated with its unilateral action but will internalise only a fraction of the lost profits. This is likely to limit the acquirer’s incentive to raise price and the profitability of such behavior. Having in mind that the number of potentially problematic cases is expected to be next to negligible, the limited potential competitive effects of non-controlling minority share acquisitions cannot be seen to clearly merit extension of the scope of the EUMR. The system suggested by the Commission is particularly ill-fitted for such purpose given the clear lack of legal certainty and considerable administrative burden associated with it.