10 resultados para Imaginary wars and battles.
em Doria (National Library of Finland DSpace Services) - National Library of Finland, Finland
Resumo:
The wars the Western armies are involved with today are different from those that were fought in the end of 20th century. To explain this change, the Western military thinkers have come up with various different types of definitions of warfare over the last 30 years, each describing the tendencies involved in the conflicts of the time. The changing nature of conflicts surfaced a new term – hybrid warfare. The term was to describe and explain the multi-modality and complexity of modern day conflict. This thesis seeks the answer for the question: what is the development of thought behind hybrid warfare? In this thesis the Vietnam War (1965-1975) is used as an example of compound warfare focusing on the American involvement in the war. The Second Lebanon War (2006) serves as an example of hybrid warfare. Both case studies include an irregular opposing force, namely National Liberation Front in Vietnam War and Hezbollah in the Second Lebanon War. These two case studies are compared with the term full spectrum operations introduced in the current U.S. Department of Army Field Manual No. 3-0 Operations to see the differences and similarities of each term. The perspective of this thesis is the American point of view. This thesis concludes that hybrid warfare, compound warfare and full spectrum operations are very similar. The first two terms are included in the last one. Although hybrid warfare is not officially defined, it will most likely remain to be used in the discussion in the future, since hybrid wars and hybrid threats are officially accepted terms.
Resumo:
From Bildung to Civilisation. Conception of Culture in J. V. Snellman’s Historical Thinking The research explores Johan Vilhelm Snellman’s (1806–1881) conception of culture in the context of his historical thinking. Snellman was a Finnish, Swedish-speaking journalist, teacher and thinker, who held a central position in the Finnish national discourse during the nineteenth century. He has been considered as one of the leading theorists of a Finnish nation, writing widely about the themes such as the advancement of the national education, Finnish language and culture. Snellman is already a widely studied person in Finnish intellectual history, often characterised as a follower of G. W. F. Hegel’s philosophical system. My own research introduces a new kind of approach on Snellman’s texts, emphasising the conceptual level of his thought. With this approach, my aim is to broaden the Finnish research tradition on conceptual history. I consider my study as a cultural history of concepts, belonging also to the field of intellectual history. My focus is on one hand on the close reading of Snellman’s texts and on the other hand on contextualising his texts to the European intellectual tradition of the time. A key concept of Snellman’s theoretical thinking is his concept of bildning, which can be considered as a Swedish counterpart of the German concept of Bildung. The Swedish word incorporated all the main elements of the German concept. It could mean education or the so-called high culture, but most fundamentally it was about the self-formation of the individual. This is also the context in which Snellman’s concept of bildning has often been interpreted. In the study, I use the concept of bildning as a starting point of my research but I broaden my focus on the cognate concepts such as culture (kultur), spirit (anda) and civilisation. The purpose of my study is thus to illustrate how Snellman used and modified these concepts and from these observations to draw a conclusion about the nature of his conception of culture. Snellman was an early Finnish philosopher of history but also interested in the practice of the writing of history. He did not write any historical presentations himself but followed the publications in the field of history and introduced European historical writing to the Finnish, Swedish-speaking reading audience in his newspapers. The primary source material consists of different types of Snellman’s texts, including philosophical writings, lecture material, newspaper articles and private letters. I’m reading Snellman’s texts in the context of other texts produced both by his Finnish predecessors and contemporaries and by Swedish, German and French writers. Snellman’s principal philosophical works, Versuch einer spekulativen Entwicklung der Idee der Persönlichkeit (1841) and Läran om staten (1842), were both written abroad. Both of the works were contributions to contemporary debates on the international level, especially in Germany and Sweden. During the 1840s and 1850s Snellman had two newspapers of his own, Saima and Litteraturblad, which were directed towards the Swedish-speaking educated class. Both of the newspapers were very popular and their circulations were among the largest of their day in Finland. The topics of his articles and reviews covered literature, poetry, philosophy and education as well as issues concerning the economic, industrial and technical development in Finland. In his newspapers Snellman not only brought forth his own ideas but also spread the knowledge of European events and ideas to his readers. He followed very carefully the cultural and political situation in Western Europe. He also followed European magazines and newspapers and was well acquainted with German, French and also English literature – and of course Swedish literature to with which he had the closest ties. In his newspapers Snellman wrote countless number of literary reviews and critics, introducing his readers to European literature. The study consists of three main chapters in which I explore my research question in three different, yet overlapping contexts. In the first of these chapters, I analyse Snellman’n theoretical thinking and his concepts of bildning, kultur, anda and civilisation in the context of earlier cultural discourse in Finland as well as the tradition of German idealistic philosophy and neo-humanism. With the Finnish cultural discourse I refer to the early cultural discussion in Finland, which emerged after the year 1809, when Finland became an autonomous entity of its own as a Grand Duchy of Russia. Scholars of the Academy of Turku opened a discussion on the themes such as the state of national consciousness, the need for national education and the development of the Finnish language as a national language of Finland. Many of these academics were also Snellman’s teachers in the early years of his academic career and Snellman clearly formulated his own ideas in the footsteps of these Finnish predecessors. In his theoretical thinking Snellman was a collectivist; according to him an individual should always be understood in connection with the society, its values and manners, as well as to the traditions of a culture where an individual belongs to. In his philosophy of the human spirit Snellman was in many ways a Hegelian but his notion of education or ‘bildning’ includes also elements that connect him with the wider tradition of German intellectual history, namely the neo-humanist tradition and, at least to some extent, to the terminology of J. G. Herder or J. G. Fichte, for example. In this chapter, I also explore Snellman’s theory of history. In his historical thinking Snellman was an idealist, believing in the historical development of the human spirit (Geist in German language). One can characterise his theory of history by stating that it is a mixture of a Hegelian triumph of the spirit and Herderian emphasis on humanity (Humanität) and the relative nature of ‘Bildung’. For Snellman, the process of ‘bildning’ or ‘Bildung’ is being realised in historical development through the actions of human beings. Snellman believed in the historical development of the human civilization. Still Snellman himself considered that he had abandoned Hegel’s idea about the process of world history. Snellman – rightly or wrongly – criticised Hegel of emphasising the universal end of history (the realisation of the freedom of spirit) at the expense of the historical plurality and the freedom of each historical era. Snellman accused Hegel of neglecting the value and independency of different historical cultures and periods by imposing the abstract norm, the fulfilment of the freedom of spirit, as the ultimate goal of history. The historicist in Snellman believed in the individuality of each historical period; each historical era or culture had values, traditions and modes of thought of its own. This historicist in Snellman could not accept the talk about one measure or the end of history. On the other hand Snellman was also a universalist. He believed that mankind had a common task and that task was the development of ‘Bildung’, freedom or humanity. The second main chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, I explore the Finnish nationalistic discourse from the cultural point of view by analysing the notions such as a nation, national spirit or national language and showing how Snellman formulated his own ideas in a dialogic situation, participating in the Finnish discourse but also reacting to international discussions on the themes of the nation and nationality. For Snellman nationality was to a great extent the collective knowledge and customs or practices of the nation. Snellman stated that nationality is to be considered as a form of ‘bildning’. This could be seen not simply as affection for the fatherland but also for the mental identity of the nation, its ways of thinking, its practices, national language, customs and laws, the history of the nation. The simplest definition of nationality that Snellman gives is that nationality is the social life of the people. In the second part of the chapter I exam Snellman’s historical thinking and his understanding about historical development, interaction between different nations and cultures in the course of history, as well as the question of historical change; how do cultures or civilisations develop and who are the creators of culture? Snellman did not believe in one dominating culture but understood the course of history as a dialogue between different cultures. On the other hand, his views are very Eurocentric – here he follows the ideas of Hegel or for example the French historian François Guizot – for Snellman Europe represented the virtue of pluralism; in Europe one could see the diversity of cultures which, on the other hand, were fundamentally based on a common Christian tradition. In the third main chapter, my focus is on the writing of history, more precisely on Snellman’s ideas on the nature of history as a science and on the proper way of writing historical presentations. Snellman wrote critics on the works of history and introduced his readers to the writing of history especially in France, Sweden and German-speaking area – in some extend also in Britain. Snellman’s collectivistic view becomes evident also in his reviews on historical writing. For Snellman history was not about the actions of the states and their heads, nor about the records of ruling families and battles fought. He repeatedly stressed that history is a discipline that seeks to provide a total view of a phenomenon. A historian should not only collect information on historical events, since this information touches only the surface of a certain epoch or civilisation; he has to understand an epoch as totality. This required an understanding about the major contours in history, connections between civilisations and an awareness of significant turning points in historical development. In addition, it required a holistic understanding about a certain culture or historical era, including also the so-called inner life of a specific nation, a common people and their ways of life. Snellman wrote explicitly about ‘cultural history’ in his texts, referring to this kind of broad understanding of a society. In historical writing Snellman found this kind of broader view from the works of the French historians such as François Guizot and Jules Michelet. In all of these chapters, I elaborate the conceptual dimension of Snellman’s historical thinking. In my study I argue that Snellman not only adopted the German concepts of Bildung or Kultur in his own thinking but also developed the Swedish concepts in a way that include personal and innovative aspects. Snellman’s concept of bildning is not only a translation from ‘Bildung’ but he uses the Swedish concept in a versatile way that includes both the moral aspect of human development and social dimension of a human life. Along with ‘bildning’ Snellman used also the terms ‘kultur’ and ‘civilisation’ when referring to the totality of a certain nation or historical era, including both the so-called high culture (arts, science, religion) and the modes of thought as well as ways of life of the people as a whole. Unlike many of his Finnish contemporaries, Snellman did not use civilisation as a negative concept, lacking the moral essence of German term ‘Bildung’ or ‘Kultur’. Instead, for Snellman civilisation was a neutral term and here he comes close to the French tradition of using the term. In the study I argue that Snellman’s conception of culture in fact includes a synthesis of the German tradition of ‘Bildung’ and the French tradition of ‘civilisation’.
Resumo:
This study deals with the development of military tactics in Finland from independence to the early 1950s. The research is divided into three periods: the time before the Winter and Continuation wars and the time after the wars. Based mainly on archive sources each period and subject is dealt with in chronological order. The objective was to study the development features in Finnish tactics and the foreign impact on its development. Before the Winter War, offence was regarded as the only course of action that could redress the balance of power in a possible war against the Soviet Union. Defence lacked the depth considered essential in European thinking because the troops were few and the heavily forested terrain prevented the deployment of automatic weapons in echelon. Delaying action was most clearly based on Finnish concepts. Between the world wars, Finnish tactics was very pan-European. Mainly through German influence, the overall thinking followed the emphases of the international mainstream with many influences from other European countries, mainly from Sweden. However, the principles of the mainstream were adapted to suit the circumstances and position of Finland. The short Winter War against the Soviet Union proved that Finnish tactics was on the right track in its basic principles. During the Continuation War it was determined that tactical thinking could not rely solely on offence, but should be based to a greater extent on terms dictated by defensive tactics. During the static phase of the Continuation War, Finland did not receive adequate intelligence on the advances in the offensive capabilities of the Soviet Union. This was why defence tactics was influenced by German combat experiences against the Red Army. In repelling the massive Soviet attack, the use of deeper echelons was adopted as the basic principle in Finland. After the war, the East - West confrontation put Finland in a totally new position. Because combat deep inside Finnish territory in future war seemed probable, Finland adopted a doctrine of territorial defence. Army tactics expanded to more effectively include combat on the coast, in centers of population and in the northern areas of the country. The years after the wars had very little effect on Finnish tactics: development of defence tactics continued further toward defence in depth as a combat model. During the period of the present study, Finnish tactics developed from mainly offensive thinking to emphasizing defensive combat.
Resumo:
Kirjallisuusarvostelu
Resumo:
Added engraved title page: The history of Lapland.
Resumo:
Military conscription and peacetime military service were the subjects of heated political, social and cultural controversies during the early years of national independence in Finland. Both the critics and the supporters of the existing military system described it as strongly formative of young men’s physical and moral development into adult men and male citizens. The conflicts over conscription prompted the contemporaries to express their notions about what Finnish men were like, at their best and at their worst, and what should and could be done about it. This thesis studies military conscription as an arena for the “making of manhood” in peacetime Finnish society, 1918–1939. It examines a range of public images of conscripted soldiering, asking how soldiering was depicted and given gendered meanings in parliamentary debates, war hero myths, texts concerned with the military and civic education of conscripts, as well as in works of fiction and reminiscences about military training as a personal experience. Studying conscription with a focus on masculinity, the thesis explores the different cultural images of manliness, soldiering and male citizenship on offer in Finnish society. It investigates how political parties, officers, educators, journalists, writers and “ordinary” conscripts used and developed, embraced or rejected these notions, according to their political purposes or personal needs. The period between the two world wars can be described as a fast-forward into military modernity in Finland. In the process, European middle class gender ideologies clashed with Finnish agrarian masculinities. Nationalistic agendas for the militarisation of Finnish manhood stumbled against intense class conflicts and ideological resistance. Military propaganda used images of military heroism, civic virtue and individual success to persuade the conscripts into ways of thinking and acting that were shaped by bourgeois mentality, nationalistic ideology and religious morality. These images are further analysed as expressive of the personal experiences and emotions of their middle-aged, male authors. The efforts of these military educators were, however, actively resisted on many fronts, ranging from rural working class masculinities among the conscripted young men to ideological critiques of the standing army system in parliament. In narratives about military training, masculinity was depicted as both strengthened and contradicted by the harsh and even brutal practices of interwar Finnish military training. The study represents a combination of new military history and the historical study of men and masculinities. It approaches masculinity as a contested and highly political form of social and cultural knowledge that is actively and selectively used by historic actors. Instead of trying to identify a dominant or “hegemonic” form of masculinity within a pre-determined theoretical structure, this study examines how the meanings ascribed to manhood varied according to class, age, political ideology and social situation. The interwar period in Finland can be understood as a period of contest between different notions of militarised masculinity, yet to judge by the materials studied, there was no clear winning party in that contest. A gradual movement from an atmosphere of conflict surrounding conscription towards political and cultural compromises can be discerned, yet this convergence was incomplete and many division lines remained.
Resumo:
The experiences of the United States Armed Forces of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War resulted a new term to surface called “hybrid warfare”. It was to describe the complexity of today’s battlefield. The term “hy-brid warfare” was never officially defined nor is it today. The updated version of the US ARMY Field Manual 3-0: Operations (Change 1) from February 22, 2011, introduced and defined “hybrid threat” and thus opened the discussion for hybrid adversary. In this thesis a model is introduced according to which any organization, group or an ad-versary can be examined and evaluated to see whether it qualifies as a hybrid adversary. It is demonstrated by the example of Hezbollah, which is recognized as the best example of an organization utilizing “hybrid warfare” and subsequently categorizing as a hybrid adver-sary. The model will be tested with Afghan Taliban to see whether both the model works and Taliban qualifies as a hybrid adversary or not. According to the model used in this thesis, it is concluded that Taliban does not meet the standards of a hybrid adversary, but with acquisition of standoff weapons it would quickly qualify as one. The model proved to work, and it could be used as a tool by intelligence of-ficers for estimating the threat levels of any group or identifying those groups that are al-ready or are about to develop into a hybrid adversary.
Resumo:
Sosialistisen vallankumouksen jälkeen Neuvosto-Venäjän oli monien muiden kysymysten ohella ratkaistava sosialismin saavutusten puolustaminen. Aluksi ratkaisuksi suunniteltiin vapaaehtoisuuteen perustuvaa punakaartia, mutta riittävän miesvahvuuden turvaamiseksi päädyttiin yleiseen asevelvollisuuteen. Pian Venäjän sisällissodan jälkeen sotataidon suunta painottui enemmän vanhan armeijan asiantuntijoiden näkemysten kuin vallankumoussankarien kokemusten mukaiseksi, vaikka Frunzen puna-armeijalle kirjoittama doktriini perustui luokkataisteluun ja korosti sisällissodassa hyväksi koettua operatiivista liikkuvuutta. Neuvostoliiton ja Venäjän sotataidon perustana on Pietari I:n aloittama länsimainen suuntaus, jota kuitenkin täydentävät vahvat kansalliset piirteet. Venäläisen sotataidon henkisenä isänä voidaan hyvällä syyllä pitää Aleksandr Suvorovia, jonka opetukset näkyvät tekstilainausten lisäksi myös periaatteissa ja sotilaskasvatuksessa. Napoleonin sotien jälkeen perustettu Keisarillinen yleisesikunta-akatemia loi Venäjälle sotatieteellisen tutkimuksen ja opetuksen. Sotatieteen mahdollisuuksia ei 1800-luvun Venäjällä osattu täysin hyödyntää. Aseistuksen kasvavan tehon merkitystä vähättelevä asenne johti sotataidon taantumisen ja katastrofiin Venäjän–Japanin sodassa. Sen kokemuksia analysoidessaan Aleksandr Neznamov kehitti edelleen saksalaista operaation käsitettä ja loi perustan Neuvostoliitossa 1920-luvulla kehitetylle operaatiotaidolle. Neuvostoliittolaisen sotataidon päämääränä oli kehittää taktinen ja operatiivinen ratkaisu aseistuksen tehon kasvun aikaansaamaan puolustuksen ylivoimaisuuteen. Ratkaisussa hyödynnettiin brittien kokemuksia ja tutkimusta. Neuvostoliittolainen taktiikka ja operaatiotaito eivät kuitenkaan olleet brittiläisen mekanisoidun sodankäynnin tai saksalaisen salamasodan itäinen kopioita vaan itsenäisiin ratkaisuihin pohjautuvia. Syvän taistelun ja operaation teoriaa kokeiltiin harjoituksissa, ja sitä kehitettiin Stalinin vuoden 1937 puhdistuksiin saakka. Toisen maailmansodan taisteluissa puna-armeija sovelsi alkuvaiheen katastrofin jälkeen syvän taistelun ja syvän operaation oppeja. Komentajien ja joukkojen taito ei riittänyt teorian vaatimusten mukaiseen toimintaan, siksi syväksi aiotusta taistelusta tuli ajoittain ainoastaan tiheää. Suuren isänmaallisen sodan kokemusten perusteella neuvostoliittolainen sotatiede kehitti yleisjoukkojen taistelun periaatteet, jotka ovat säilyneet muuttumattomina nykypäivään saakka. Kylmän sodan aikakaudella ydin- ja tavanomaisen aseistuksen merkitys sodan ja taistelun kuvassa vaihteli. Lännen sotataidon ja aseteknologian kehitys pakotti Neuvostoliiton siirtymään 1980-luvulla sotilaallisessa ajattelussaan hyökkäyksestä puolustukseen. Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen Venäjän sotilaallisen turvallisuuden takaajana on ydinaseistus. Yhdysvaltain tavanomainen ilma-avaruushyökkäyskyky vaatii Venäjää kehittämään torjuntajärjestelmiä. Tavanomaisten joukkojen rakentamisessa Venäjä seuraa tarkasti läntisen sotataidon kehittymistä, mutta pitäytyy omaperäisiin ratkaisuihin, joiden kehittämisessä sen vahvalla sotatieteellisellä järjestelmällä ja dialektisen materialismin metodilla on edelleen olennaisen tärkeä merkitys.
Resumo:
Merisodassa tapahtunut muutos – erityisesti konevoiman syrjäyttäessä purjeet ja raudan korvatessa puumateriaalin 1800-luvun loppupuolella – johti nykypäivänäkin merkittäviin merisodan teoreettisiin tarkasteluihin. Teorioihin pohjautuneet merisotataidon yleisperiaatteet saivat ensimmäisen maailmansodan aikana käytännön testauksensa. Voittajat ja häviäjät analysoivat taistelut sekä maailmalla vallinneen ripeän teknisen kehityksen, minkä seurauksena laivastojen varustelu kiihtyi uudestaan valtapolitiikan tueksi. Maailmansotien välisenä aikana pyrittiin kansainvälisin sopimuksin säätelemään suurten laivastojen, kuten Britannian, Ranskan, Italian, Japanin ja Yhdysvaltojen varustelukilpailua. Versaillesin rauhansopimus rajoitti samanaikaisesti Saksan merivoimien kokoa. Tässä työssä tutkitaan Britannian ja Saksan merivoimien varustelua ja merisotataidon kehittymistä maailmansotien välisenä aikana. Merisotataidon kehittymisen tarkastelu tapahtuu postimerkkien avulla. Postimerkki syntyi Englannissa vuonna 1840 ja sen käyttö yleistyi ympäri maailman lähes samanaikaisesti konevoimaa käyttäneiden laivojen kanssa. Postimerkkien kuva-aiheet olivat aluksi valtioiden päämiehiä, heraldiikkaa, maisemia tai abstrakteja aiheita. Vasta 1900-luvun alkupuolella kuva-aiheina saattoi olla lähes mitä vain, myös sotalaivojen kuvia. Postimerkkikokoelmastani erottuu tutkimusaiheeseen 335 merkkiä. Britannian ja Saksan kansallisarkistojen alkuperäislähteiden ja tutkimuskirjallisuuden dokumenttianalyysiin perustuvaa merisotataidon moninaista kehitystä verrataan tutkimuksessani postimerkkien kuva-aiheisiin ja niiden yksityiskohtiin 3 300 kertaa. Tällä menettelyllä pyrin selvittämään voiko postimerkkejä käyttää ja pitää merisotaidon kehityksen kattavina dokumentteina. Postimerkeissä satunnaisiksi jääneet virheet tai propaganda eivät vähennä merisotataidon kehityksen kuvaamisen dokumenttiarvoa. Postimerkkien sotalaivoihin liittyvät kuvat kattavat muutamaa laivaluokkaa lukuunottamatta molempien maiden kaikki taistelualuslajit- ja luokat. Postimerkeistä voidaan nähdä vanhat sotalaivat, niiden peruskorjaukset ja uudet luokat lentotukialuksista sukellusveneisiin. Alusten kuvat voidaan liittää Britannian kansainyhteisön muuttuneisiin strategisiin ja taktisiin tavoitteisiin niin Atlantilla kuin Kaukoidässä. Saksan merivoimien nousu Versaillesin rauhanehtojen rajoituksista ja lopulta pyrkimys Britannian kauppamerenkulun tuhoajaksi välittyy myös postimerkeistä. Yleinen sotatekninen kehitys, lentoneiden tulo merisotanäyttämölle ja aikanaan kansainvälisten tonnistorajoitusten poistuminen näkyvät postimerkeissä. Kokopostimerkin historian aikana vuoteen 2012 mennessä purjeettomien, nykyaikaisten sotalaivojen kuvia on julkaistu noin 3 350 postimerkillä, jotka on koottu Maailman suurin laivasto-osasto -postimerkkikokoelmaani noin 35 vuoden aikana