Information Content of Bank Credit Rating Changes: Evidence from Europe

This thesis examines the short-term impact of credit rating announcements on daily stock returns of 41 European banks indexed in STOXX Europe 600 Banks. The time period of this study is 2002–2015 and the ratings represent long-term issuer ratings provided by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch. Bank ratings are significant for a bank’s operation costs so it is interesting to investigate how investors react to changes in creditworthiness. The study objective is achieved by conducting an event study. The event study is extended with a cross-sectional linear regression to investigate other potential determinants surrounding rating changes. The research hypotheses and the motivation for additional tests are derived from prior research. The main hypotheses are formed to explore whether rating changes have an effect on stock returns, when this possible reaction occurs and whether it is asymmetric between upgrades and downgrades. The findings provide evidence that rating announcements have an impact on stock returns in the context of European banks. The results also support the existence of an asymmetry in capital market reaction to rating upgrades and downgrades. The rating downgrades are associated with statistically significant negative abnormal returns on the event day although the reaction is rather modest. No statistically significant reaction is found associated with the rating upgrades on the event day. These results hold true with both rating changes and rating watches. No anticipation is observed in the case of rating changes but there is a statistically significant cumulative negative (positive) price reaction occurring before the event day for negative (positive) watch announcements. The regression provides evidence that the stock price reaction is stronger for rating downgrades occurring within below investment grade class compared with investment grade class. This is intuitive as investors are more concerned about their investments in lower-rated companies. Besides, the price reaction of larger banks is more mitigated compared with smaller banks in the case of rating downgrades. The reason for this may be that larger banks are usually more widely followed by the public. However, the study results may also provide evidence of the existence of the so-called “too big to fail” subsidy that dampens the negative returns of larger banks.

Compulsory licensing of standard-essential patents and injunctive relief as abuse of dominant position in violation of Article 102 TFEU

When a dominant undertaking holding a standard-essential patent uses its exclusive right to the IP to seek injunctions against those wishing to produce either de jure or de facto standard compliant products, it creates a conflict between the exclusive right to the use of the IP on the one hand and the possible abuse of dominance due to the exclusionary conduct on the other. The aim of the thesis is to focus on the issues concerning abuse of dominance in violation of Article 102 TFEU when the holder of the standard-essential patent seeks an injunction against a would-be licensee. The thesis is mainly based on the most recent ECJ case law in Huawei and the Commission’s recent decisions in Samsung and Motorola. The case law in Europe prior to those decisions was mainly focused on the German case law from Orange Book Standard which provided IP holders great leverage due to the almost automatic granting of injunctions against infringers. The ECJ in Huawei set out the requirements for when a de jure standard-essential patent holder would not be violating Article 102 TFEU when seeking an injunction, requiring that negotiations in good faith must take place prior to the seeking of the injunction and that all offers must comply with FRAND terms, thus limiting the scope of case law derived from Orange Book Standard in Germany. The ECJ chose not to follow all of the reasoning the Commission had laid out in Samsung and Motorola which provided a more licensee-friendly approach on the matter, but rather chose a compromise between the IP holder friendly German case law and the Commission’s decisions. However, the ECJ did not disclose how FRAND terms themselves should be interpreted, but rather left it for the national courts to decide. Furthermore, the thesis strongly argues that Huawei did not change the fact that only vertically integrated IP holders who have made a FRAND declaration are subject to the terms laid out in Huawei, thus leaving non-practicing entities such as patent trolls and entities that have not made a FRAND declaration outside its scope. The resulting conclusion from the thesis is that while the ECJ in Huawei presented new exceptional circumstances for when an IP holder could be abusing its dominant position when it seeks an injunction, it still left many more questions answered, such as the meaning of FRAND and whether deception in giving a FRAND declaration is prohibited under Article 102 TFEU or not.