Lectio praecursoria: Environmental policy evaluation concepts exemplified in the context of the European Unions strategy for better regulation

Lectio praecursoria 3.2.2006 Tampereen yliopisto

Professional sports and gambling regulation in Finland - Examining the institutional factors of gambling affecting professional sport clubs in Finland

This study examines how to institutional environment of gambling is currently in motion both in Europe and Finland. Furthermore, it examines the criticism by Finnish professional sport clubs directed towards the national gambling monopolies, especially Veikkaus Oy. This criticism addresses the acclaimed issue of low or non-existing sponsorship funds coming to the clubs despite the clubs’ duties to promote Veikkaus Oy in their stadiums etc. In essence the main research objective was to examine the interaction and institutional environments of both Finnish professional sport clubs and gambling regulation. This was done through three sub-objectives: 1) to analyze professional sport as business and its institutional environment 2) to analyze the institutions of gambling in their current state and their potential future 3) to evaluate the potential impact of an institutional change in gambling legislation to the professional sport clubs The findings from Finland were then compared to those of Denmark where an institutional change had occurred in gambling regulation. Empirical data was collected through multiple interviews. Interviewees represented sport clubs (7), sport association (1), sport league (1), Finnish monopoly representatives (2), commercial gambling providers (1), Danish monopoly system representatives (1), Danish sport club (1). In addition a vast amount of secondary data (e.g. Green and white books by EU, court decisions, a variety of studies etc.). Theoretically this study combines the aspects of institutional theory with the theory of professional sports as business. This proved to be a rather new approach and no published literature was found to have done specifically this. The findings of this study are twofold, on the European level it is clear that the momentum if towards a more liberated gambling market while Finland is at the moment trying to go the opposite direction and uphold its monopoly. From the sport club’s level the findings suggest that currently sport clubs do not directly benefit from the funds originated from Veikkaus Oy as these funds are more or less used on the association/league levels. However, the clubs themselves are also lacking in self-criticism as they are lacking in clear sponsorship packages/programs which Veikkaus Oy might be interested in participating. If liberation of the gambling market would occur it is highly possible that that the largest clubs in football and ice-hockey would be the main beneficiaries while smaller clubs and sports could possibly be worse off than currently. These interpretations were well supported by the findings from Denmark.

Competitive Effects of Non-Controlling Minority Acquisitions – Sufficient to merit further EU merger regulation?

Partial ownership interests are a widespread phenomenon in modern corporate environment. Unless minority shareholding affords the target to exercise control over the target, they do currently not have to be notified to the European Commission under EU merger regime. However, economic research has long suggested that when linking competing or non-horizontally positioned undertakings particularly in industries with few competitors, minority shareholdings even far below the majority of shares or voting rights could lead to higher prices or lower output volumes to the detriment of consumers. The Commission has recognized this issue and proceeded to suggest an extension of the merger regime to catch also certain non-controlling minority acquisitions. Horizontal non-controlling minority shareholdings create a positive correlation between the sales revenues of the partial acquirer and target. Through the equity interest the acquirer will internalise a fraction, proportional to the financial rights attached to the shareholding, of the profit of the target. This will incentivise the acquirer to contribute to increasing the target’s business profits by increasing its own sales price (horizontal unilateral effects). When a minority stake is held in a vertically related or a conglomerate company, the minority acquirer could be allowed to hamper or eliminate the target’s rivals’ access either to inputs (input foreclosure) or customers (customer foreclosure), depending on which level of the supply chain the parties are (vertical unilateral effects). Under certain circumstances minority share acquisitions could also lessen competition because they facilitate collusion between companies active in the market (coordinated effects). Economic theory confirms that non-controlling minority shareholdings may under certain circumstances create anti-competitive effects that are unlikely to be remedies by pro-competitive effects. However, they are likely to be of less significant nature than anticompetitive effects created by full mergers. This derives fore mostly from the fact that a minority share acquirer carries all the costs associated with its unilateral action but will internalise only a fraction of the lost profits. This is likely to limit the acquirer’s incentive to raise price and the profitability of such behavior. Having in mind that the number of potentially problematic cases is expected to be next to negligible, the limited potential competitive effects of non-controlling minority share acquisitions cannot be seen to clearly merit extension of the scope of the EUMR. The system suggested by the Commission is particularly ill-fitted for such purpose given the clear lack of legal certainty and considerable administrative burden associated with it.

Effects of bank supervision and regulation on bank risk

In the last few decades, banking has strongly internationalized and become more complex. Hence, bank supervision and regulation has taken global perspective, too. The most important international regulation are the Basel frameworks by the Basel committee on banking supervision. This study examines the effects of bank supervision and regulation, especially the Basel II, on bank risk and risk-taking. In order to separate and recognize the efficiency of these effects, the co-effects of many supervisory and regulatory tools together with other relevant factors must be taken into account. The focus of the study is on the effects of asymmetric information and banking procyclicality on the efficiency of the Basel II. This study tries to find an answer, if the Basel II, implemented in 2008, has decreased bank risk in banks of European Union member states. This study examines empirically, if the volatility on bank stock returns have changed after the implementation of the Basel II. Panel data consists of 62 bank stock returns, bank-specific variables, economic variables and variables concerning regulatory environment between 2003 and 2011. Fixed effects regression is used for panel data analysis. Results indicate that volatility on bank stock returns has increased after 2008 and the implementation of the Basel II. Result is statistically very significant and robustness has been verified in different model specifications. The result of this study contradicts with the goal of the Basel II about banking system stability. Banking procyclicality and wrong incentives for regulatory arbitrage under asymmetric information explained in theoretical part may explain this result. On the other hand, simultaneously with the implementation of the Basel II, the global financial crisis emerged and caused severe losses in banks and increased stock volatility. However, it is clear that supervision and regulation was unable to prevent the global financial crisis. After the financial crisis, supervision and regulation have been reformed globally. The main problems of the Basel II, examined in the theoretical part, have been recognized in order to prevent problems of procyclicality and wrong incentives in the future.