15 resultados para Desert warfare
em Doria (National Library of Finland DSpace Services) - National Library of Finland, Finland
Resumo:
The wars the Western armies are involved with today are different from those that were fought in the end of 20th century. To explain this change, the Western military thinkers have come up with various different types of definitions of warfare over the last 30 years, each describing the tendencies involved in the conflicts of the time. The changing nature of conflicts surfaced a new term – hybrid warfare. The term was to describe and explain the multi-modality and complexity of modern day conflict. This thesis seeks the answer for the question: what is the development of thought behind hybrid warfare? In this thesis the Vietnam War (1965-1975) is used as an example of compound warfare focusing on the American involvement in the war. The Second Lebanon War (2006) serves as an example of hybrid warfare. Both case studies include an irregular opposing force, namely National Liberation Front in Vietnam War and Hezbollah in the Second Lebanon War. These two case studies are compared with the term full spectrum operations introduced in the current U.S. Department of Army Field Manual No. 3-0 Operations to see the differences and similarities of each term. The perspective of this thesis is the American point of view. This thesis concludes that hybrid warfare, compound warfare and full spectrum operations are very similar. The first two terms are included in the last one. Although hybrid warfare is not officially defined, it will most likely remain to be used in the discussion in the future, since hybrid wars and hybrid threats are officially accepted terms.
Resumo:
We live in an age where rationalization and demands of efficiency taint every aspect of our lives both as individuals and as a society. Even warfare cannot escape the increased speed of human interaction. Time is a resource to be managed. It has to be optimized, saved and won in military affairs as well. The purpose of this research paper is to analyze the dogmatic texts of military thought to search for answers what the classics of strategy saw in the interrelations of temporality and warfare and if their thoughts remain meaningful in the contemporary conjunction. Since the way a society functions is reflected in the way it conducts its wars, there naturally are differences between an agrarian, industrial and information society. Theorists of different eras emphasize things specific to their times, but warfare, like any human interaction, is always bounded by temporality. Not only is the pace of warfare dependent on the progress of the society, but time permeates warfare in all its aspects. This research paper focuses on two specific topics that arose from the texts themselves; how should time be managed and manipulated in warfare and how to economize and “win” it from the enemy. A method where lengthy quotations are used to illustrate the main point of the strategists has been chosen for this research paper. While Clausewitz is the most prominent source of quotations, thoughts from ancient India and China are represented as well to prove that the combination of right force in the right place at the right time is still the way of the victorious. Tactics change in the course of time but the principles of strategy remain unaltered and are only adapted to suit new situations. While ancient and pre-modern societies had their focus on finding auspicious moments for battle in the flow of kronos-time based on divinities, portents and auguries, we can trace elements of manipulation of time in warfare from the earliest surviving texts. While time as a fourth dimension of the battlespace emerged only in the modern era, all through the history of military thought it has had a profound meaning. In the past time could be squandered, today it always has to be won. This paper asks the question “why”.
Resumo:
A postgraduate seminar series with a title Cyber Warfare held at the Department of Military Technology of the National Defence University in the fall of 2012. This book is a collection of some of talks that were presented in the seminar. The papers address computer network defence in military cognitive networks, computer network exploitation, non-state actors in cyberspace operations, offensive cyber-capabilities against critical infrastructure and adapting the current national defence doctrine to cyber domain. This set of papers tries to give some insight to current issues of the cyber warfare. The seminar has always made a publication of the papers but this has been an internal publication of the Finnish Defence Forces and has not hindered publication of the papers in international conferences. Publication of these papers in peer reviewed conferences has indeed been always the goal of the seminar, since it teaches writing conference level papers. We still hope that an internal publication in the department series is useful to the Finnish Defence Forces by offering an easy access to these papers.
Resumo:
This is a sociological study of the views of officers in the Swedish Army and its Amphibious Forces on tactics in Irregular Warfare (IW), in particular, Counterinsurgency (COIN). IW comprises struggles, where the military weaker part uses an indirect approach with smaller units and integrates the civilian and military dimensions in a violence spectrum including subversion, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare and infantry actions. IW is the main armed warfare style in insurgencies. COIN is the combined political, military, economic, social and legal actions in counter insurgencies. Data has been collected by means of interviews with almost all (n =43) officers, who were either commanding battalions or rifle and manoeuvre companies while undergoing training for general warfare and international operations. The main theoretical and methodological inspiration is the traditional one for research on social fields, inaugurated by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. The statistical technique used is Multiple Correspondence Analysis. As a background and context base, an inquiry inspired by the Begriffsgechichte (Conceptual History) tradition explores the genesis and development of understandings of the term Irregular Warfare. The research question is outlined as; “how can contemporary Swedish military thought on tactics in Irregular Warfare be characterized using descriptive patterns, mapped in relation to background factors and normative standards? The most significant findings are that there are two main opposing notions separating the officers’ views on tactics in Irregular Warfare: (1) a focus on larger, combat oriented and collectively operating military units versus smaller and larger, more intelligence oriented and dispersed operating units, and (2) a focus on military tasks and kinetic effects versus military and civilian tasks as well as “soft” effects. The distribution of these views can be presented as a two-dimensional space structured by the two axes. This space represents four categories of tactics, partly diverging from normative military standards for Counterinsurgency. This social space of standpoints shows different structural tendencies for background factors of social and cultural character, particularly dominant concerning military backgrounds, international mission experiences and civilian education. Compared to military standards for Counterinsurgency, the two tactical types characterized by a Regular Warfare mind-set stands out as counter-normative. Signs of creative thought on military practice and theory, as well as a still persistent Regular Warfare doxa are apparent. Power struggles might thus develop, effecting the transformation to a broadened warfare culture with an enhanced focus also on Irregular Warfare. The result does not support research results arguing for a convergence of military thought in the European transformation of Armed Forces. The main argument goes beyond tactics and suggests sociological analysis on reciprocal effects regarding strategy, operational art, tactics as well as leadership, concerning the mind-set and preferences for Regular, Irregular and Hybrid Warfare.
Resumo:
Tutkielman nimi käännettynä suomeksi on Lentokoneiden omasuojajärjestelmien kyllästäminen – mahdollisuuksia kätkeytymiseen. Siinä keskitytään etsimään aktiivisia, ilmauhkaa kohti säteileviä keinoja ilmahyökkääjän, lentokoneen tai helikopterin, omasuojajärjestelmän harhauttamiseksi. Järjestelmät pyrkivät varoittamaan lentäjää laser- ja tutkasäteilyhavainnoista sekä ohjuksen laukaisusta ja lähestymisestä. Omasuojajärjestelmiin kuuluviin vastakeinoihin tutkimus ei keskity. Tavoitteena harhauttamisella on ilmapuolustuksen todellisen määrän ja sijainnin suojaaminen. Epätietoisuus voi saada lentäjän tekemään vääriä johtopäätöksiä. Työ ei fokusoi harhauttamisen taktiseen kehykseen työn kannalta tarpeellista määrää enempää. Tietosuojasyistä tutkimus ei käsittele käytössä olevien omasuojajärjestelmien operatiivisia ominaisuuksia vaan käsittelee teoriaa niiden taustalla. Tutkimus tehtiin käyttäen taustatutkimukselle enemmän tyypillistä kirjallisuustutkimusta. Jo tutki-muksen alkuvaiheessa oli oletettavaa, että elektronisiin sensoreihin perustuvaa omasuojajärjestelmää pystytään harhauttamaan. Systeemianalysoinnilla pyrittiin löytämään vastauksia tähän olettamukseen. Omasuojajärjestelmästä muodostettiin jo tutkimuksen varhaisessa vaiheessa malli. Tieteellistä kirjallisuutta omasuojajärjestelmistä on olemassa jonkin verran, ja niistä löydettyä tietoa omasuojajärjestelmien ominaisuuksista ja sensoreista yhdistettiin malliin niin, että siitä saatiin mahdollisimman tarkka systeemin kuvaus todellisesta omasuojajärjestelmästä. Analyysin tavoitteena oli löytää niitä kriteereitä, joilla omasuojajärjestelmä saataisiin kohtuullisen tehokkaasti uskomaan harhautusta oikeaksi hälytykseksi. Ohjuksen laukaisusta varoittava sensori perustuu ohjuksen moottorin muodostaman pilven lämpö-säteilyyn. Säteily kuitenkin muuttuu lennon eri vaiheissa, mikä tuottaa haasteita järjestelmälle. Millimetrialueen tutkan käyttö varoittimen sensorina on myös yksi vaihtoehto. Laser-varoittimet toimivat koko sillä taajuusalueella, mitä sotilaskäytössä tulenjohtamiseen ja ohjusten ohjaamiseen käytetään. Tutkavaroittimen tutkimus on vielä kesken. Löydettyjä tuloksia analysoimalla tulen tässä vaiheessa hieman ristiriitaisiin tuloksiin. Lämpösäteilyn käytön suurin haaste on sen eteneminen ilmakehässä. Varoittimen tavoitekaan ei ole toimia kymmentä kilometriä pidemmälle. Yksi mahdollinen ratkaisu on suunnitella ja toteuttaa raketti, jonka tuottaa lämpösäteilyä kuten tietty puolustavan joukon käytössä oleva ohjus. Jos koneessa on kuitenkin myös millimetrialueen tutka tukemassa varoitusjärjestelmää, hankaloituu rakettiharhautus merkittävästi, koska sen pitäisi oletettavasti olla lentokoneen kanssa melko tarkasti kohtaavalla reitillä. Laser-varoitin on ilmeisesti herkin järjestelmistä, koska se voi tietyissä olosuhteissa ja varsinkin matalalla lentokorkeudella aiheuttaa paljon vääriä hälytyksiä ilman tarkoituksellista harhauttamista. Laserin käyttö yhdistettynä raketin laukaisuun saattaisi tuottaa halutun tuloksen. Tutkavaroittimen harhautus onnistuu, jos valelaitteen signaali on uskottavan tarkka.
Resumo:
Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the War College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the War College.
Resumo:
Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the National Defence College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the National Defence College.