Loukatun suostumuksesta potilaan itsemääräämisoikeuteen

Ylänimeke: Oppirakennelmia ja periaatteita

Military crisis management in the next decade (2020-2030) : inducing consent or relying on compliance?

The most outstanding conceptual challenge of modern crisis management is the principle of consent. It is not a problem only at the operational level - it challenges the entire decision-making structures of crisis management operations. In post-cold war times and especially in the 21st century, there has been a transition from peacekeeping with limited size and scope towards large and complex peace operations. This shift has presented peace operations with a dilemma. How to balance between maintaining consent for peace operations, whilst being able to use military force to coerce those attempting to wreck peace processes? To address such a dilemma, this research aims to promote understanding, on what can be achieved by military crisis management operations (peace support operations) in the next decade. The research concentrates on the focal research question: Should military components induce consent or rely on the compliance of conflicting parties in crisis management operations of the next decade (2020 – 2030)? The focus is on military – political strategic level considerations, and especially on the time before political decisions to commit to a crisis management operation. This study does not focus on which actor or organisation should intervene. The framework of this thesis derives from the so called ‘peacebuilding space’, the scope of peace operations and spoiler theory. Feasibility of both peace enforcement and peacekeeping in countering future risk conditions are analysed in this framework. This future-orientated qualitative research uses the Delphi-method with a panel of national and international experts. Citation analysis supports identification of relevant reference material, which consists of contemporary literature, the Delphi-questionnaires and interviews. The research process followed three main stages. In the first stage, plausible future scenarios and risk conditions were identified with the Delphi-panel. In the second stage, operating environments for peace support operations were described and consequent hypotheses formulated. In the third stage, these hypotheses were tested on the Delphi-panel. The Delphi-panel is sufficiently wide and diverse to produce plausible yet different insights. The research design utilised specifically military crisis management and peace operations theories. This produced various and relevant normative considerations. Therefore, one may argue that this research; which is based on accepted contemporary theory, hypotheses derived thereof and utilising an expert panel, contributes to the realm of peace support operations. This research finds that some degree of peace enforcement will be feasible and necessary in at least the following risk conditions: failed governance; potential spillover of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict; vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces; as well as in territorial and extra-territorial border disputes. In addition, some form of peace enforcement is probably necessary in risk conditions pertaining to: extremism of marginalised groups; potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories; and interstate rivalry. Furthermore, this research finds that peacekeeping measures will be feasible and necessary in at least risk conditions pertaining to: potential spillover of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict; uncontrolled migration; consequences from environmental catastrophes or changes; territorial and extra-territorial border disputes; and potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories. These findings are all subject to both generic and case specific preconditions that must exist for a peace support operation. Some deductions could be derived from the research findings. Although some risk conditions may appear illogical, understanding the underlying logic of a conflict is fundamental to understanding transition in crisis management. Practitioners of crisis management should possess cognizance of such transition. They must understand how transition should occur from threat to safety, from conflict to stability – and so forth. Understanding transition is imperative for managing the dynamic evolution of preconditions, which begins at the outset of a peace support operation. Furthermore, it is pertinent that spoilers are defined from a peace process point of view. If spoilers are defined otherwise, it changes the nature of an operation towards war, where the logic is breaking the will of an enemy - and surrender. In peace support operations, the logic is different: actions towards spoilers are intended to cause transition towards consent - not defeat. Notwithstanding future developments, history continues to provide strategic education. However, the distinction is that the risk conditions occur in novel futures. Hence, lessons learned from the past should be fitted to the case at hand. This research shows compelling evidence that swaying between intervention optimism and pessimism is not substantiated. Both peace enforcement and peacekeeping are sine qua non for successful military crisis management in the next decade.

The TTIP, ISDS and the shift towards transparency in investor-state arbitration

The negotiations between the EU and the US over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have generated a lot of discussion about investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). This discussion provided the inspiration for this thesis, with the TTIP in the background, setting the scene. In this thesis I study the nature of ISDS and the principle of transparency within investor-state arbitration. I aim to determine whether the use of ISDS is restricted to international arbitration and whether ISDS can be considered to constitute a system or regime. Furthermore, I consider whether the introduction of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (2014, the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules) changes investor-state arbitration in relation to transparency. To achieve this, I examine ISDS provisions in several different international investment agreements (IIAs) and evaluate the ways in which transparency is incorporated into investment law. Moreover, I compare the provisions on transparency and confidentiality in institutional arbitration rules with the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules. I have formed several conclusions, including that the ISDS provisions may contain methods other than international arbitration and that ISDS does not constitute a system. Furthermore, the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules do change – theoretically, at least – investor-state arbitration to become more transparent. Whether the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules will make investor-state arbitration fully transparent depends on the actions of the contracting state parties when negotiating new IIAs and whether they choose to incorporate the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules in the IIAs already concluded.